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values, racial traditions, and moral customs. This model provides an
alternative to the dominant colorblind prosecutorial canon of race
neutrality in cases of racially motivated violence.
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[T]hey take me to the bathroom and they threw me to the ground.
One start beating me up and then one of them, there was two of them,
one picked up something on the floor—I don’t know what it is, but it
looked like a plunger to me—and just, you know, push it on my ass
and then it come out with shit and blood and then after that he put it
1
in my mouth and he said that’s my shit.
No, I don’t think there’s a race factor here.

2

INTRODUCTION
This Article begins the fourth year of an interdisciplinary enterprise venturing to study the role of race, lawyers, and ethics in the
American criminal justice system. Sparked by the new jurisprudence of
race,3 the project employs a series of case studies to investigate the
rhetoric of race, or “race-talk,” in the prosecution and defense of acts
of racially motivated violence.4 The purpose of this long-term project is
to understand the meaning and the place of racial identity, racialized
narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and ethics.

1. Nightline: The Blue Wall—Part II: Police Brutality and Police Silence (ABC television
broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCNew File (interview by Ted
Koppel with Abner Louima).
2. Nat Hentoff, Jim Crow in Blue: Eighty Per Cent of Civilian Complaints Are from
Nonwhites, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 23, 1997, at 20 (quoting Howard Safir, New York City Police Commissioner, speaking about the Louima case on Jesse Jackson’s CNN program Both
Sides (broadcast Sept. 21, 1997)).
3. Roughly framed, the jurisprudence of race includes the movements of critical race theory,
Asian-Pacific theory, and LatCrit theory. For helpful surveys of critical race theory, see CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); see also Anthony V. Alfieri,
Black and White, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1654, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 561, 568 (1997) (reviewing
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra, and CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra, and offering a sympathetic critique of critical
race theory literature, while highlighting its failure to integrate a racial analysis of legal theory and
practice).
For a mapping of Asian-Pacific theory, see Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1241 (1993).
For overviews of LatCrit theory, see Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1087, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1997); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and
Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).
4. For a broad illustration of the case study approach to legal theory and practice, see LAW
STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996).
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The opening work of this series contemplated the rhetoric of race
in cases of black-on-white racially motivated violence, interrogating the
defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on charges of beating
Reginald Denny and others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles
riots.5 The next work pondered racial rhetoric in cases of white-onblack racially incited violence, extrapolating from the criminal and civil
trials of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael
Donald.6 The third work parsed the rhetorical meaning of race in the
“double trial” (i.e., successive state criminal and federal civil rights
prosecutions) of Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price growing out of four
days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn,
New York, in 1991.7
The work at hand examines the federal prosecution of five white
New York City police officers on charges of assaulting a young male
Haitian immigrant by the name of Abner Louima.8 The assault erupted
in the aftermath of a street fight between club patrons and police officers outside a popular local nightclub in the Flatbush section of
Brooklyn on August 9, 1997.9 The Louima assault began in a police patrol car and continued at a Brooklyn police precinct. Newspaper accounts reported that the four arresting officers, enraged by Louima’s
alleged battle with the police and his protests of innocence, twice
stopped their patrol cars “to beat him with their fists.”10 At the 70th
Precinct station house, two officers continued their beating of Louima
in the men’s bathroom, one shoving the wooden handle of a mop or
toilet plunger into Louima’s rectum, and afterward into his mouth,
while shouting racial slurs.11 Thereupon, one or both of the officers carried Louima to a holding cell and locked him inside, calling for an am-

5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); see
also Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996) (responding to
Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996) (critiquing Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra)).
6. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Alfieri, Lynching Ethics].
7. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998).
8. The federal prosecution included additional charges of assaulting a second young male
Haitian immigrant named Patrick Antoine.
9. Police officers charged Louima with disorderly conduct, obstructing governmental administration, and resisting arrest. See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers
Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1.
10. Id.
11. See id.
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bulance only when other inmates complained of his profuse bleeding.12
Louima suffered extensive internal injuries from the assault, including
a perforated colon and a ruptured bladder.13
Within ten days, the Kings County district attorney in Brooklyn,
Charles J. Hynes, indicted four of the arresting officers and ordered
their arrest on state charges of assault and sexual abuse.14 Shortly
thereafter, Louima’s legal defense team filed a $155 million federal
civil damages action against the officers complaining of police brutality.15 In late August 1997, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York, Zachary W. Carter, commenced a federal investigation of
the incident.16 Described as “one of the most prominent black law enforcement officials in the country,”17 Carter convened a federal grand
jury in October 1997 to conduct a criminal inquiry.18 On February 26,
1998, Carter filed a superseding federal indictment, notwithstanding
the risk of a double jeopardy bar,19 charging five of the police officers
from the 70th Precinct with criminal civil rights violations in the arrest
and assault of Louima.20 At the same time, Carter referred the Louima
incident to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
for a broader investigation into “whether the Police Department created an atmosphere conducive to brutality by systematically failing to
supervise or discipline its officers adequately.”21
Seizing upon the federal criminal prosecution and civil rights investigation in the Louima case, this Article presents a race-conscious,
community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion applicable to
cases of racially motivated violence. This presentation may both baffle
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See John Kifner, Nurse Claims Staff Cover-Up on Louima, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at
B1; Helen Peterson, Louima Case Still Far from Trial, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 23, 1998, at
28.
15. See Joseph P. Fried, In Louima Case, Dream Team and Perhaps Overkill, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1997, at 37.
16. See John Kifner, Louima Says His Attackers Did Not Yell ‘Giuliani Time’, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1998, at B3.
17. David Firestone, Louima Case Tugs at a Prosecutor’s Mask, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at
B2.
18. See Lawrence Goodman, Fed Grand Jury Hears Louima, DAILY NEWS (New York), Feb.
5, 1998, at 46.
19. See Firestone, supra note 17, at B2; Joseph P. Fried, Prosecutors Building a Case for a
Federal Louima Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4.
20. See Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Takes Over the Louima Case; 5th Suspect, a Sergeant, Is Indicted,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at A1.
21. Id.
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and offend. For some, the Louima prosecution and investigation
merely demonstrate the exercise of federal prosecutorial convention,
nothing more. For others, the reconfiguration of that conventional exercise into a scheme of racial reformation smacks of woolly-headed
theorizing and makeshift minority-preference policymaking. This Article will demonstrate that a race-conscious approach to prosecutorial
decisionmaking, evidenced by Zachary Carter’s conduct as a federal
prosecutor in the Louima case, both honors and reinvigorates the ethics rules and standards promulgated by the American Bar Association
and the Justice Department.
Carter’s actions, however, acquire significance for reasons apart
from mere rule compliance. His actions stand out in contemporary law
and society because they reaffirm the foundational sociolegal norms
animating formal ethics rules. The founding norms at stake here are racial dignity and equality. Both apply to individuals and communities of
color in the face of group- or state-sanctioned racial violence. Racial
dignity refers to the physical and psychological integrity of the self, experienced as an interior sense of worth and as an exterior acknowledgement of respect. Dignity confers self-esteem and the esteem of
others outside the self. Equality here relates to the outward egalitarian
treatment of the self by others, whether private individuals and groups,
or public agents and institutions of the state. That treatment preserves
equal racial standing and safeguards against discriminatory conduct in
private and public transactions.
Carter’s normative exercise of prosecutorial discretion to safeguard the dignitary and equality interests of communities of color provides the springboard for a wider inquiry into the role of racial identity,
racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering,
and ethics. Careful inquiry dictates scrutiny of the source of that discretion, its evolution, its scope, and its regulation. To come to fruition,
that inquiry requires a mapping of the reformist deployment of prosecutorial discretion and a rough measuring of its impact on interracial
community. This initial mapping marks the starting point of a longer
meditation on the conjunction between the prosecution of violence and
the construction of community in American law and society.
The Article is divided into six Parts. Part I describes the arrest and
assault of Abner Louima, the police investigation of the assault, the
state criminal prosecution, the superseding federal criminal civil rights
prosecution, and the subsequently commenced federal civil damages
action. The description draws upon press reports, as well as the federal
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and state pleadings of the prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil
rights attorneys.
Part II examines the Louima assault as a form of sexualized racial
violence recurrent in American legal and social history. Culling from
both historical and jurisprudential materials, the examination compares the Louima incident to the public and private sexualized racial
violence against blacks during the antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction periods. Moreover, it inspects the racial/sexual content of the
assault under critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and queer
studies.
Part III surveys the current regulation of the prosecution function
in cases of racially motivated violence under rules prescribed by the
American Bar Association and the Justice Department. The survey
canvasses the ethical guidelines and the underlying racial canons that
direct the prosecution of cases involving civil rights complaints, violence against women, and hate crimes.
Part IV proposes a model of race-conscious, community-oriented
prosecutorial discretion as an alternative to the dominant colorblind
prosecutorial canon of race neutrality. This Part unpacks that alternative model into several components, emphasizing the centrality of racial identity and racialized narrative to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. It also compares the proposed model to race-conscious
practices in other civil and criminal law fields.
Part V considers whether federal prosecutors ought to carry special race-conscious, community-oriented duties to investigate and to
prosecute cases of racially motivated violence. This Part endeavors to
show that the foundation for such duties may obtain from a battery of
norms moored in constitutional precepts, citizenship ideals, professionalism values, racial traditions, and moral customs.
Part VI enumerates four objections to the proposed raceconscious, community-based approach to prosecutorial discretion.
The first objection protests the constitutional incompatibility of raceconscious standards of prosecutorial discretion under equal protection principles. The second objection assails the same standards as
unworkable, pointing to the mutability of racial identity and the incoherence of racialized narratives. The third objection cites to the
expressive or representational harm inflicted on white-majority
communities when governmental prosecutorial action favors minority
interests. The fourth objection complains of the injury to voluntary,
cross-racial communities when prosecutorial intervention, intended
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to remedy the effects of interracial violence, displaces alternative
community-based, citizen-led modes of racial reconciliation.
With luck, the process of engaging, and perhaps overcoming, the
above objections will serve to advance the larger project underway in
this series and, thereby, compel the bar and bench to reconsider the
ethical responsibilities of prosecutors in racially and politically charged
cases like the assault of Abner Louima and, more recently, the New
York City police killing of Amadou Diallo.22 Progress may also be
achieved if the same process persuades interdisciplinary scholars of
American law and society to appreciate the importance of integrating
the new jurisprudence of race into their analysis of both high- and lowprofile race cases. In these complementary ways, the Article may contribute to a greater understanding of the place of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and
ethics.
I.

THE LOUIMA CASE

A. The Louima Arrest, Assault, and Investigation
The assault of Abner Louima is cast against a sociolegal backdrop
of sharpening community-police conflict fueled by the growing tensions
over immigration, race, and crime in Brooklyn. Complicated by the increasing diversity of racial and ethnic groups and subgroups, 23 and continuing public and private displays of racism,24 the relationship between
22. On February 4, 1999, four white New York City police officers, members of a Bronx
Street Crimes Unit, shot and killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old unarmed West African immigrant street peddler, who had no criminal record, in a “ferocious barrage” of 41 bullets in the
vestibule of his apartment building in the Bronx borough of New York City. Robert D. McFadden, U.S. Examining Killing of Man in Police Volley, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1. Diallo
suffered 19 gunshot wounds. See id. Like the Louima incident, the Diallo killing sparked community protests, state and federal investigations, and a national outcry. See Elisabeth Bumiller,
Giuliani Cancels Political Trip amid Protest over Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A1;
Kevin Flynn, Police Killing Draws National Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at B5. The killing
also inflamed racial tensions across New York City. See Dan Barry, A Reopened Divide, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A1; Amy Waldman, Killing Heightens the Unease Felt by Africans in
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at A1.
23. See CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 3-24
(1993) (surveying historical and experiential diversity of minority groups).
24. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY
AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (1996) (asserting that
the New York City Police Department is plagued by “problem[s] of police brutality and excessive force” and concluding that “the large majority of the victims of police abuses are racial
minorities, particularly African-Americans and people of Latin American or Asian descent”);
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crime and communities of color has been the subject of renewed academic and popular interest.25 This interest exploded with the perverse
violence inflicted on Abner Louima. In 1997, Louima was a married
thirty-year-old Haitian legal immigrant and father of two children, who
had lived in Brooklyn for six years.26 Although he had studied electrical
engineering in Haiti, Louima worked as a night security guard at the
Spring Creek water-and-sewage treatment plant in the Flatlands section of Brooklyn.27 On August 9, 1997, he visited Club Rendez-Vous, a
popular nightclub in the East Flatbush section of Brooklyn.28 Late in
the evening, a small crowd gathered outside the nightclub after Louima
and several other men interceded in a fight between two women.29
Called to intervene, police officers from the nearby 70th Precinct immediately clashed with patrons and bystanders outside the nightclub.30
The patrol officers included Justin Volpe, Charles Schwarz, Thomas
Bruder, and Thomas Wiese, among others.31 In the ensuing scuffle, one
or more patrons or bystanders struck Volpe.32 Enraged, Volpe, a
twenty-five-year-old “short and muscular” second-generation officer,33
“took off his gun belt and squared off in a fistfight against one of the
men on the street corner.”34 Evidently, this man “knocked Mr. Volpe
see also Dan Berry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police Are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at A1 (reporting the results of a recent New York Times poll
showing that “fewer than a quarter of all New Yorkers believe that the police treat blacks and
whites evenly, with blacks in particular viewing the police with fear and distrust”).
25. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 3-167 (1997) (exploring
the intersection of race relations and criminal law).
26. See Associated Press, The New New Yorkers/Focus on a Community’s Fear/Louima
Case May Galvanize City’s Haitians, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 27, 1997, at A39 [hereinafter
Associated Press, Louima Case May Galvanize City’s Haitians]; Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality: The Overview; Officer Charged in Man’s Torture at Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1997, at A1 [hereinafter Barry, Charges of Brutality]; Kocieniewski, supra note 9, at B1.
27. See Barry, Charges of Brutality, supra note 26, at A1; David M. Herszenhorn, Family
Describes a Readily Friendly Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B3.
28. See Garry Pierre-Pierre, Charges of Brutality: The Club; Solidarity at Arrest Site a
Week Later, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 41.
29. See Barry, Charges of Brutality, supra note 26, at A1; Mike McAlary, The Frightful
Whisperings from a Coney Island Hospital Bed, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 13, 1997, at 2
[hereinafter McAlary, Frightful Whisperings].
30. See Charges of Brutality: The Roster; Shake-Up at a Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1997, at B8; Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 21,
1997, at A32 [hereinafter Chronology of Events].
31. See Police Torture: Sequence of Events, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 20, 1997, at 4.
32. See William K. Rashbaum, Mistaken ID Theory Is Eyed in Sex Abuse, DAILY NEWS
(New York), Aug. 21, 1997, at 5.
33. Barry, Charges of Brutality, supra note 26, at A1.
34. John Kifner, Investigators Looking at New Allegations in Brutality Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Kifner, Investigators Looking].
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flat in front of his fellow officers.”35 Believing that he had been sucker
punched, Volpe, for reasons that remain unclear, identified Louima as
his assailant, declaring, “[h]e hit me,” and “[t]his collar is mine.”36 Bent
on reprisal, Volpe arrested Louima on charges of disorderly conduct,
obstructing government administration, and resisting arrest.37 That
same night, Volpe also arrested Patrick Antoine, a second Haitian immigrant, on similar charges38 after Antoine happened upon Volpe and
other officers several blocks away during the subsequent beating of
Louima.39 Antoine reported that Volpe and the other officers struck
and kicked him both on the street and in a squad car en route to the
station house.40
Upon arrest, Schwarz and Wiese handcuffed Louima and placed
him in the backseat of their patrol car. 41 During the drive to the station
house, Volpe, Schwarz, Bruder, and Wiese twice stopped their respective patrol cars and beat Louima with their fists, nightsticks, and handheld police radios.42 At the 70th Precinct station house, Schwarz and
Wiese strip searched Louima.43 Soon after, Schwarz moved the handcuffed Louima from a holding cell to the bathroom where he and
Volpe renewed beating Louima.44 At some point during the assault,
Volpe produced a two- to three-foot-long stick45—a plunger or mop
handle.46 While Schwarz pinned Louima to the floor of the bathroom,
Volpe sodomized Louima with the stick and then jammed the handle
into Louima’s mouth, breaking several of his teeth.47 During the assault, Volpe and Schwarz hurled racial invectives at Louima.48 After35. Id.
36. Dan Barry, 2d Police Officer Charged in Attack on Arrested Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter Barry, 2d Police Officer Charged]; Lawrence Goodman, Sgt. Said
Louima Punched Cop, DAILY NEWS (New York), Apr. 5, 1998, at 22; Mike McAlary, ‘It Wasn’t
Me,’ Cop Maintains, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 22, 1997, at 2.
37. See Editorial, A Sickening Spectacle, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 14, 1997, at 42.
38. See Kifner, Investigators Looking, supra note 34, at B1.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Police Torture: Sequence of Events, supra note 31, at 4.
42. See Chronology of Events, supra note 30, at A32.
43. See id.; Corky Siemaszko et al., Cop Nabbed in Torture Case—Sgts. Grilled About Assault, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 14, 1997, at 3.
44. See Chronology of Events, supra note 30, at A32; Michael Cooper, 2d Officer Gives
Account of Sex Assault of Haitian, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at B3.
45. See Chronology of Events, supra note 30, at A32.
46. See Cooper, 2d Officer Gives Account of Sex Assault of Haitian, supra note 44, at B3.
47. See Chronology of Events, supra note 30, at A32.
48. New York City’s Daily News reported that Louima recounted that one of the officers
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wards, Volpe and perhaps another officer brought the still-handcuffed
Louima to a station house holding cell and “dumped” him inside the
cell.49
At dawn, apparently alarmed by the complaints of adjoining prisoners regarding Louima’s condition, precinct officers summoned an
ambulance.50 Although arriving within twenty-four minutes, the ambulance inexplicably failed to depart for well over an hour. 51 Finally, more
than three hours after the arrest and attack inside the 70th Precinct, a
police-escorted ambulance transported Louima to the Coney Island
Hospital emergency room.52 At the hospital, officers transporting
Louima “indicated that he had been injured during homosexual activity.”53 In fact, the officers portrayed Louima “as a victim of ‘abnormal
homosexual activity,’” informing emergency room doctors and nurses
that he had been “found injured with his pants down lying in the street
in front of Club Rendez-Vous.”54 Furthermore, they described the
nightclub as a “homosexual club.”55 But a Coney Island Hospital emergency room nurse, suspecting Louima’s injuries were not the result of
gay sex, notified Louima’s family and the Police Department’s Internal
Affairs Bureau of the likelihood of a sexual assault and battery.56 Subsequently transferred to Brooklyn Hospital Center, Louima remained
hospitalized for two months.57

declared, “You niggers have to learn to respect police officers,” while another allegedly commanded, “If you yell or make any noise, I will kill you.” Siemaszko et al., supra note 43.
Louima added that one of the officers, when plunging the stick in his mouth, proclaimed,
“That’s your shit, nigger.” McAlary, Frightful Whisperings, supra note 29, at 2.
49. Kifner, Investigators Looking, supra note 34, at B1.
50. See Chronology of Events, supra note 30, at A32.
51. Relying on investigative statements, the press reported that “the [70th] precinct called
for an ambulance at 6:01 a.m., more than an hour after Louima was booked on charges of assault and resisting arrest, and that the ambulance arrived about 6:25. But the ambulance did not
leave the station house until 7:58, more than 90 minutes after arriving.” Peter Noel, Were Cops
Trying to Kill Abner Louima? Making the Case for Attempted Murder, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept.
23, 1997, at 47 [hereinafter Noel, Were Cops Trying].
52. See Kifner, Nurse Claims Staff Cover-Up on Louima, supra note 14, at B1. Press reports noted that “the Patrol Guide, the police regulation book, gives specific instructions that
injured prisoners be taken to Kings County Hospital, which has a prison ward.” Id.
53. Id.
54. Peter Noel, Ex-Louima Lawyers Lien on ‘Dream Team’, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 22,
1998, at 53 [hereinafter Noel, Ex-Louima Lawyers].
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See Metropolitan Desk, Louima, on Critical List, Has Blood Clot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 1997, at B4.
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Within weeks of the assault, the Police Department disciplined fifteen officers in the 70th Precinct, including the precinct’s commanding
officer, a captain, and two sergeants.58 Disciplinary measures ranged
from transfer to suspension and placement on modified assignment.59
During the same period, New York City Mayor Giuliani created a
citywide task force to investigate accusations of police brutality arising
out of the Louima case.60 In September 1997, the Police Department
filed misconduct charges against Volpe, Wiese, Bruder, and Schwarz.61
Highlighting Volpe’s role in the assault, the charges alleged that he
“‘did wrongfully insert a foreign object into the rectum of a prisoner,
Abner Louima, causing injury.’”62 Volpe’s attorney, Marvyn Kornberg,
assailed the charges as “nothing more than political grandstanding and
showboating” springing out of “political expediency.”63 Later, in October 1998, the Police Department filed additional administrative and
disciplinary charges against the 70th Precinct officers, alleging that they
had lied to FBI agents investigating the assault of Abner Louima.64 To
avoid jeopardizing the ongoing state and federal investigations, the Police Department elected to hold its disciplinary trials in abeyance until
the conclusion of the criminal prosecutions.65
B. Community Protest
The Louima assault caused a political and popular uproar over
police brutality within the Haitian community, as well as in other

58. See Leonard Levitt, A Detective Transferred/Still Unclear How Louima Tip Was Mishandled, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 28, 1997, at A33.
59. See id.
60. See Daniel Wise, “Katie Who?” a Quiet Powerhouse, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 1997, at 1.
Upon release of the task force recommendations, however, Giuliani stated that some of the
proposals were “‘unrealistic and make very little sense,’” and moreover “sarcastically derided
the task force’s work.” Jodi Wilgoren, Police Critics Renew Call for Change in Attitudes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at B4.
61. See Graham Rayman, Cochran to Join Louima’s Legal Team, NEWSDAY (New York),
Sept. 4, 1997, at A29.
62. Michael Cooper, Brutality Case Seen Bringing Modified Duty for Officer, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1997, at B3. Cooper reported that the charges also accuse Volpe of “placing the object”
into Louima’s mouth, “striking” Louima, “failing to report a beating in custody to police
authorities and uttering an ethnic slur.” Id.
63. Rayman, supra note 61, at A29.
64. See Helen Peterson & John Marzulli, More Cops Hit on Lying in Louima Case, DAILY
NEWS (New York), Oct. 30, 1998, at 24.
65. See Michael Cooper, Accused Officers Barred from Duty, but with Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1997, at B1.
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communities of color in New York City.66 Already roiling from the
story of “The Rockaway Five”—a report that a white New York City
police officer had repeatedly kidnapped and sodomized African and
West Indian immigrant jitney drivers without arousing police suspicion,
departmental investigation, or state prosecution67—Haitian political
and social groups began mobilizing a grassroots movement intended to
focus attention on the community-wide issue of police brutality and racial violence.68 Citing an ongoing escalation in such race-motivated
state brutality, local movement organizers compared “the white police
of Brooklyn’s 70th Precinct” to “just another version of Duvalier’s
paramilitary thugs, the TonTon Macoutes.”69 Invocations of this kind
sparked the organization of a protest rally attended by thousands outside the 70th Precinct on August 16, 1997, 70 and a march in the Flatbush
section of Brooklyn on August 23, 1997.71 Speakers at the march expressed the collective view that people of color suffered unfairly as
“targets of special abuse by police.”72 Targeting of this sort, they complained to reporters, “created the understanding among some police
officers” that those officers had the extralegal freedom “to take unnecessarily brutal measures against ‘powerless minorities,’ the city’s most
vulnerable group.”73
Emboldened by the protest, a coalition of twelve political and social groups, led by the Haitian-American Alliance and Haitian Enforcement Against Racism,74 organized a march and a “rally against

66. See Associated Press, Louima Case May Galvanize City’s Haitians, supra note 26, at
A39 (speculating that “the Louima case could be a watershed for the metropolitan area’s
400,000 to 1 million Haitians, who wield little political power and formed few alliances with
other ethnic groups”).
67. See Wilbert A. Tatum, Giuliani’s Police Force: A Twice-Told Tale of Police Rape,
Sodomy and Bestiality in the NYPD, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at 12.
68. See James Ridgeway & Jean Jean-Pierre, Louima Time: An Alienated and Angered
Haitian American Community Fights Back, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 2, 1997, at 53.
69. Id. Specifically, it was reported that many Haitians feel that “the white police of
Brooklyn’s 70th Precinct are just another version of Duvalier’s paramilitary thugs, the TonTon
Macoutes: appearing out of nowhere, setting up nighttime checkpoints, swooping down in unmarked cars to harass teenagers, and yelling insults at Haitian women on the street.” Id.
70. See Robin Leary, Haitians Outraged over New York Cop Attack, PHILADELPHIA
TRIB., Aug. 19, 1997, at 1A.
71. See Charles Baillou, Angry Haitians March at the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, N.Y.
AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Richard Goldstein & Jean Jean-Pierre, Day of Outrage, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 9,
1997, at 44.
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police brutality”75 on August 29, 1997. Reports show that in addition to
“Haitians and Haitian Americans, scores of people from other parts of
the Caribbean along with Hispanics, whites, and African Americans
took part in the march.”76 The Haitian-American Alliance and Haitian
Enforcement Against Racism both publicly urged that the Louima assault “not be portrayed as an isolated incident,” and recommended
that “no self-proclaimed community leader enter into negotiations”
with local, state, or federal officials over the issue of police brutality
“on behalf of the community.”77 Further, they called “for the trial and
conviction of all police personnel involved” in the assault, and “for the
termination of all police officers in the 70th precinct” tied to the assault.78 Additionally, the protest groups demanded the “formation of a
community task force to investigate complaints against the police” and
to better supervise racially motivated police behavior.79
Concretely, the August 29 mobilization galvanized more than
“7,000 angry but peaceful protesters” into marching upon City Hall to
deliver the “twin messages” of “zero tolerance for police brutality and
justice” for Louima.80 Denominated as a “Day of Outrage Against Police Brutality and Harassment,”81 the march “shut down the Brooklyn
Bridge and part of Broadway”82 resulting in the arrest of 107 protesters
on charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing governmental administration.83 Throughout the march, protesters waved toilet plungers
and carried signs condemning state-condoned police brutality.84 One
protester declared: “‘We’re here to send a message to America that

75. Patrick Markey, Louima Too Weak to Watch Rally Live, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug.
31, 1997, at A8.
76. Goldstein & Jean-Pierre, supra note 74, at 44.
77. See Taibah L. Chikwendu, Louima Case—‘Cover Up?’, BALT. AFRO-AMERICAN, Aug.
30, 1997, at A1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Timothy Williams, Marchers Denounce Attack on Suspect, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30,
1997, at 12 [hereinafter Williams, Marchers Denounce]. Crowd estimates “varied widely from
organizers (20,000) to the police department (7,000).” Goldstein & Jean-Pierre, supra note 74,
at 44. The crowd included dozens of demonstrators from the Washington, D.C., chapter of the National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians. See Timothy Williams, Protesters Target
Police, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 30, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter Williams, Protesters].
81. Williams, Protesters, supra note 80, at A1.
82. Williams, Marchers Denounce, supra note 80, at 12.
83. See Four Protesters in Louima March Remain in Custody, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug.
30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2546626.
84. See Williams, Marchers Denounce, supra note 80, at 12.
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people of color will not sit idly by when someone is brutalized.’”85 Another lamented: “‘The problem is the police think they are the only
ones that count—no one else.’”86 The rally itself “began with protesters
singing ‘We Shall Overcome,’ followed by a prayer in Creole.”87 Continuing for “more than three hours,” it featured “tales of police brutality” and derisive references to the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, the union representing rank-and-file police officers in New York
City, in the form of protesters chanting “‘PBA, KKK, different name,
same thing . . . .’”88 By linking up historical forms of public and private
racial oppression, the rally inflamed the political consciousness of a
Haitian community historically unaccustomed to domestic political activism.
In an expansion of the nascent activism stirring the Brooklyn Haitian community, protest groups organized a third march and rally on
September 5, 1997, which was attended by thousands of marchers who
traveled across the Brooklyn Bridge into Manhattan for a rally at City
Hall.89 Protests also extended to Washington, D.C., where on September 12, 1997, “several hundred protesters marched to the Justice Department” rallying to demand “a federal investigation into police brutality.”90 Demonstrators, many “carrying photographs of loved ones
and family members” allegedly “killed or beaten while in police custody,” decried police brutality as “an everyday fact of life in many
black and minority communities.”91

85. Id. (quoting DeLacy Davis, an East Orange, N.J., police officer demonstrating at the
August 29 protest on City Hall).
86. Id. (quoting Jean Bernard, a demonstrator who marched on City Hall in protest over
the attack on Louima).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Vinette K. Pryce, A Week of Outrage, Pain and Celebration: Thousands March
Across B’klyn Bridge in Search of Justice, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Sept. 10, 1997, at 1. Reports document that many marched to the chant of “Bad cops, bad cops, what you gonna do?
What you gonna do when they come for you?” Id.
90. Ronald Powers, Protesters Seek Federal Probe of Police Brutality Allegations,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4883331.
91. Id. That same day, Congressman John Conyers, the ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, convened a hearing on “African Americans and Police Misconduct” at the Annual Congressional Black Caucus Weekend in Washington, D.C., that garnered wide participation
by advocacy groups. See Ron Daniels, CBC Hearing on Police Misconduct Planned, OAKLAND
POST, Aug. 27, 1997, at 4.
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C. State Criminal Prosecution
The state criminal prosecution in the Louima case commenced in
August 1997 with the indictment of Volpe, Schwarz, Bruder, and Wiese
on counts of assault, sexual abuse, harassment, and illegal weapons
possession.92 Promising “swift prosecution” of the officers,93 Charles
Hynes, the Kings County district attorney, assigned a team of seven
prosecutors to the case.94 On September 8, 1997, the state prosecution
team filed a superseding indictment charging Volpe, Schwarz, Bruder,
and Wiese with first degree assault, criminal possession of a weapon
(i.e., police nightsticks and radios), and aggravated harassment based
on “‘race, color, religion or national origin.’”95 Additionally, the superseding indictment charged Volpe and Schwarz with aggravated sexual
abuse in the first degree and assault in the first degree.96
The state prosecution team’s indictment and arraignment of the
four officers from the 70th Precinct left two fundamental matters unresolved. The first pertained to the facts of the assault. Shrouded by a
precinct-wide “Blue Wall” of silence, both the nature of the assault and
the extent of the ensuing conspiracy remained unsettled. Even the basis
of Louima’s arrest, albeit outwardly pretextual,97 rested unconfirmed.
The second matter concerned the U.S. Attorney’s impending intervention in the criminal and civil rights prosecution of the Louima
case. The decision to relinquish control of a case to the federal government, rather than maintain a dual state/federal prosecution,98 de-

92. See Tom Hays, Four New York Policemen Indicted on Bias Charge in Torture Case,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4880547; Patricia Hurtado, Cops Go
Down: B’klyn Officers Face Assault Rap in Torture Case, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 19,
1997, at A5 [hereinafter Hurtado, Cops Go Down].
93. See Editorial, It Can Happen to You, INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER, Sept. 6, 1997, at A2.
94. The prosecution team included assistant district attorneys Dennis R. Hawkins, Edward
Boyar, Lance P. Ogiste, Neal F. Doherty, Jay Shapiro, Charles Guria, and Jeffrey Ferguson. See
Attorneys Crowd Police Assault Case, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1997, at 1.
95. Richard Pyle, Bias Charge Added Against Two Officers in Brutality Case, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 9, 1997, at 6.
96. See Superseding Indictment, New York v. Bruder, No. 8925/97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8,
1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Patricia Hurtado, A Second Witness? Cop’s Lawyer:
Prosecutors Holding Back, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 9, 1997, at A33 [hereinafter Hurtado,
A Second Witness?]; Today’s News Update, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 1997, at 1.
97. See generally Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond
the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693,
694-715 (1998) (explicating the constitutional jurisprudence ratifying pretextual arrests).
98. Dual state-federal prosecution statistics reflect a federal policy of selectivity borne out
of inadequate institutional resources. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 695 (1997) (commenting that “federal prosecu-
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pends on several considerations. Institutional competence, public resources, and organizational relationships rank as noteworthy among
the many considerations germane to state prosecutorial deference.
State prosecutors, for example, amass experience in state criminal law
and procedure, but their expertise seldom encompasses federal criminal and civil rights law. Moreover, in high-profile cases, state prosecutors suffer from comparatively scarce institutional resources relative to
federal prosecutors.99 Resource scarcity yields a particularly deleterious
effect on the investigative function of a prosecutorial office. Last, state
prosecutors rely on organizational relationships with police officers and
other bureaucratic agents of the state criminal justice system for the
purposes of fact investigation, early disposition through plea bargaining, and trial adjudication.100 These relationships may spawn conflicts of
interest. Some media commentators in fact suggested that Hynes suffered “a clear conflict of interest in prosecuting police officers from a
local precinct.”101
tors lack the resources necessary to review the evidence in all cases eligible for duplicative federal prosecution”) (footnote omitted); Renée M. Landers, Prosecutorial Limits on Overlapping
Federal and State Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 69 (1996) (noting
that congressional expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction is unaccompanied by a corresponding increase in the resources of federal law enforcement agencies or the federal courts on
a scale necessary to alter the disproportionate state-federal ratio of criminal law enforcement);
Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 72, 77 (1996) (mentioning that dual
prosecutions appear to be “quite rare”).
99. The comparative advantage federal prosecutors enjoy in resource allocation varies by
both case and context. See Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 976-77 (1995). Gorelick and Litman explain:
The federal government’s advantages may vary according to the case, but they typically include inter-jurisdictional investigative capabilities, victim- and witnessassistance programs, expertise in traditionally federal areas of law such as organized
crime or environmental crime, and favorable procedures, such as preventive detention. The availability of stiffer penalties in the federal system is also a potential comparative advantage, particularly in multiple-offender cases, where the prospect of a
long sentence may induce a low-level figure to plead guilty and cooperate in the
prosecution of the most culpable offenders.
Id.
For a broad discussion of the federalization of criminal law and duplicative state-federal
law enforcement, see Symposium, The Federal Role in Criminal Law, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 9 (1996); Symposium, Federalism and the Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA.
L. REV. 757 (1996); Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and State
Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1995); Symposium, Rethinking Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
100. See Benjamin Weiser, Some Favor Federal Role in Police Shooting Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at B6 (quoting Michael Hardy, attorney for the family of a previous victim of deadly police violence, in observing that “[o]ne thing about the Federal Government is
that they don’t have the conflict of interest with the New York City police”).
101. Noel, Were Cops Trying, supra note 51, at 47.
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More base considerations, such as political advancement or selfaggrandizement, may also influence a state’s decision to cede the field
of prosecution to the federal government. Reports indicated, for example, that Hynes seriously considered running for governor in 1998
and appeared “determined to increase his influence among police
groups, to whom he owes his political existence.”102 Indeed, some saw
his decision to pursue the Louima prosecution against the arresting officers, particularly the upgrading of charges, as a “political blunder.”103
The defense strategy in the state prosecution of the Louima assault presented both conventional and racialized opportunities for
criminal legal advocacy. Shaped by defense attorneys Marvyn Kornberg, Stuart London, Joseph Tacopina, and Stephen Worth,104 those
opportunities provided the defense teams not only the standard maneuvers of attacking victim credibility,105 quashing the indictment,
changing venue,106 severing the trials,107 negotiating for immunity, and
plea bargaining, but also the more novel stratagem of fashioning a racialized defense. American legal history offers multiple versions of the
racialized defense, including black rage,108 white rage,109 racial self-

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Kornberg, London, Tacopina, and Worth served, respectively, as the attorneys for
Volpe, Bruder, Wiese, and Schwarz. See Joseph P. Fried, Judge Sets Tentative Trial Date for
Five Policemen in Louima Brutality Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter Fried,
Judge Sets Tentative Trial Date]; Hurtado, A Second Witness?, supra note 96. Each of the four
defendants moved for severance and a separate trial on the ground of “antagonistic” joint defense theories. See Fried, Judge Sets Tentative Trial Date, supra.
105. In March 1998, Louima’s legal team issued a public retraction of its prior claim that
arresting officers had taunted Louima during the assault with the mocking refrain, “It’s Giuliani time.” Firestone, supra note 17, at B2.
106. The New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division denied Volpe’s motion for a
change of venue, originally brought on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publicity. See Joseph
P. Fried, Judge Rejects Plea for Change of Venue in the Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1997, at B4. Wiese also filed the same motion. See Helen Peterson, Cop’s Lawyer Seeks Change
of Trial Site, DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 18, 1997, at 61.
107. See Joseph P. Fried, Officer Accused in Louima Case Seeks Separate Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1997, at B3.
108. On the evolution of the black rage defense, see P AUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE
CONFRONTS THE LAW 1-202 (1997); BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 8-30
(1995) (discussing the legacy of contemporary black rage). See also WILLIAM H. GRIER &
PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 200-13 (1992) (exploring the roots of black rage); John C. Brittain, Book Review, 54 NAT’L LAWYER’S GUILD PRAC. 178, 178 (reviewing PAUL HARRIS,
BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW (1997)) (explaining that “the black rage defense presents
certain criminal conduct in the context of social, political and economic experiences of African
Americans”).
109. On the origins of the white rage defense, see Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 6, at
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defense,110 and the variegated cultural defense.111 This race-specific defensive stratagem lays the foundation for the color-coded tactics of victim denigration, diminished capacity, and jury nullification.112 The latter
tactic may induce jurors to discount evidentiary inferences, disobey
statutory commands, and dispense legal excuses on behalf of racially
sympathetic defendants.113
At the arraignment before Brooklyn State Supreme Court Judge
Priscilla Hall on the original indictment, Volpe’s defense team
sketched the early contours of a racialized strategy in pleading not
guilty.114 Echoing postbellum race-specific victim denigration tactics,
Kornberg declared: “‘What happened to [Louima] was not a result of
anything that took place in the station house.’”115 More sharply, in responding to the accusation of racially motivated assault, Kornberg dismissed the charge as “‘ridiculous,’” pointing to Volpe’s black girlfriend
as proof that he could not be a racist.116 Coming to the defense of
1074-84. See also HARRIS, supra note 108, at 214-40 (explicating white rage).
110. On racialized claims of self-defense, see JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 3-5, 21, 50-58
(1997) (analyzing the use and justification of race-based self-defense claims); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988)
(discussing the Goetz trial); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402-23 (1996) (discussing “the Blackas-criminal” stereotype).
111. On the context of cultural defenses, see Farah Sultana Brelvi, “News of the Weird”:
Specious Normativity and the Problem of the Cultural Defense, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
657, 679-83 (1997).
112. See Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 6, at 1074-84.
113. See generally Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room
and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 449-54 (1998) (discussing jury nullification
as a Sixth Amendment right). Compare Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (arguing that “the race of a
black defendant is sometimes a legally and morally appropriate factor for jurors to consider in
reaching a verdict of not guilty”), with Lawrence W. Crispo et al., 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1
(1997) (assailing the right of jury nullification for inducing anarchy, unchecked power, and arbitrary results) and Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 111 (1996) (rejecting the proposed right of
jury nullification as “foolish and dangerous”). See also Symposium, The Role of Race-Based
Jury Nullification in American Criminal Justice, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 907, 907-35 (1997)
(debating the merits of jury nullification).
114. See Dan Barry, 2 More Officers Held in Attack on Haitian Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1997, at A1 [hereinafter Barry, 2 More Officers Held].
115. Christopher John Farley, A Beating in Brooklyn; New York’s Finest Come Under Fire
After a Haitian Man Is Sexually Assaulted, Allegedly by Cops, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 38
(quoting Marvyn Kornberg).
116. Associated Press, Officers Say Immigrant Hurt Before Arrest; The Haitian Immigrant’s
Attorney Says He Smells an Attempted Cover-Up, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Aug. 23,
1997, at A4 (quoting Marvyn Kornberg).

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1176

10/14/99 9:35 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1157

Schwarz by contrast, Worth “said prosecutors had arrested the ‘wrong
man.’”117 Further, he ridiculed the state prosecution for having “‘rushed
to judgment,’” remarking that the prosecution of the case showed signs
of “‘disarray.’”118 In the subsequent arraignment before Judge Hall on
the superseding indictment, Volpe and Schwarz, together with Bruder
and Wiese, pleaded not guilty.119 This initial posture of innocence extended to the federal criminal prosecution as well.
D. Federal Criminal Civil Rights Prosecution
Zachary W. Carter, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York,120 commenced the federal criminal prosecution in August
1997, asserting several violations of civil rights laws.121 Federal civil
rights laws, Carter explained:
grant[] to the attorney general of the United States the authority to
seek civil injunctive relief where it can be established that a pattern
or practice exists of failing to take effective action against officers
who are guilty of civil rights violations, or otherwise permitting an
atmosphere of tolerance for police abuse of authority in violation of
122
the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.

Citing issues of police brutality, racism, and conspiracy, observers
quickly ranked the prosecution of the Louima assault among “the most
explosive cases to be handled by the office of the U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District.”123 To his credit, Carter recognized the significance of
the Louima prosecution. At a news conference on August 18, 1997,
Carter described the assault as “an act of almost incomprehensible de-

117. Hurtado, Cops Go Down, supra note 92, at A5 (quoting Stephen Worth).
118. Id. (quoting Stephen Worth).
119. See Hurtado, A Second Witness?, supra note 96, at A33; Today’s News Update, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 9, 1997, at 1.
120. Carter served as the U.S. Attorney from 1993 to 1999. See Joseph P. Fried, As Federal
Prosecutor Quits, Aspiring Successors Rush In, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at B2; Mark Hamblett, Carter’s Chief Assistant Recommended for Top Post, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1999, at 1.
121. See Blaine Harden, Civil Rights Investigation Targets N.Y. Police; Two More Brooklyn
Officers Arrested in Brutal Assault on Haitian Immigrant Under Arrest, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
1997, at A1 [hereinafter Harden, Civil Rights Investigation]; Hurtado, Cops Go Down, supra
note 92, at A5.
122. All Things Considered: Justice Department to Investigate in Louima Case (National
Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 18, 1997).
123. David W. Chen, Prosecutor in Louima Case Will Resign, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at
B3.
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pravity.”124 Addressing the implied police expectation that the act
would go not only undetected but unpunished, he remarked: “The
boldness of the action suggests a mind-set that they could possibly get
away with this extraordinarily heinous offense.”125
Carter defined his investigation of the Louima assault as a determined effort “to hold accountable any officer who failed to protect, fails to report or fails to cooperate with Federal investigators
when a criminal civil rights violation is committed in their presence
or on their watch.”126 The investigation, according to Carter, reflected
a “commitment to bring to justice any police officer who abuses the
public trust through the use of unjustified punitive force.”127 More
profoundly, Carter proclaimed: “We must seize this opportunity once
and for all to strike a death blow against police abuse of force.”128
In addition, Carter stated that the Louima trial “will unmask the
ugly side of police brutality when cops themselves testify and break the
Blue Wall of Silence.”129 Describing the “extent of cooperation by police, the FBI and prosecutors,” he asserted that the trial “will show a
positive side—how officers broke the invisible wall of silence at the
precinct level.”130
Carter quickly assembled an experienced federal prosecution
team.131 By early June, however, local newspapers reported that the

124. Barry, 2 More Officers Held, supra note 114, at A1.
125. Id.
126. David Kocieniewski, Precinct Silence on Louima Is Still Under Investigation, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at B5.
127. Morning Edition: Indictments in Louima Case (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb.
27, 1998).
128. Barry, 2 More Officers Held, supra note 114, at A1. Articulating the same reasoning,
on February 1, 1999, Carter announced that the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, acting with the approval of the Nassau County district attorney Denis Dillon
and the aid of the FBI, “will investigate allegations of the misuse of force by guards at the Nassau County Jail, including the death, ruled a homicide, of a prisoner while in custody last
month.” Today’s News, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 2, 1999, at 1. Carter stated: “We came jointly to the conclusion that a federal investigation had the greatest potential for fulfilling our mutual interest in
the vindication of the rights of prisoners to be free from the unlawful use of force.” Id.
129. Maria Alvarez, Louima Trial to Break Blue Wall, N.Y. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at 11.
130. Id.
131. The original federal prosecution team consisted of assistant U.S. Attorneys Catherine E.
Palmer, Kenneth Thompson, Loretta Lynch, and Margaret Giordano. See Chen, supra note 123,
at B3. In June 1998, Palmer, the lead attorney, resigned without prior warning to return to private
law firm practice. See id. Press reports indicated that “Carter was stunned by Palmer’s resignation.” Peter Noel, U.S Attorney Resigns from Louima Case, VILLAGE VOICE, June 16, 1998, at
23 [hereinafter Noel, U.S. Attorney Resigns]. Subsequently, Alan Vinegard joined Lynch and
Thompson on the federal prosecution team. See Mark Hamblett, Louima Jury in Place, Brutal-
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FBI “was investigating whether Federal prosecutors and agents and
New York police detectives tried to coerce testimony from witnesses
and to strengthen the testimony of other potential grand jury witnesses.”132 In particular, reports indicated that “federal agents are questioning colleagues, NYPD internal affairs brass, and NYPD detectives
to see if prosecutors pressured them to change reports of interviews
with potential grand jury witnesses or put words in the mouths of people they questioned.”133 Although no charges of witness or evidence
tampering resulted from this probe, the Justice Department reassigned
two lead FBI agents, who had “clash[ed] with federal prosecutors.”134
1. Prosecution Strategy. The federal prosecution team filed both
an original and a superseding indictment in the Louima case. The
original indictment, filed on February 26, 1998, named five
defendants from the 70th Precinct: officers Volpe, Bruder, Schwarz,
and Wiese, along with Michael Bellomo, a police sergeant.135 The
indictment set forth twelve counts of assault, conspiracy, and civil
rights deprivations material to the arrest and beating of Louima.136
ity Trial Is Set to Open This Week, N.Y. L.J., May 3, 1999, at 1, 8.
132. Chen, supra note 123, at B3. Nonetheless, the federal investigation continued. Increasingly thwarted by the silence of precinct officers closing ranks out of loyalty to the indicted officers,
federal prosecutors accused undercover police officers Rolando Aleman and Francisco Rosario of
“lying to the FBI to protect colleagues charged with torturing” Louima. Peter Noel, One in the
Chamber, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 12, 1999, at 52 [hereinafter Noel, One in the Chamber]. Aleman and Rosario had been in the 70th Precinct when police officers Justin Volpe and Charles
Schwarz allegedly dragged Louima into the station house. See id. Nevertheless, Aleman and
Rosario maintained that another officer, not Justin Volpe, placed Louima in the prison cell. See
Joseph P. Fried, 2 Officers Accused of Lying to Investigators in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1998, at B6. On December 16, 1998, federal prosecutors arrested Aleman and Rosario, charging them with “attempting to cover up the attack.” Id. Federal prosecutors said that Aleman and
Rosario were motivated not so much to protect Volpe himself as to avoid being labeled as rats. See
id. The arrests increased the number of police officers charged in the case to seven.
133. Noel, U.S. Attorney Resigns, supra note 131, at 23.
134. Alvarez, supra note 129, at 11.
135. Indictment, United States v. Volpe, No. 98-196, at 1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
136. The indictment also encompassed the assault on Patrick Antoine. The counts of the
indictment pertinent to Antoine charged Volpe and Bellomo with “knowingly and willfully” conspiring to “injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate” Antoine in the “free exercise and enjoyment”
of his right to be free from “arrest and seizure without probable cause” and “the intentional use of
unreasonable force.” Id. at 6-8. The alleged conspiracy involved several overt acts: first, the physical assault of Antoine by Volpe, see id. at 6-7; second, the false arrest of Antoine by Volpe “in order to conceal an unlawful assault”, id.; third, the false report “in writing” by Bellomo that Antoine “attempted to interfere” with the arrest of Louima by striking Volpe, id.; and fourth,
Bellomo’s and Bruder’s statements to the FBI that they witnessed Antoine “run and charge” into
Volpe, which constituted acts of “knowingly and willfully” making “materially false” statements,
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The inclusion of the civil rights count enabled Carter “to broaden the
prosecution to include officers who tried to cover up the beating, as
well as those who were in a position to stop [it] and did not.”137
The counts of the indictment charged Volpe, Bruder, Schwarz,
and Wiese with “knowingly and willfully” conspiring to “injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate . . . Louima in the free exercise and enjoyment” of his “right to be free from the intentional use of unreasonable force . . . .”138 The alleged conspiracy involved multiple acts of
physical and sexual assault “resulting in bodily injury” during police
custody.139 The first set of acts occurred on August 9, 1997 in a police
car when officers physically assaulted Louima “while his hands were
handcuffed behind his back.”140 A second set of acts occurred on the
same date but in a 70th Precinct bathroom where Volpe and Schwarz
assaulted Louima “by kicking him and by shoving a wooden stick into
his rectum and mouth while his hands were handcuffed behind his
back.”141 A third set of acts also occurred in the 70th Precinct where
Volpe “knowingly and intentionally” intimidated and threatened
Louima “with the intent to hinder, delay and prevent the communication” of information “to a [federal] law enforcement officer” relating to
the deprivation of Louima’s civil rights.142 A fourth set of acts occurred
thereafter in the 70th Precinct when Bellomo “knowingly and intentionally” assisted Volpe, Bruder, Schwarz, and Wiese in an attempt “to
hinder and prevent their apprehension, trial and punishment,”143 and
“knowingly and willfully” made “a materially false, fictitious and
fraudulent statement” to the FBI that he had authorized the arrest of
Louima on August 9, 1997.144
The superseding indictment, filed November 1, 1998, reiterated
the first twelve counts of the original indictment, and also contained a
thirteenth count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, an asserted violation
of section 1503 of the federal code governing crimes and criminal procedure.145 Section 1503 comprises part of the general provision defining
id. at 10.
137. Dan Barry, Officers’ Silence Still Thwarting Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997,
at A1.
138. Indictment, United States v. Volpe, supra note 135, at 2.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 5-6.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Volpe, No. 98-196 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
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and regulating federal obstruction of justice offenses, in particular acts
influencing or injuring an officer in the performance of her official duties.146 Specifically, count thirteen alleged that Bruder and Wiese provided “false and misleading information to federal and local law enforcement authorities in an effort to exculpate” Schwarz on the charge
of sexually assaulting Louima.147
Count thirteen further alleged several overt acts, occurring between August 11, 1997 and August 14, 1997, in aid of the conspiracy.
The acts in controversy pertained to confidential statements made between and among Bruder, Schwarz, and Wiese, and investigative
statements made by individual officers to federal and local law enforcement authorities representing the Brooklyn district attorney’s office, the New York City Police Department, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of New York, and the FBI. The first act concerned statements made in common between August 11, 1997 and
August 14, 1997 by the officers to each other concerning the sexual assault.148 The second act referred to false and misleading statements, also
concerning the Louima sexual assault, made on or about August 17,
1997 by Wiese to representatives of the Brooklyn district attorney’s office and the New York City Police Department.149 The third act addressed false and misleading statements once again regarding the
Louima assault made on or about November 8, 1997 by Bruder to representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI.150
The trial of the superseding indictment commenced on May 4,
1999 before U.S. District Judge Eugene Nickerson.151 Delayed initially “by a switch from state to Federal prosecution” and then “by a
dispute over legal representation for two of the officers,”152 the case
presented a crucial test for the federal enforcement of criminal civil

1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
146. 18 U.S.C. §1503 (1994).
147. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Volpe, supra note 145, at 11-12.
148. See id. at 12.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 12-13. In early March 1999, the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced its decision to drop the charge of misrepresentation against Bruder, citing insufficient evidence to
prove that Bruder willfully made the false statements. See Joseph P. Fried, Judge Refuses Separate Trials For 5 Officers in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at B3 [hereinafter Fried,
Judge Refuses Separate Trials].
151. See Joseph P. Fried, Graphic Details as Trial Opens in Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 1999, at A1.
152. Fried, Judge Sets Tentative Trial Date, supra note 104, at B3.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

10/14/99 9:35 AM

PROSECUTING RACE

1181

rights laws against state actors under a race-conscious, communityoriented model of prosecutorial discretion.153
2. Defense Strategy. The early defense strategy in the federal
prosecution of the Louima assault relied upon pretrial maneuvers involving trial severance and venue change. Borrowed from the state
defense teams, the attorneys again included Kornberg, London, Tacopina,154 and Worth,155 as well as John Patten for Bellomo.156 To set
the groundwork for severance, each of the defense attorneys publicly
announced that he would seek a separate trial for his client from the
other defendants because of conflicting defense strategies.157 Noting
this conflict, Kornberg remarked: “We have antagonistic defenses.”158
Like the others, Kornberg submitted a motion for change of venue,
claiming that “the intensive pre-trial publicity would prevent Officer
Volpe from obtaining a fair trial in Brooklyn.”159 Judge Nickerson
rejected the motions for trial severance,160 along with the requests to
move the trial outside New York City.161

153. Subsequent trial events suggest an ambiguous outcome to that prosecutorial test. On
May 25, 1999, in a surprising development, Volpe pleaded guilty to six of seven counts of the
superseding indictment, including violating the civil rights of Antoine and Louima. See David
Barstow, The Louima Case: The Overview; Officer, Seeking Some Mercy, Admits to Louima’s
Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A1; Helen Peterson, Volpe Admits Louima Attack:
Pleads Guilty to Torture, Says 2nd Cop Was Present, DAILY NEWS (New York), May 26, 1999,
at 2. Under federal sentencing guidelines, Volpe faces a maximum prison sentence of life without parole and a minimum sentence of 30 years, in addition to a fine of up to $1.5 million. See
Barstow, supra; Peterson, supra.
Further, on June 8, 1999, after two-and-a-half days of deliberations, the jury convicted
Schwarz on two counts of violating Louima’s civil rights through sexual assault, but acquitted
Schwarz, Wiese, and Bruder of additional civil rights charges. See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine
Harden, The Louima Case: The Overview; Officer Is Guilty in Torture of Louima, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 1999, at A1; Mark Hamblett, Louima Jury Convicts One Officer; Acquits 3, N.Y. L.J.,
June 9, 1999, at 1. The jury also acquitted Bellomo of attempting “to cover up the beating” of
Antoine and Louima. Fried & Harden, supra. Carter immediately announced that his office
would seek to try Schwarz, Wiese, and Bruder on charges of conspiring to obstruct justice. See
Joseph P. Fried, The Louima Case: The Aftermath; For Acquitted Officers, Their Department
and the City, Legal Action Is Far From Over, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at B8.
154. See id.
155. See Patricia Hurtado, Cops’ Defense Lawyers OKd, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 17,
1998, at A40.
156. See Fried, Judge Refuses Separate Trials, supra note 150, at B3.
157. See Fried, Judge Sets Tentative Trial Date, supra note 104, at B3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Fried, Judge Refuses Separate Trials, supra note 150, at B3.
161. See Joseph P. Fried, Judge in Louima Case Refuses to Move Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
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3. Justice Department Civil Rights Division Referral. In
February 1998, Carter referred evidence of misconduct gathered
from his investigation of the 70th Precinct in the Louima case, and
from related cases of police brutality, to the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department.162 In 1994, Congress authorized the Justice
Department to prosecute “pattern or practice” cases of police abuse
and brutality against entire precincts and departments.163 Spurred by
the aftermath of the Rodney King trials, this grant of authority
expressly empowers federal intervention in circumstances of state
and local police misconduct.164 Absent such legislation, the Justice
Department lacks constitutional and statutory authority to
commence civil actions for injunctive relief “even where police abuse
is alleged to be widespread.”165
Enacted under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, the legislative grant enlarges the enforcement powers of
the Justice Department to investigate department-wide police misconduct and to collect police misconduct statistics.166 Section 14141 of
the Act establishes a cause of action for unlawful conduct given evidence of “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.”167 Section 14141 also provides for a civil action by the Attorney General when she finds “reasonable cause to believe” that unlawful conduct has occurred.168 The action may seek to “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or
practice.”169 Similar legislation authorizes injunctive relief in cases of
1999, at B4.
162. See Harden, Civil Rights Investigation, supra note 121, at A1; Hurtado, Cops Go
Down, supra note 92, at A5.
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994).
164. See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 465, 500 (1992) (discussing the genesis of the legislation); Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly Force: Policy and Practice, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER
J. 79, 100-02 (1993) (same).
165. Rudovsky, supra note 164, at 499; see also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644
F.2d 187, 189-206 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing a civil action brought by the Justice Department
against the city of Philadelphia and members of the Philadelphia Police Department because of
a lack of constitutional and statutory authorization for the lawsuit).
166. See Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 62, 63 (“Effective use of this legislation could disarm Justice critics who contend internal politics and limited
resources have kept federal prosecutors from making police brutality cases a priority.”).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994).
168. Id. § 14141(b).
169. Id.
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employment170 and housing171 discrimination.
In addition, section 14142 of the Act commands the Attorney
General to “acquire data about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.”172 It also directs the Attorney General to “publish an annual summary of the data acquired.”173 Pursuant to this
mandate, the federal government is preparing a victimization study
and compiling a database on the use of force by police.174 Since 1994,
acting pursuant to local “pattern or practice” findings, the Justice Department has commenced department-wide federal investigations of
police abuse and brutality in New Orleans, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.175 In 1997, the Department entered a consent decree with the
city of Pittsburgh.176 More recently, newspapers reported that the Department will propose a consent decree establishing federal monitoring and oversight of the New York City Police Department.177

170. See id. § 2000e-6(a); see also Sofia C. Hubscher, Making It Worth Plaintiffs’ While: Extra Incentive Awards to Named Plaintiffs in Class Action Employment Discrimination Lawsuits,
23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463, 465-66 (1992) (discussing the use of government and private class action litigation to address “pattern or practice” cases of employment discrimination).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994); see also Johnnie Scott Jr., Comment, Eradicating Discriminatory Housing Practices: The Role of Damages and the Discriminatory Effects of Evidentiary Standards in Fair Housing Litigation, 22 N.M. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (1992) (noting the
availability of injunctive relief in Justice Department “pattern or practice” fair housing litigation).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 14142(a) (1994).
173. Id. § 14142(c).
174. See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing
for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 710 n.130 (1996). Absent this information, political
and legal reforms aimed at addressing police abuse may be frustrated. See Rudovsky, supra
note 164, at 500.
175. See Editorial, Police Brutality/Police Abuse, WASH. INFORMER, Aug. 27, 1997, at 12;
see also Harden, Civil Rights Investigation, supra note 121, at A5. Harden reported: “In Pittsburgh, the city escaped a major court battle with the Justice Department by agreeing to reforms
in police training and discipline. Philadelphia has also worked out an arrangement with the
federal government; the investigation in New Orleans is still underway.” Id.
176. See Jon Schmitz, A Blueprint for Change, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1997, at A14
(summarizing the terms of the consent decree).
177. See Jack Newfield, Feds May Soon Appoint Monitor for NYPD—U.S. Attorney Weighs
Action as Result of Louima Probe, N.Y. POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at 6; Robert Polner & Patricia
Hurtado, Rudy Says No/Vows Opposition to Federal Monitoring of NYPD, NEWSDAY (New
York), Mar. 24, 1999, at A7; Benjamin Weiser, Federal Inquiry Criticizes Police in New York
City, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A1.
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E. Federal Civil Damages Action
In August 1998, a legal team representing Louima filed a federal
civil damages action in federal district court in the Eastern District of
New York.178 The complaint named the city of New York, the New
York City Police Department, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association
(i.e., the police union), and the five officers.179 The complaint asserted
that the alleged acts of police brutality violate federal civil rights laws,
federal constitutional provisions, and state tort laws.180 For relief, the
complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages.181 Slated to be
held before U.S. District Judge Sterling Johnson, the Louima civil suit
remains postponed until after the completion of the federal criminal
civil rights trial.182
The arrest and assault of Louima, the explosion of urban protest
marches and rallies in politically dormant immigrant communities, the
state criminal indictments of police officers, the superseding federal
criminal civil rights prosecution, and the pending federal civil damages
actions all provide the sociolegal framework for the examination of the
history of private and public sexualized racial violence in the United
178. See Complaint, Louima v. City of New York, No. 98-5083 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 6,
1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The legal team consists of Johnnie Cochran, Barry
Scheck, and Peter Neufield, acting in association with Sanford Rubenstein. See Joseph P. Fried,
Louima Said to Add Police Union to Those Named in Civil Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at
B8. A legal team representing Patrick Antoine filed a similar civil suit against New York City
and the New York City Police Department. See Patricia Hurtado, Trial Date for Officers in
Abner Louima Case, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 19, 1998, at A16 [hereinafter Hurtado, Trial
Date for Officers].
The practice of employing private civil damage actions to enhance public civil rights enforcement and prompt remedial reform is well established. Indeed, private enforcement actions
arise commonly in the fields of employment and housing discrimination. See Michael Selmi,
Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998) (concluding that private attorneys have been more successful
than government attorneys at obtaining monetary relief for plaintiffs in such cases). The practice continues even in a perceived climate of growing congressional and judicial hostility. See
Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and
Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 245-46 (1997) (observing that numerous plaintiffs’ attorneys
perceive the federal judiciary and Congress “as having become much more hostile to civil
rights litigation”). The similar deployment of civil actions for the sake of tort law enforcement
seems equally well settled. Private actions of this sort provide a means to consolidate tort law
and social justice. See Leslie Bender, Tort Law’s Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 249, 259 (1998) (proposing the development of new causes of action aimed at
promoting social equality and protecting human dignity).
179. See Complaint, Louima v. City of New York, supra note 178.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Hurtado, Trial Date for Officers, supra note 178, at A16.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

10/14/99 9:35 AM

PROSECUTING RACE

1185

States. Juxtaposing this history against the facts of the Louima case
may explicate the logic of Carter’s decision to pursue a superseding
federal prosecution and to refer the case to the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department for a department-wide investigation of raceinfected police brutality.
II. SEXUALIZED RACIAL VIOLENCE
This Part examines the Louima assault as a form of sexualized racial violence common to American legal and social history. Winnowing
from historical and jurisprudential materials, the examination compares the Louima incident to the public and private sexualized racial
violence against blacks during the antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction periods. Moreover, it inspects the racial/sexual content of the
assault under critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and queer
studies.
The starting point of this examination is definitional. Broadly defined, sexualized racial violence intertwines sexuality, race, and violence in a single act. The discrete elements that comprise this historical
act suffer from interpretive contest and instability. Furthermore, the
elements often surrender to dichotomy. Sexuality, for example, accedes
to a masculine/feminine duality while shifting the dominant/subordinate alignments of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.183
Likewise, race collapses into a binary white/black opposition in spite of
the vagaries of color.184 Even violence erupts into a material/interpretive tension185 noteworthy in the conflict over the regulation of hate speech.186 Rather than boil down the categories of sexual-

183. See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (examining the distortions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation
as social and legal constructs); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the
Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161
(1996) (exploring the historical origins for the Euro-American sex/gender system).
184. See generally Juan F. Perea, The Black-White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127 (1997) (discussing the black/white paradigm of race and its omission of nonblack people of color).
185. For an investigation of violence, both in the form of material impoverishment and institutional oppression, and in the form of interpretive subordination and discipline, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,
100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2118-30 (1991).
186. On the harm of racist hate speech, see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
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ity, race, and violence into essentialist ideals of universal appeal, the instant examination focuses on the contextual facts of the Louima assault
and assigns only a contingent meaning to the elements of sexuality,
race, and violence found in the assault. For the limited purposes of this
examination, it suffices to observe that the evidence of racial animus,
forced sodomy, and repeated physical assault compels the conclusion
of sexualized racial violence.
Beyond this definitional threshold, the next task is to determine to
what extent sexualized racial violence represents a form of racism.
Consider two basic types of racism borrowed from the work of David
Lyons. The first involves “naked hostility, inhuman cruelty, and brutal
violence toward persons who are identified in racial terms.”187 This
overt style of racism accompanies “harsh measures to secure status in a
racial hierarchy.”188 The Louima assault conforms to this overt brand of
racism by reinforcing the dominant status of white police officers and
the subordinate status of black immigrants. A second, more covert type
entails “tolerance of racist conduct or of racist social arrangements.”189
Such tolerance, Lyons explains, comes from the “failure to attach
proper importance to known facts which primarily concern people with
whom one does not identify in racial terms.”190 In the Louima case, the
precinct-wide conspiracy to conceal evidence of the assault reflects this
manner of tolerance.
A. Sexualized Racial Violence: Black History
Sexualized racial violence emerges throughout American history. Coinciding with the racial struggle for dignity and equality,191 it
finds expression in both private and public acts, materializing at the

89-110 (1993) (arguing for an independent tort action as a means of redressing the harm of racial insults); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,
in MATSUDA ET AL., supra, at 17, 51 (attempting to strike a balance between protecting freedom of speech and prosecuting racist hate speech); cf. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS:
INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 63 (1995) (“If racial and ethnic slurs
are to be made illegal by independent legal standards, the focus should be on face-to-face encounters, targeted vilification aimed at members of a specific audience.”) (footnote omitted).
187. David Lyons, Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience, 27 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 31, 48 (1998).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The postbellum racial struggle for dignity and equality spans the fields of law, labor,
and politics. See JULIE SAVILLE, THE WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION: FROM SLAVE TO WAGE
LABORER IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1860-1870, at 102-95 (1994).
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intersection of race and sex.192 Historically, race and sex represent
sites of discipline and punishment. Linked to the state and the juridical violence of public and private law enforcement, these sites reinforce racial and sexual status hierarchies. Consistent with hierarchical
reinforcement, the act of violence signals a “corrective normalization”193 of racial/sexual relations dependent on the treatment of black
men and women as governable and punishable imperial subjects.
The infliction of racial violence against black men and women
through extralegal forms of behavior occurred under specific historical conditions shaped by changing racist ideologies.194 Inflamed by racial aggression, white cultural supremacy, and complex political and
socioeconomic forces, that behavior spanned a variety of ritualized
acts of mob violence, including lynching.195 Tailored to preserve and
reaffirm white supremacy, these acts of violence provided the tools to
perpetuate white dominance, notwithstanding a diversity in race relations and a “fluidity in racial contact.”196 This historical diversity and
regional fluidity produced both “continuity and change” in southern
race relations and the “varied and contradictory character” of whiteon-black violence.197
Racial violence finds roots deeply embedded in the history of
slavery in the antebellum South.198 The exigencies of that institution
fostered violence marked by “a powerful extralegal undercurrent.”199
192. See Marilyn Maness Mehaffy, Advertising Race/Raceing Advertising: The Feminine
Consumer(-Nation), 1876-1900, 23 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 131, 132-33 (1997)
(documenting post–Reconstruction era stereotypes of race and gender in the commercial binary construction of black and white female consumers).
193. Patricia Gray, Deconstructing the Delinquent as a Subject of Class and Cultural Power,
24 J. L. & SOC’Y 526, 545 (1997).
194. The instant historical analysis borrows from the works of W. Fitzhugh Brundage and
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH:
GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 13 (1993); JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT
AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
LYNCHING 129-57 (1993); see also AMERICAN VIOLENCE 107-09 (Richard Maxwell Brown ed.,
1970) (chronicling an 1899 “lynch-burning”).
195. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 9-16.
196. Id. at 13.
197. Id. at 15.
198. See generally DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 114-60 (1979); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 141-91 (1956); see also HALL, supra note 194, at 13036 (describing the origins, development, and consequences of southern extralegal racial violence).
199. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 4 (“By the close of the antebellum era, the tradition of mob violence had evolved into an integral part of southern culture.”).
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Imposed by force of act or threat, violence “became a customary way
to compel deference and acceptable behavior in slaves.”200 Indeed,
during the Civil War, southern slaveholders executed large numbers
of slaves “in gruesome spectacles aimed at intimidating the slave
community into submission and loyalty.”201 The Reconstruction era
later “unleashed an unprecedented wave of extralegal violence,” not
only perpetuating but also “expanding antebellum customs of communal violence in southern culture.”202 Found throughout the decadelong era of Radical Reconstruction, “the lynching of black men and
the rape of black women became the most spectacular emblems of a
counterrevolution that convulsed almost every former Confederate
state.”203 The convulsions induced by postbellum “economic and racial tensions” in fact transformed lynching into an “increasingly sadistic” practice of “emasculation, torture, and burning.”204
Captured in the commonplace lawlessness of mob lynching,205
southern culture during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries forged an ethic of communal violence intended “to elaborate
and impose a racial hierarchy upon people of color throughout the
globe.”206 Lynching in particular “served as a dramatization of hierarchical power relationships based both on gender and on race.”207 Derivative of the tradition of public vengeance and reminiscent of “fron-

200. Id.; see also HALL, supra note 194, at 131 (observing that antebellum “lynch law
helped suppress both white dissidence and slave rebellion”).
201. BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 6; see also HALL, supra note 194, at 131 (arguing that
“lynching took on new significance as a systematic weapon of terror against blacks” during the
Civil War).
202. BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 6.
203. HALL, supra note 194, at 131 (“By the time federal troops withdrew in 1877, signaling
the North’s abandonment of the ex-slaves, private, collective violence in support of white supremacy was embedded in southern political culture.”); see also BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 172-78 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1972) (excerpting testimony
from witnesses before a House of Representatives–appointed committee to investigate the
Memphis race riot of 1865).
204. HALL, supra note 194, at 133.
205. Brundage writes:
Few images of the travail of white-black relations in the South are more compelling
than those of baying hounds and armed whites chasing black men across moonlit
swamps, of frenzied mobs torturing and mutilating their victims, and of festive
crowds gathering to gawk at the dangling or charred bodies of lynching victims.
BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 1.
206. Id. at 2. Hall adds: “In some cases lynching was a specific mode of political repression.
In others, it represented a diffuse reassertion of white solidarity.” H ALL, supra note 194, at 132.
207. HALL, supra note 194, at 156.
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tier vigilante justice,”208 lynching and other communal forms of violence served as extralegal methods of punishment in defense of slavery and “community morals and virtues.”209 Evolving through the late
nineteenth century, lynching became a “semiofficial institution of the
South,” and part of “an elaborate code of behavior that required
white men to respond to challenges to their honor by acting outside
of the law.”210 Rising to enforce the code of “lynch law,” white men
might cast themselves as “the protectors of women, dispensers of justice, and guardians of communal values.”211 Under that cultural code
of honor, “skin color determined status.”212 The status hierarchy of
color presented “pervasive racist stereotypes of blacks as degraded
and dishonorable.”213 Stereotypes of white supremacy and black inferiority in turn “gave whites license to punish blacks ruthlessly without
suffering attacks of conscience.”214 In this way, postbellum modes of
punishment worked to discipline and to enforce “conformity to prevailing racial roles” in southern society.215 Indeed, the “communal ritual” of punishment “reinforced white unity, intimidated blacks as a
group, and ensured allegiance to caste roles on the part of both
whites and blacks.”216
The assault on Louima presents a form of public and private
violence against people of color designed to discipline political and
socioeconomic hierarchy, and to punish disobedience and rebellion.
Like postbellum blacks, Louima belongs to a subordinate black immigrant group “associated with whites’ repressed fears and desires.”217 Moreover, like postbellum blacks, his perceived act of insolence in denying police accusations of wrongdoing constitutes “the
transgression of a whole range of nebulous taboos,” traditionally de-

208. BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 1.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id. at 3-5.
211. HALL, supra note 194, at 151.
212. BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 5.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 6; see also HALL, supra note 194, at 136 (describing lynching as “an instrument of
social discipline intended to impress not only the immediate victim but all who saw or heard
about the event”).
216. HALL, supra note 194, at 139; see also id. at 144 (“Lynching persisted as much to reaffirm solidarity and demonstrate power to whites themselves as to punish and intimidate
blacks.”).
217. BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 9.
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serving of “a verbal rebuke, a beating, or a lynching.”218 His resulting
brutalization by the police not only affirms the unity of white supremacy within portions of the New York City Police Department,
but also instills individual and collective fear within communities of
color.219
Consider the specific sexualized racial violence against Louima.
Here, the violence bolsters the discipline of racial hierarchy through
the act of forced sodomy. Perversely, that act reinforces the insistent
masculinity and heterosexuality of the arresting officers. At the same
time, it buttresses the armament of violence wielded by state agents
(the white Volpe) against alien victims (the black/immigrant
Louima). The fact that hierarchy survives this intermixing and reconstitution of categories of state violence suggests that “whiteness and
masculinity have no single ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ standing beyond
the cultures they organize.”220 This outcome indicates that the disciplinary function of masculinity may “designate a whole range of cultural forms and practices.”221
Michael Uebel, a postmodern scholar of English literature, offers a dialectical constructionist view of racial and gender subjectivities. Uebel contends that “the active production of new meanings,”
seen here in the Louima case, forges “alliances such as the masculine
with patriarchy or blackness with absolute otherness.”222 But these alliances remain short-lived, betraying a kind of “ideological flexibil-

218. HALL, supra note 194, at 141.
219. Hall adds:
In addition to its ritualistic affirmation of white unity, lynching functioned as a mode
of repression because it was arbitrary and exemplary, aimed not at one individual but
at blacks as a group. White supremacy was maintained by psychological repression as
well as by economic and political control, and lynching worked effectively to create a
general milieu of fear that discouraged individual or organized black assertiveness.
Id. at 141.
220. Michael Uebel, Men in Color: Introducing Race and the Subject of Masculinities, in
RACE AND THE SUBJECT OF MASCULINITIES 2-3 (Harry Stecopoulos & Michael Uebel eds.,
1997).
221. Id. at 4. Uebel explains that the category of “masculinities is not meant to be a stable
consolidation of historically specific subject-positions or a collective term for masculinity, but a
polysemy denying the autonomy and stability of male identity as it claims to specify and interpret masculine self-perception, performativity, and existence.” Id. For Uebel, the use of the
term “masculinities” as an analytic tool “brings into play the recognition of the profound multiplicity and conditional status of the historical experience of male subjects.” Id. Accordingly,
masculinity becomes for him “not the defining quality of men, of their fantasies and real experiences of self and other, but one coordinate of their identity that exists in a constant dialectical
relation with other coordinates.” Id.
222. Id. at 4-5.
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ity.”223 For Uebel, the coupling and uncoupling of such alliances “reveal the contingency and fragility of their encodings and the possibilities for altering their own terms of reference.”224 Under this analysis,
the Louima sexual assault receives its racial and gender “inscription
within a systematics of performance.”225 Out of this systematic cultural and social framework, Uebel argues, “racial and gender identities emerge as dynamic performances scripted, rehearsed, and
(re)enacted in the presence of one another.”226
Like any dynamic cultural performance featuring the “interplay
of racial masculine particularities and generalities,”227 the Louima assault reenacts a historically scripted and rehearsed racial hierarchy in
the public/private space of a patrol car and a precinct bathroom. The
reenactment inscribes dominant/subordinate identities of race and
power, effectively marginalizing Louima and privileging his assailants. The presence of others—both arresting and precinct officers—
during the acts of physical and sexual assault underscores Louima’s
colonized status. In this way, Uebel notes, “definitions of black masculine identity crucially hinge on investments in white male identity.”228 Volpe’s act of forced sodomy defines black masculine identity
in terms of white dominance even while the act itself crosses and uncrosses “masculine sex/gender interests and class/ethnic identities.”229
To Uebel, such performative acts entangle interests and identities in
the impulse toward dominance.230 Driven by that impulse, Volpe and
the other arresting officers deploy physical and sexual forms of violence to underwrite their own masculinities, thereby asserting the supremacy of their own “racialized masculinities” of whiteness.
The cultural production of racial/sexual dominance through acts
of sexualized racial violence also affects women. Historically enacted
within a culture of white supremacy and patriarchy,231 sexualized ra-

223. Id. at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 3-4.
231. See Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths and Preserving Power: Deconstructing
White Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the Rape Corroboration Rule in the Interest of Black Liberation, 40 HOWARD L.J. 459, 474-79 (1997) (discussing the merger of white supremacy, patriarchy, and phallocentrism to “racially construct rape”).

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1192

10/14/99 9:35 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1157

cial violence inflicts individual harm232 and collective injury.233 The
harm may come as a result of battering or interracial rape and may
be visited not only upon black women, but upon other women of
color as well.234 When these communities confront the sexualized racial violence of rape, Lisa Crooms points out that “[p]atriarchy and
its phallocentrism merge with white supremacy to racially construct
rape.”235 The consequent racial construction of sexualized violence
realigns the “hierarchy of crime, injury, and credibility.”236 Under this
postbellum realignment, according to Crooms, “both Black and white
women were presumptively incredible when charging white men with
rape which, in most cases, merely reinforced the broad scope of the
sexual access rights held by white men.”237 In this way, Mary Joe Frug
remarks, “legal rules—like other cultural mechanisms—encode the
female body with meanings.”238
B. Theories of Violence: Race, Gender, and Sexuality
Theories of sexualized racial violence shape prosecutorial decisionmaking at both the federal and state levels. Although increasingly
232. These individual harms include physical and mental trauma. See Jacqueline St. Joan,
Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic Abuse, 20 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 272-73 (1997) (discussing post-traumatic stress disorder).
233. Crooms observes that “the law not only granted white women limited protection
against real and contrived sexual violence, but also recognized a larger, collective injury suffered by white men because of the intrusion on their sexual rights of both access and exclusion.” Crooms, supra note 231, at 474.
234. See Yvette Flores-Ortiz, La Mujer y La Violencia: A Culturally Based Model for the
Understanding and Treatment of Domestic Violence in Chicano/Latina Communities, in
CHICANO CRITICAL ISSUES 169, 176 (Norma Alarcón et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that “Latinas
who are battered are typically blamed for their own situation by the batterer, the larger cultural
system and the social institutions that exist to help her”); Jacqueline Dowd Hall, “The Mind
That Burns in Each Body”: Women, Rape, and Racial Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE 328,
329-40 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (discussing how sexual violence against black women was
a comparable form of domination to lynching in the post-Reconstruction South).
235. Crooms, supra note 231, at 474; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence and
Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 366 (1993) (arguing that “whites have used
both the act and the law of rape as an instrument of white supremacy”); Jennifer Wriggins,
Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 117-23 (1983) (discussing the systematic neglect in American law of the rape of black women).
236. Crooms, supra note 231, at 475.
237. Id.
238. MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 129 (1992). Frug comments that
“[l]egal discourse then explains and rationalizes these [gendered] meanings by an appeal to the
‘natural’ differences between the sexes.” Id. For Frug, it is the “formal norm of legal neutrality” that “conceals the way in which legal rules participate in the construction of those meanings.” Id.
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challenged by critical race scholarship, feminist jurisprudence, and
queer studies, the theories draw mainly from a crude version of scientific formalism. Prosecutors follow a formalist expectation of violence.239 This expectation distinguishes between legal and social forms
of, and motives for, violence. The legal construction of violence interprets criminal conduct in narrow, reductionist terms framed by statutory or common law doctrine. For this type of violence, prosecutorial
expectation looks inward to the law and the legal system. This inwardlooking expectation strives to classify criminal wrongdoing in terms of
statutory or doctrinal prohibition. In contrast, the social construction of
violence comprehends the same conduct in broad, inferential terms
tied to general sociolegal currents such as class, race, ethnicity, or sexuality. For this kind of violence, prosecutorial expectation rotates outward to culture, society, and political economy. This outward-looking
expectation seeks to explain, rather than simply classify, criminal
wrongdoing. In this manner, it departs from the terms of positive law
prohibition to link the banned conduct to larger patterns of human behavior.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky mentions that the “legal form not only
gives the law inner coherence, it also preserves law’s autonomy.”240 For
Lidsky, it is the “formal character” of law that renders it distinctively
legal instead of political, sociological, or moral.241 The Louima case acquires its formal character from state criminal and federal civil rights
statutes, and the evidence of their violation. This distinctive character
derives from the separation of law and politics. Absent that distinction,
the Louima case descends into the politics of race, class, and ethnicity,
spheres traditionally located outside the formal province of law. Only
in the insular province of statutory construction does the law enjoy the
limited autonomy of its own internal logic without the tainted intrusion
of politics, culture, and society.
For prosecutors, formalism carries the implication of neutrality
and with it the cloak of impartiality. Despite postwar attacks on the viability of legal neutrality launched from the jurisprudential movements

239. See generally Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1393 (1998) (discussing aesthetic and scientific formalism in the law). Formalism, according to Malkan, “presumes that there is a fundamental difference between a substantive
agenda and its formal expression in law; the lawyer’s job is to translate one into the other so
that substantive problems become legal problems.” Id. at 1399.
240. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47
FLA. L. REV. 815, 825 (1995) (footnote omitted).
241. Id.
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of Legal Realism242 and Critical Legal Studies,243 prosecutors basically
adhere to the foundationalist belief that “a neutral interpreter can discern objective meaning free from the influences of her own subjective
predispositions.”244 Here, the claim of objectivity, rather than being
naïve or illusory, may simply posit a dual sense of descriptive accuracy.
A strong sense of objectivity,245 akin to empiricism, might claim the
ability to verify the external world by concrete physical measurement
or alternate methods of factual proof. A weak sense of objectivity
might limit its claim to courtroom veracity during pleading and discovery.246
Application of critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and
queer studies heightens a juridical sense of empirical doubt. Postulating
alternative theories of objectivity and violence, critical race theorists
make claims that undermine the standard gauge of colorblind neutrality, and reconfigure the stock construction of racial violence. Rooted in
the rejection of the separation of law and politics, the claims find the
structures and institutions of the law saturated by conscious and unconscious racial bias. Feminist scholars advance similar contentions that
assail the survival of contradictory and pernicious renditions of genderbased discrimination and violence. Frequently locating both contradiction and harm in the criminal law setting, especially in the contexts of
battered women and rape, the contentions dispute the equity and objectivity of established legal classifications.247 In the case of battered
women, this dispute reconceives the claim of self-defense in light of the
242. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL L. REV. 1151 (1985).
243. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
244. Ian Crosby, Note, Worlds in Stone: Gadamer, Heidegger, and Originalism, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 849, 850 (1998).
245. Feminist theorists critique the strong objectivity claims of scientific knowledge. See
Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity”?, in
FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 49, 49-82 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993).
246. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
TEX. L. REV. 267, 313 (1997) (mentioning that “the folk theories of adjudication that lawyers
employ all the time seem to lack the systematicity characteristic of genuine scientific theories:
in particular, they fail to generate laws of judicial behavior”). However, the standards governing the introduction of “scientific” evidence, which allow judges to regulate the admissibility of
junk science, demonstrate doubts about objectivity even in the limited sense of advocacy and
adjudication. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999); General Electric Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
247. See Patricia A. Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367,
372-76 (1997) (linking the validity of sexual classification to the harm of sex discrimination and
the context of remedial compensation).
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harsh material reality experienced by victims of domestic violence.248
The quarrel over objectivity also extends to the gendered-efficacy of
expert testimony in trials involving battered women.249 Although these
controversies may disturb traditional classifications inimical to the
rights of women, they may produce an alternate set of classifications
equally noxious in their depiction of women’s lives. The advent of state
doctrine endorsing rape trauma syndrome,250 and the resulting deformation of female identity, exemplifies this point.
Likewise, queer studies scholars work to reinvent theories of objectivity and violence. Queer theory signifies both “a coalition of culturally marginal sexual self-identifications” and “a nascent theoretical
model.”251 Mustered against the rising violence aimed at suppressing
the articulation of sexual difference in public and private social
spaces,252 queer theorists seek both to encompass and to transcend the
identity categories of gay and lesbian sexuality by linking performativity and identity.253 Noting the underlying sway of the theory of performativity, Annamarie Jagose mentions that queer theory “opts for denaturalisation as its primary strategy.”254 Shared by critical race theory
and feminist theory, the strategy of denaturalization attempts to disen-

248. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34-43, 79-93 (1991) (intertwining analyses of self-defense, battered women’s syndrome, and the notion of learned helplessness); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 497-512 (1996) (identifying gender bias in syndrome-based criminal defenses and excuses).
249. See Regina A. Schuller & Janice Cripps, Expert Evidence Pertaining to Battered
Women: The Impact of Gender of Expert and Timing of Testimony, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
17, 27-30 (1998) (investigating the contextual variable impact of the expert’s gender, as well as
the timing of testimony, on jury evaluation and verdict decision in homicide trials of battered
women).
250. See Kenneth Winchester Gaines, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Toward Proper Use in the
Criminal Trial Context, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 227, 228-32 (1997) (commenting on the development and evidentiary appeal of rape trauma syndrome); cf. Fiona E. Raitt & M. Suzanne
Zeedyk, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Its Corroborative and Educational Roles, 24 J. L. & SOC’Y
552, 565 (1997) (mentioning the danger that the rape trauma syndrome phenomenon may become “merely another form of control of women, prescribing as it does the manner in which
women are supposed to react to an invasion of their physical and emotional integrity”).
251. ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1996).
252. See, e.g., Patricia M. Logue & David S. Buckel, Fighting Anti-Gay Abuse in Schools:
The Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiff Jamie Nabozny in Nabozny v. Podlesny, 4 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 425, 429-43 (1997) (describing specific acts of homophobic harassment of a teenage boy in a public school).
253. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX”
223-42 (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 1-34, 128-41 (1990).
254. JAGOSE, supra note 251, at 98.
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tangle the analytics of sexualized power255 by mapping the elements of
identity “contestation and regulation.”256 Applied to the case at hand,
this strategy comes to view the Louima assault as an individual and institutional attempt to stigmatize people of color racially and sexually.
Here, the stigma of male-imposed sodomy links the public/private formation of Louima’s racial identity to an institutionally condoned practice of sexual degradation.257 In effect, the act of forced sodomy works
to transform Louima’s identity into “a cultural matter of group signification” derisive of the Haitian community “based on historically specific social relations” of racial inferiority.258
The prosecution of the Louima assault publicly exposes this stigmatizing practice. Prosecutorial exposure of this sort may induce
shame and encourage the convention of silence 259 in the victims of
sexualized racial violence. At the same time, exposure may prompt a
law-propelled cultural and political enablement260 of such victims and
their communities. In either event, prosecutors will encounter a practice of sexualized racial violence tenacious in its ability to wound black
men and women, and yet obscured by a theory of violence wedded to
the formal separation of law and politics. This ever-present practice of
violence, and the corresponding absence of a well-developed prosecutorial, community-based politics to combat its public and private manifestations, furnishes the basis for reviewing the regulation of the prosecutorial function under ABA and Justice Department rules. Applying
these rules to the facts of the Louima case may elucidate Carter’s decision to commence a superseding federal prosecution and to refer the

255. See Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 449, 453-54 (1996) (reviewing ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994)).
256. WILLIAM G. TIERNEY, ACADEMIC OUTLAWS: QUEER THEORY AND CULTURAL
STUDIES IN THE ACADEMY 169 (1997).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See David L. Chambers & Steven K. Homer, Honesty, Privacy, and Shame: When Gay
People Talk About Other Gay People to Nongay People, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 255, 258-70
(1997).
260. See TIERNEY, supra note 256, at 171. Tierney contends that “[t]he challenge is to create the conditions for enablement where our multiple identities can be decoupled from overarching norms.” Id. This view posits “the need of pluralities rather than singular norms.” Id.
Hence, to Tierney, “[t]he struggle becomes one of cultural politics over the discursive conditions of identity formation.” Id. Rejecting “the duality in terms of minority/majority, as if all
minorities were similar,” he urges us to “seek multiple voices and try to make sense of where
differences and similarities lie.” Id.
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case to the Justice Department for a department-wide investigation of
police brutality.
III. PROSECUTORIAL REGULATION: THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
This Part surveys the ethical rules prescribed by the ABA261 and
the Justice Department262 that regulate the prosecution of racially motivated violence. Starting from the postbellum federal prosecution of
Klan violence in the late nineteenth century, the survey canvasses the
ethical guidelines governing the prosecution of cases involving civil
rights complaints, violence against women, and hate crimes. Two
premises inform this survey. The first concerns the widely acknowledged “dominant and commanding role” prosecutors exert in both
federal and state criminal justice systems “through the exercise of
broad, unchecked discretion.”263 The second premise pertains to the
“inextricable and profound” nature of the prosecutorial role in dealing
with “the complexities of racial inequality in the criminal process.”264
A. Prosecuting Racially Motivated Violence
The prosecution of racially motivated violence marks the historical intersection of race and the criminal justice system. That intersection unfolds across a continuum of federal and state prosecutions that
alternately elevate and debase the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Debased discretion occurs notwithstanding federal and state
statutory constraints.265 Historical antecedents show that such racially
invidious discretion forms part of a colonial discourse that repro-

261. The survey draws on four ABA rule clusters: the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1908), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 11-197
(1967); the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982); the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1999); and the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1993).
262. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 8-3.000 to 8-3.150
(visited Apr. 22, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/>.
263. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16-17 (1998).
264. Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
265. See James A. Strazzella, The Relationship of Double Jeopardy to Prosecution Appeals,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 8-16 (1997) (discussing statutes which implicate double jeopardy
concerns); see also JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 111-17 (1994) (discussing the
racial ideology of the Attorney General of Alabama, Thomas E. Knight, Jr., who led the prosecution in the Scottsboro case).
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duces the constraints and the discipline of “‘colonized minds.’”266 Explicating this disciplinary dynamic, Pier Larson comments that “colonized people routinely engaged and rearranged colonial discourses by
fitting them into local systems of knowledge.”267 Viewed as imperial
subjects, victims of racially motivated violence nevertheless may constrain, limit, and transform the “cognitive culture of the foreign and
politically dominant” through “their active engagement with the intellectual material of colonial discourses . . . .”268
In the Louima case, Carter’s decision as a person of color to file
a superseding federal indictment and to refer his investigative fact
findings to the Civil Rights Division signifies a cognitive transformation in the culture of federal prosecutorial discretion. Prodded by
community protest, this transformation braves the structures of
popular and institutional racism that “circulate across and around the
contours of material power” in the private and public domains of civil
society.269 By publicly braving the racist culture of the 70th Precinct,
as well as the larger New York City Police Department, Carter unveiled what James Scott terms a “hidden transcript” of collective racial hierarchy, rather than the usual “public transcript” of isolated individual or group racial animus disclosed in incidents of police
brutality and in criminal prosecutions under civil rights and hate
crimes statutes.270 The symbolic import of that public exposition by
one among a small handful of federal prosecutors of color deserves
note in a culture rich in the racial symbolism of crime and punishment, as the recent revival of the chain gang271 so vividly demonstrates.

266. Pier M. Larson, “Capacities and Modes of Thinking”: Intellectual Engagements and
Subaltern Hegemony in the Early History of Malagasy Christianity, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 969,
970 (1997).
267. Id. Larson also notes that “people at the periphery of the European empire could only
understand what was new to them by analogy to what they already knew.” Id. He adds: “By
filtering European discourses through their own orders of meaning, ‘subalterns’ limited the potential of those discourses to rule effectively in the service of colonial power.” Id.
268. Id. at 971.
269. Id. at 998.
270. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN
TRANSCRIPTS 1-16 (1990) (elucidating relationships of power in transcripts of social life).
271. Tessa Gorman describes chain gangs as “a mode of punishment that is both a cruel
barb and an unusual indignity to the class of persons most likely to suffer the penalty.” Tessa
M. Gorman, Comment, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth Amendment and the History
of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REV. 441, 458 (1997) (discussing the history and revival of chain gangs). For Gorman, chain gangs present “a loaded symbol
. . . evok[ing] the horror of countless racial indignities, from slave ships to forced labor.” Id.
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Symbolically and practically, the Louima case signals a break
from the historical pattern shaping the federal prosecution of racially
motivated violence. That pattern, characterized by inaction and spare
enforcement, tracks the failure of the federal government to enforce
civil rights during the Reconstruction era,272 despite widespread postbellum Klan violence.273 Acts of violence, whether motivated by politics
or race, spanned both “political sides” during that era.274 Where politi-

272. See David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 839-40 (1998) (citing federal
government’s post-Reconstruction failure to protect the rights of African-Americans as “one of
the great tragedies of American history”); David Bernstein, Note, The Supreme Court and
“Civil Rights,” 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725, 726-33 (1990) (observing that the Supreme Court
upheld “explicitly discriminatory race and gender-based regulations” while it struck down “facially neutral restrictions” but arguing that the latter “substantially advanced the economic
prospects of Blacks, women, and immigrants”).
273. See Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation,
1865-1910, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 461-66 (1994) (discussing this history); see also John A.
Carpenter, Atrocities in the Reconstruction Period, in LYNCHING, RACIAL VIOLENCE, AND
LAW 36, 48 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) (mentioning “an unusual amount of atrocities, deprivations of rights, and other forms of illegal treatment” of blacks during the Reconstruction era);
Lee W. Formwalt, Petitioning Congress for Protection: A Black View of Reconstruction at the
Local Level 119, 132, in 7 AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE, 1861-1900: BLACK FREEDOM/WHITE
VIOLENCE, 1865-1900 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994) [hereinafter AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE]
(citing Freedman’s Bureau records of violent attacks—murders and assaults with intent to
kill—on blacks in Georgia during 1868); Otto H. Olsen, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study in Reconstruction Politics and Propaganda, 232 passim, in AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE, supra (noting
Klan atrocities and vigilante terror campaigns during Reconstruction).
274. KENNETH C. BARNES, WHO KILLED JOHN CLAYTON? POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1861-1893, at 131 (1998) (tracing the relationship of political
violence to the rise of “New South politics” and citing the murder of Clayton as an example of
how “violence was used consistently to attain political goals”); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT
THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 1-15
(1984) (depicting causes of postbellum political violence and disorder); BERTRAM WYATTBROWN, HONOR AND VIOLENCE IN THE OLD SOUTH 154-213 (1986) (explicating ritualistic
community violence of lynching, vigilantism, and charivaris).
Barnes comments that “Union soldiers and guerillas had been ruthless to local rebel
families during the Civil War.” BARNES, supra, at 131. Indeed, he explains that “[b]lack and
white Republicans organized into paramilitary bands in 1868 to protect the civil rights of
freedmen and to combat the terror of the Ku Klux Klan.” Id. Overtaken by the same zeal,
Barnes continues, Republicans “again responded with a show of arms in the 1890 election in an
attempt to ensure a fair vote.” Id. Nonetheless, he concludes, Democratic elites “relied most on
the use of violence as a political weapon,” and moreover, “used it most effectively.” Id. Cataloguing the “marauding attacks on freedmen in 1867 to Klan terrorism in 1868 and 1885, to the
long list of victims in the late 1880s and early 1890s,” Barnes finds that “Democrats established
a pattern of physical violence used to intimidate their political opposition.” Id. When intimidation proved inadequate, he shows that “the violence spilled into the polling place with theft of
ballots at gunpoint and ultimately murder.” Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, NIGHT
RIDERS: DEFENDING COMMUNITY IN THE BLACK PATCH, 1890-1915, at 140-60 (1993) (de-
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cal progress advanced, Supreme Court–led federal court nullification
ended its march.275
The violence of the Reconstruction era encompassed economic,
legal, and extralegal forms designed to maintain the southern
antebellum order through the disenfranchisement of blacks,276 the enactment of Jim Crow laws,277 and the threat of sexual violence (e.g.,
rape)278 and lynching.279 Lacking presidential leadership,280 the federal
role in prosecuting these forms of racially motivated violence appears
minimal, at least when judged by its civil rights enforcement history.281
scribing vigilante violence); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE
RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 180-223 (1984) (surveying white
violence manifested in lynchings and rioting during the Reconstruction era); GEORGE C.
WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND
“LEGAL LYNCHINGS” 19-60 (1990) (documenting various forms of racial violence during the
Reconstruction era such as lynchings, “legal lynchings,” and mob rule).
275. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 284 (1997). Pointing to
recent events, Spann asserts that “racial minorities have had some success protecting their interests before the political process, but have often had their political victories nullified by the
Supreme Court—just as the Supreme Court nullified minority political victories during the eras
of Dred Scott and Reconstruction.” Id. He stresses that for “both the past and the present, the
political process has been a better friend to racial minorities than the Supreme Court has
been.” Id.
276. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 45-82
(1974) (tracking the use of fraud registration and literacy tests as means to disenfranchise African-Americans).
277. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
278. See Crooms, supra note 231, at 474-79; Roberts, supra note 235, at 364-67.
279. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 194, at 1-85; see also JAMES R. MCGOVERN, ANATOMY OF
A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE NEAL 1-15 (1982) (providing a general overview of the
occurrence of, and responses to, lynching); HOWARD SMEAD, BLOOD JUSTICE: THE LYNCHING
OF MACK CHARLES PARKER 3-58 (1986) (describing one example of ritual lynching); STEWART
E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS,
1882-1930, at 1-201 (1995) (discussing lynching as a form of popular justice and social control).
280. See EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON, BETRAYED: A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE
TO PROTECT BLACK LIVES (1996). Hutchinson explains that “Presidents and attorneys general
generally ignored or sparingly used the federal statutes to prosecute criminal civil rights
abuses.” Id. at 214. This manner of neglect arose less out of “the personalities, individual preferences, or even racial bigotry of the men and women in the White House and DOJ” and more
out of “political expediency.” Id. In point of fact, Hutchinson remarks, this historical line of
presidents seemed “determined not to offend the politically powerful South.” Id. Bolstered by
a jurisprudence of federalism, they broke from this determined orthodoxy only “when a violent
act triggered a major riot, generated mass protest, or attracted major press attention.” Id. Yet
even in such cases, Hutchinson adds, “black leaders had to pressure the federal government to
take action.” Id.
281. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6-22, 23-59 (1997) (discussing the evolution of the U.S. Attorney General’s authority to prosecute civil rights violations, exploring the federal government’s
role in enforcement, and describing various models of enforcement).
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This meager showing may be attributable to the bureaucratic organization of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division,282 the acquiescence of the Solicitor General’s office,283 and the Department’s onerous
and antiquated criminal-civil distinction.284 Whatever the causal explanation, the anti-Klan trials of the late nineteenth century285 and the
voting rights initiatives of the middle part of the twentieth century286
stand out as exceptions to the lackadaisical enforcement record otherwise accrued by the Civil Rights Division. Although this record makes
no mention of southern state court defiance, it raises similar doubts
about judicial independence and impartiality that besieged those state
courts during the Reconstruction and post-Brown eras.287
In contrast, the current prosecution of violence against women
points out the potentially activist role of prosecutors288 in the enforce282. See id. at 77-154 (explaining Civil Rights Division practices of priority setting, resource
allocation, and litigation policymaking).
283. Compare Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 817-52 (1987) (discussing and celebrating the role of the Solicitor General’s office in the civil rights movement), with
Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942 (1987) (arguing
that Elman “misallocates credit” for the legal struggle against segregation between 1930 and
1960).
284. See LANDSBERG, supra note 281, at 56 (mentioning that the “blurring of the line between civil and criminal sanctions may lead to confusion as to the role of the government attorney responsible for such litigation”).
285. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 425-59
(1988); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 53-115 (1985);
ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN
RECONSTRUCTION 383-418 (1971); LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA
KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-1872, at 40-130 (1996); Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921,
924-49 (1984).
286. See John Doar, The Work of the Civil Rights Division in Enforcing Voting Rights Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997) (describing the
early frustration of voting rights enforcement litigation in the South by federal court “delay and
obfuscation”).
287. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 817 (1998). Bright argues that ignoring the historical neglect of state court transgressions
and the “wishful” incantation of judicial independence “will not make independence a reality.”
Id. at 857. For Bright, the juridical community, comprised of “[c]itizens, judges, lawyers, and
public officials, must recognize the lack of independence, acknowledge the historic role the
courts have played in defiance of the law, explore the influence of that history on the present,
and realize how far the courts have to go to reach independence.” Id.
288. See Machaela M. Hoctor, Note, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The
Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 695-97 (1997) (noting that
prosecutors often determine how the criminal justice system addresses domestic violence).
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ment of both statutory and common law rights. Epitomized by increasingly aggressive policies of prosecuting battering partners,289 such
as “no-drop” trials,290 compelled victim testimony, and victimuncorroborated trial proceedings,291 this role suggests a more affirmative stance toward domestic violence that leaves the character of the
victim unblemished.292
A similar upsurge of affirmative efforts seems detectable in the
prosecution of violence against gays and lesbians under statutes proscribing “hate crimes.” Employed in part as a means of combating such
violence,293 the statutes offer a broad definition of hate crimes294 delineating the elements of prejudice and causality, the nature of the substantive offense, and the availability of sentence enhancement. Confirming
this breadth of coverage, reporting statutes indicate that hate crimes
radiate beyond the circle of race to incorporate ethnicity, religion, and
sexual orientation.295 To be sure, certain categories of identity resist
easy classification.296 The theoretical insufficiency of hate crime classifi289. See Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners: Some
Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89, 90-94 (1997).
290. See id. Cochran explains: “No-drop policies require that prosecutors go forward with
bringing the batterer to trial despite the battered victim’s reluctance to do so. This is accomplished by prosecuting either without the victim’s trial testimony or with the victim’s compelled
trial testimony.” Id. at 113.
291. See id. at 96-99.
292. Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the Welfare Reform
Debate, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 205, 218-30 (1997) (discussing the denigration of battered women’s
“morality” choices).
293. See GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 31-94
(1991) (reviewing empirical data on victims and perpetrators); VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL
BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 49-73
(1997) (tracing the history of homophobic violence against gays and lesbians, along with the
emergence of antiviolence projects).
294. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, in 22
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 5-9 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) (describing
various types of hate crimes laws). See generally JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER,
HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 29-44 (1998) (describing a wide range of
federal and state hate crimes statutes); LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW (1994) (compiling
federal and state statutes addressing hate- or bias-motivated crimes).
295. John Finnis argues that the judgment of moral condemnation toward homosexual conduct “need not be a manifestation of mere hostility to a hated minority, of purely religious,
theological, and sectarian belief, or of prejudice.” John Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, in SAME SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 33 (John Corvino ed., 1997) [hereinafter SAME SEX]. For Finnis, that judgment “can be supported by reflective, critical, publicly intelligible and rational considerations.”
Id.
296. See John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals, and Sexual Categories, in SAME SEX, supra
note 295, at 185, 201 (dismissing arguments for “a single system of sexual categorization” in
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cation schemes297 spawns the risk of prosecutorial deployment against
common hate crime victims, namely people of color. The danger of
disproportionate statutory enforcement against people of color298 corresponds to the bleak history of civil rights law enforcement.299 Thus
far, the risk of selective prosecution seems unsubstantiated, though underreporting may cloud the record.300
B. Regulating the Prosecution of Racially Motivated Violence
The task of regulating the prosecution of racially motivated violence falls to the American Bar Association, the Justice Department,
and to bar associations acting under state court supervision. Unlike
conventional inspections, this regulatory inquiry charts a path outside
the usual terrain of prosecutorial misconduct and the ordinary range
of matters concerning, for example, the timely and complete disclosure of exculpatory evidence.301 Instead, it focuses on the prosecutorial function as a state-structured institutional expression of public
and private hierarchical relationships that are contingent upon racial
subordination. Encased in its own sheen of normativity, racial hierarchy acquires a kind of “structured invisibility”302 in the prosecutorial
setting. Peripheral only because of the “tendency to ‘forget’ or overlook racialized and subordinated others,”303 the conventional prosecuWestern history); Carla Golden, Diversity and Variability in Women’s Sexual Identities, in
SAME SEX, supra note 295, at 149, 150 (describing “enormous diversity and variability in
women’s self-defined sexual identities” contrary to social definitions).
297. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1032-80 (1997).
298. See Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 606-07 (1998). Remarking on this danger, Maroney notes that
the neutral gloss of hate crime laws and policies, exemplified in categorical generality rather
than particularity, “can be used to penalize bias-motivated crimes lacking historical pedigree.”
Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted). By way of example, he points to statutory invocation “against an
African American person who attacks a white person, or against a gay person who attacks a
heterosexual, even though such crimes are neither the most common sort nor the kind that
spurred the development of anti-hate measures.” Id. at 607.
299. See MANN, supra note 23, at 115-65; see also id. at 160 (arguing that the law and legal
system maintains “an ingrained system of injustice for people of color”).
300. See Maroney, supra note 298, at 607 (citing the absence of empirical research tending
to support or refute the claim of selective prosecution).
301. See Christopher Slobogin, Having It Both Ways: Proof That the U.S. Supreme Court Is
“Unfairly” Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743, 754 (1996) (discussing the lack of procedural sanctions when confronted by prosecutorial bad faith in the conduct of discovery).
302. Angela Woollacott, “All This Is the Empire, I Told Myself”: Australian Women’s Voyages “Home” and the Articulation of Colonial Whiteness, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 1003, 1007
(1997).
303. Id.
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tion of racially motivated violence implies a false neutrality and unity
of white/black relations.
The canons of race-neutrality and racial unity may be found
ideologically embedded in the ABA’s regulatory ethics clusters.
Regulation adopts the form of rules and standards.304 Together, they
govern the normative exercise of prosecutorial discretion.305 This
regulatory framework applies equally to federal prosecutors, despite
claims of federal preemptive authorization.306 The composition of that
framework conveys a pervasive sense of discretion interlacing the
charging decision, as well as plea bargaining and sentencing.307 Despite checking mechanisms308 and administrative channeling,309 discretionary decisions often suggest the appearance of impropriety310 and
stir charges of inadequate enforcement and discipline.311 Attributable
in part to the dynamics of the adversarial system,312 prosecutorial dis-

304. See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard:
Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148-63 (1973) (noting the inconsistency and
vagueness of multifactor ethical standards regulating prosecutors).
305. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669, 671-91 (discussing the standards and factors affecting prosecutorial charging discretion); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 736-59 (1996) (remarking on the prosecutorial enjoyment of largely unreviewed discretion
under administrative, legislative, and judicial oversight).
306. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 378-427 (1996) (defending limited Justice Department preemption of
state regulatory authority over federal prosecutors); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate
the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 431-62 (1996) (assessing the Justice Department’s preemption of
state ethics regulation of federal prosecutors).
307. See Misner, supra note 305, at 750 (citing the charging decision as “the basic source of
prosecutorial authority” but noting the enhancement of that power “by the prosecutor’s role in
plea bargaining and by recent trends in sentencing”).
308. See Wayne A. Logan, Note, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1695, 1719-27 (discussing federal and state controls on
prosecutorial discretion).
309. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative
Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 490-505 (1976) (proposing
administrative law regulation of pretrial prosecutorial procedures).
310. See Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 704-19, 728-39 (1998) (exploring the
history, impact, and content of the ethical standard regulating the appearance of prosecutorial
impropriety).
311. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 77-94 (1995) (surveying formal and instrumental grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and institutional mechanisms of federal and
state disciplinary review).
312. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include
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cretion may rapidly breach the restraints313 and responsibilities314 of
ethics rules. Breaches may occur during preliminary investigation,315
plea bargaining316 and negotiation,317 pretrial discovery,318 trial,319 sentencing,320 and even non-adversarial proceedings.321 Such transgresthe Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 927-62 (1996) [hereinafter Flowers, A Code of Their Own] (noting the adversarial nature of the ethics codes and the
unguided quality of the non-adversarial role of the federal prosecutor); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 45, 50-85 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics] (analyzing the prosecutorial role in the context of adversarial trials when equality premises fail). See generally Bruce A.
Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 126 (1988) (highlighting the importance of the defense counsel’s role in ensuring fairness of prosecutorial conduct within an adversarial system).
313. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1537-45, 1560-72 (1981) (mapping the external and self-imposed limits on the scope of
prosecutorial discretion to enhance accountability to legislative and judicial authorities).
314. See John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U.
RICH. L. REV. 511, 513-37 (1983) (parsing federal prosecutorial responsibilities in the fields of
investigation, charging, grand jury proceedings, discovery, plea bargaining, trial conduct, and
publicity).
315. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395-405
(1992). Gershman relates increased prosecutorial use of “more imaginative and intrusive undercover tactics both to investigate persons suspected of crime—a legitimate goal—and to test
the integrity of persons not suspected of any crime—an illegitimate goal.” Id. at 400.
316. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 52-85 (1968) (remarking that prosecutorial plea negotiations may thwart fairness goals of
procedural rules); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 42-54 (remarking on the prosecutorial dominance and leverage over defense attorneys during plea bargaining); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 449-52 (1971) (citing
the trial prosecutor’s unchecked discretion in plea bargaining process).
317. See Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 913, 915-22 (1997). Experience may fail to mitigate the effect of such bias. Indeed, Babcock and others assert that “to mitigate the [self-serving] bias and promote settlement, two conditions must be met: negotiators must become aware of the bias, and such awareness must have the effect of reducing the bias.” Id. at 921. Neither of these conditions, they add,
“is likely to be satisfied in practice.” Id.
318. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 708-16 (1987) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct
in the suppression of exculpatory evidence and presentation of false evidence).
319. See Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 312, at 85-102 (delineating the causes
of failure in the adversarial trial process).
320. See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 724 (mentioning that “prosecutors possess some discretionary power to influence sentencing outcomes
through charging decisions and plea negotiations”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the
Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681,
1723-24 (1992) (attributing disparity in the sentencing process to federal prosecutorial discretion); Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor’s
Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 216-39
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sions may stem from both good322 and bad323 institutional incentives,
or social status.324 Moreover, they may advance the cause of “rough
justice”325 or degenerate into racist misconduct.326 Whatever the outcome, prosecutorial discretion may have little effect on deterring private or public acts of racially motivated violence associated as here
with police brutality and misconduct.327
The absence of meaningful ethical rule restraints rests on the
pragmatic rationality animating prosecutorial discretion. The logic of
that rationality assumes the colorblind unity of white-black relations.
This regulative ideal imposes a colorblind harness on prosecutorial
conduct that is predicated on the normative race-neutral priority “to
see that justice is done.”328 Originally announced in the ABA Canons,
(1997) [hereinafter Lee, From Gatekeeper] (discussing advantages and disadvantages of federal
prosecutorial power over substantial assistance departures in sentencing); see also Cynthia
Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 149-73 (1994) (locating overzealous adversarial incentive in
the discretionary power of prosecutors to participate in federal sentencing guidelines). Citing
evidence of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing function, Lee mentions that “prosecutors
play a defining role in determining whether a defendant receives a downward departure based
on substantial assistance.” Lee, From Gatekeeper, supra, at 235. Hence, she adds, “the authority to veto a substantial assistance departure is a significant power in light of the fact that such
departures constitute the bulk of all departures and an increasing percentage of all Guidelines
sentences.” Id.
321. See Flowers, A Code of Their Own, supra note 312, at 962-74 (describing a lack of federal prosecutorial guidance and regulation in the area of non-adversarial investigation).
322. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-89 (1995) (proposing a financial-incentives model of monetary awards to control prosecutorial discretion).
323. See Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 540-44 (1996) (probing prosecutorial incentive to
engage in the practice of conviction-rate scorekeeping).
324. See Debra S. Emmelman, Gauging the Strength of Evidence Prior to Plea Bargaining:
The Interpretive Procedures of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
927, 936 (1997) (observing that “it is not a person’s social status alone that affects her case but
the social conditions associated with her status, how or whether those conditions enter as evidentiary facts in the case, and most important, how convincing those facts are within the cultural framework of common sense”).
325. James A. Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor: Restrictions on Threatening Prosecution for Civil Ends, 37 ME. L. REV. 41, 42 (1985) (“In either the false arrest or brutality situation, the prosecutor may believe that exchanging a dismissal or grant of nolle prosequi for release from civil liability constitutes rough justice.”).
326. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 4.3(a)-(d), at 4-16 to
4-23 (1998); Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1221-42 (1992).
327. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME
IN AMERICA 158 (1996) (remarking that prosecutors “can do little” to control police brutality
or perjury).
328. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5, supra note 261, at 19.
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this normative priority echoes in the commentary accompanying the
Model Rules. That commentary recognizes the prosecutorial responsibility to serve as “a minister of justice.”329 The ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice confirm this ministerial obligation by reiterating the
prosecutorial duty “to seek justice, not merely to convict.”330 Indeed,
the Standards recognize the “critical role” the prosecutor plays in the
criminal justice system.331 This role confers a quasi-judicial position,
endowing the prosecutor with the duties of an “administrator of justice.”332 Guided by the interests of justice and liberated by broad discretionary powers, the prosecutor may expand his reign over the administration of the criminal justice system to improve the quality of
criminal justice itself.333
This race-neutral ministry receives the implicit approval of the
334
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. It garners additional support from Justice Department guidelines in cases where the
pursuit of justice in a criminal civil rights matter serves the “national
interest.”335 Pursuit of justice here may include the move to supersede
an extant state prosecution. Normative approval triumphs because the
reigning ethic of race-neutral, justice-based prosecutorial discretion
“takes precedence, at least in principle, over any countervailing
choice-supporting consideration that can arise at the level of choice
of action within the context of a situation to which the rule is applicable.”336 In this way, ethics rules render the prosecutor a discretionary agent of the “neutral” state and a legislator of colorblind criminal
justice policy.337 Examining the prosecution of racially motivated vio-

329. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8 cmt. (1999).
330. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2
(c).
331. Id. Standard 3-1.2(c) cmt.
332. Id.
333. See id.
334. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156 cmt. h (1998).
335. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL § 8-3.000 (visited Apr.
22, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/>; see also Robert G.
Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Litigation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 155 (1995). Morvillo and Bohrer explain that although “the Department of Justice has developed guidelines and regulations designed to centralize the exercise of discretion in some cases,” nonetheless “its role is seen more as setting
boundaries rather than imposing restraint and moderation in individual cases in an age of increasing prosecutorial power and increasing public expectations.” Id.
336. Edward F. McClennen, Pragmatic Rationality and Rules, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 210,
255 (1997).
337. See Misner, supra note 305, at 743. Citing the breadth of prosecutorial charging discre-
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lence and its regulatory compass under ABA rules and Justice Department guidelines invites exploration of race-conscious, community-oriented prosecutorial duties.
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
This Part proposes a race-conscious, community-oriented model
of prosecutorial discretion as an alternative to the dominant colorblind
prosecutorial canon of race neutrality. Building out from an analysis of
liberal models of discretion, it puts forward an alternative communitysituated model emphasizing the centrality of racial identity and racialized narrative (e.g., racial slurs and violence) to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It also compares the proposed model to other raceconscious practices in the fields of environmental justice, transracial
adoption, employment discrimination, and jury selection.
A. Liberal Models of Discretion: Justice and Merit
Liberal models of lawyer discretion inform ABA and Justice Department rules of ethics. Commonly framed, the rules share a similar
form and content. As to form, the rules closely resemble the multifactor, context-specific standards found in postwar jurisprudence.338 As to
content, the rules favor client- or state-centered calibrations of interest.
In doing so, they relegate to a secondary plane other interests pertinent
to law, courts, unrepresented third parties, and the public. Relegation
systematically diminishes the weight of non-client considerations associated with the integrity of the law, as well as court officer responsibility and third party or community obligation. At the same time, both the
form and content of the rules reserve space for the lawyer to exercise
individual discretion. Vigilant of client or state interest, that exercise
stems from autonomy-instilled, individualism norms that limit the
scope of professional duty. These norms often accommodate discretionary judgments that neglect or reject considerations of collective racial or interracial harmony.
Definitionally, the rules operate at a fairly high level of generality.339 Taken at this level, the grant of individual discretion renders the
tion, Misner contends that “prosecutorial decisions—such as whether to prosecute, how to
prosecute, how long to sentence, and whether to dismiss charges—all contribute to the creation
of the prosecutor as the real policy-maker within the criminal justice system.” Id.
338. On the form of postwar legal standards, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-121 (1992).
339. See Alan H. Goldman, Rules in the Law, 16 LAW & PHIL. 581, 589 (1997) (arguing that
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lawyer’s independent judgment susceptible to race-marred decisionmaking.340 Contrary to the claim of “nonjudgmentalism” heard from
some postmodern critics, liberal models of lawyer ethical discretion involve judgment and choice about the merit and justness of racial commitments to individuals and to communities.341 Acting upon such commitments entails calculations of merit and justice unconfined by
obligations to the mythic liberal subject manifested in the guise of the
client, the state, or the lawyer himself. Construing the client, the state,
and the lawyer-self as the freewheeling sovereigns of liberal myth underestimates the place of racial identity and narrative in machinations
of client consent, state deliberation, and lawyer decisionmaking. The
same construction overlooks the place of gender and sexuality in such
machinations.342
Proponents of mythic liberal legalism and its orthodox constructions rely on the rhetoric of consent to justify client- or state-centered
decisions that omit consideration of external factors, such as race and
community.343 That justification posits a narrowly fixed meaning of consent unaffected by outside intervention. Yet lawyers regularly participate in the production of client consent and state policy. Their participation, however, raises few concerns about paternalism.344 By
paternalism, I mean an outside act of intrusion in the decisionmaking
process of a person or entity in order to promote the perceived endgoals of that person or entity.345 Even when conceded, proponents of
“genuine rules must be stated at a sufficiently broad level of generality so that their stated conditions are likely to recur, but not so broadly as to suggest that they should be read as principles
against which other factors may always have to be weighed”).
340. See MANN, supra note 23, at 180 (“For minorities, the inequities ensuing from this absolute and unrestricted authority center on the increased likelihood of being charged, overcharged, and indicted.”).
341. See Paddy Ireland, Reflections on a Rampage Through the Barriers of Shame: Law,
Community, and the New Conservatism, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 189, 208 (1995) (arguing that the
“new, ‘radical’, postmodern liberalism which has emerged embodies a non-judgmentalism,
which, whatever its intent, ends up advocating individual choice while denying that any collective political choices have to be, or can be, made”).
342. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 261-62 (1996) (discussing legal and nonlegal factors influencing
prosecutorial discretion).
343. See Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1325 (1997) (discussing the interaction of liberal justification and consent).
344. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 233-54 (1998) (asserting that paternalism is compatible with normative economics and justifiable under efficiency analysis).
345. See id. at 236 (“Paternalism is intervention in a person’s freedom aimed at furthering
her own good.”).
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client- or state-centered liberalism justify the intrusions of lawyer paternalism on the basis of localized efficiency and limited application.346
Functionalist justifications of lawyer paternalism inevitably run
afoul of normative prescriptions. Although not without merit, the justification of heightened efficiency in carefully cabined circumstances of
lawyer-arrogated ethical decisionmaking must acknowledge the resulting denial of client- or community-centered moral development, as
well as the consequential deprivation of deliberative autonomy. Even
when contextually tailored, the devaluation of autonomy 347 denigrates
the value and impedes the growth of citizenship. As such, it inhibits the
fullness of deliberative judgment required in the choice of options and
in the appreciation of their consequences in client-, victim-, or community-centered advocacy.
Liberal models of lawyer discretion suffer deep-seated internal
tensions rankling the pursuit of client, lawyer, and community interests.
The conflicting endorsement of client autonomy and lawyer independence under the same normative slate of liberal individualism works to
the detriment of community conceptions of a higher collective good.
That endorsement also gives little guidance to the lawyer-client analysis of options in light of their impact on individually joined community.
Additionally, though the privileged position accorded to autonomy under a theory of liberal individualism seems clear-cut, the scope of the
privilege falls unbounded. Indeed, liberal theory seems to waver in the
“acceptance of autonomy as a desirable end in itself, rather than as a
means to the attainment of the good.”348 Similarly, it seems to falter
both in asserting the neutral quality of liberal autonomy “irrespective
of the use to which it is put,”349 and in accommodating the adverse consequences flowing to individuals and communities.

346. See id. at 233-34. Zamir explains that “efficiency attributes equal weight to the wellbeing of every person.” Id. at 233. Following this attribution, Zamir reasons, “an act or a rule is
efficient if the sum of the well-being (utility) it generates is greater than the sum of its costs
(disutility).” Id. More expansively, in comparing normative theory, “efficiency analysis may
focus on one or more objects of evaluation: particular actions, general rules, character traits,
and so forth.” Id.
347. See Alexander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 23, 30 (1997) (arguing that “the non-autonomous person, the person for whom decisions
are made by others, or who, for whatever reason, is unable to make decisions for himself, leads
a poorer life”).
348. Id. at 31.
349. Id. at 30; see also David A. J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHICS 3, 12-20
(1981) (providing an autonomy-based interpretation of treating persons as equals).

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

10/14/99 9:35 AM

PROSECUTING RACE

1211

Consider then an alternative account of autonomy tied to community interest and collective responsibility.350 Like the standard liberal
vision, this account views lawyer discretion, and more specifically
prosecutorial discretion, as an institutional necessity of the criminal justice system. Accepting that necessity, Angela Davis concedes the difficulty of “imagin[ing] a fair and workable system that does not include
some level of measured discretion in the prosecutorial process.”351
Whether the institutional incentives and disincentives driving that discretion may accommodate competing considerations of merit, justice,
and racial community evades easy answer. By way of answer, however,
consider first merit-based discretion.
The merit-based model of liberal ethical discretion seems well
grounded in conventional ethics rules. In the criminal arena, for example, Model Rule 3.8 recognizes the function of merit in the exercise of
prosecutorial decisionmaking.352 Under that Rule, the demands of
merit-based discretion strive to guarantee impartiality and state independence.353 Both elements are essential for legitimacy reasons. Here,
the idea of legitimacy seems untouched by speculation of racial harm
to the defendant or victim, and to the communities that may embrace
each. Legitimacy remains undiminished because the theory of meritbased prosecution relies on colorblind claims of punishment fired by
the race-neutral logic of instrumental and intrinsic reasoning.354 Driving
the rationality of merit-based action, these claims ignore the fact that
prosecutorial discretion presents “a major cause of racial inequality in
the criminal justice system.”355
Causal neglect of this kind fosters the view of systemic racial inequality as a necessary cost of prosecutorial agency.356 The sociolegal in-

350. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 85-93 (1993) (sketching a nonaggregative conception of collective interests akin to
the traditional natural law theory of the common good); JOHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERALISM
69-87 (1997) (defending the moral requirement of collective responsibility).
351. Davis, supra note 263, at 20. Davis finds prosecutorial discretion deficient “in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application.” Id. Even where general policies constraining discretion are in place, Davis laments, “there is no effective mechanism for enforcement or public
accountability.” Id. at 20-21. Furthermore, she discounts prosecutorial self-regulation as
“largely nonexistent or ineffective.” Id. at 21.
352. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8 (1999).
353. See id. Rule 3.8 cmt.
354. For helpful discussion of these competing claims, see David Dolinko, Retributivism,
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Good of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507 (1997).
355. Davis, supra note 263, at 17.
356. For a brief description of prosecutorial agency costs, see Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in
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stitutions of the state tolerate that view. Curing the systemic racial inequality operating in criminal justice institutions requires communitybased prosecutorial discretion. Converting institutional tolerance of
systemic racial inequality into institutional condemnation under an
ethical rationale of a community-oriented, racial justice-based model of
prosecutorial discretion begins with a sense of moral activism.
Consider David Luban’s notion of moral activism in evaluating
this contemplated conversion. Luban argues that “morally activist lawyers should sometimes refrain from zealously advancing lawful client
interests even when the threat to third parties is minimal or even intangible, and even when the benefit to the client may be substantial.”357
Specifically, he urges avoiding the performance of “collectively harmful actions.”358 Transmuting Luban’s cautionary prohibition for civil justice into an exhortation for the use of prosecutorial power as a collective instrument of racial justice conforms to a community justice–based
model of discretion. To that end, Angela Davis recommends deploying
such power “to construct effective solutions to racial injustice.”359 For
Davis, prosecutors possess “the power, discretion, and responsibility to
remedy the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the
criminal justice process.”360
The community justice–based model of prosecutorial discretion
proceeds from the premise of lawyers as morally independent agents
within a system of adversarial justice.361 This model struggles against
Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1181-82 (1998) [hereinafter Zacharias, Justice].
357. David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 955, 955 (1995).
358. Id. at 962.
359. Davis, supra note 263, at 17 (footnote omitted).
360. Id. at 18. Davis maintains that prosecutors, by virtue of their grant of discretion, “make
decisions that not only often predetermine the outcome of criminal cases, but also contribute to
the discriminatory treatment of African Americans as both criminal defendants and victims of
crime.” Id. This, in large part, privately exerted discretion, according to Davis, “gives prosecutors more power than any other criminal justice officials, with practically no corresponding accountability to the public they serve.” Id. (footnotes omitted). On these grounds, Davis urges
that prosecutors, guided by the “duty to pursue justice,” accept “the responsibility to use their
discretion to help eradicate the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the criminal
justice system.” Id.
361. See Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in
Criminal Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 47 (1997). Echoing this
sense of procedural justice, Clark observes that “[a] basic tenet of a society maintaining tolerance of and support for lawyers representing persons charged with crime is that we believe in
the moral independence of the lawyer from the client.” Id. at 59. Independence comes in part
from the fact that it is the client and not the lawyer who “is charged with or has committed the
crime.” Id. Indeed, Clark explains, the lawyer is not himself “involved in the crime—he or she
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the competing roles and functions of prosecuting and defense attorneys
in the criminal justice system.362 Under its alternative template, the
function of the prosecutorial role expands beyond the predicate state
obligation to the public to encompass both victim and defendant communities.
In contrast to the usually obscurantist role of defense counsel, 363
here prosecutorial role performance combines both intrasystemic and
extrasystemic appeals to justice. Intrasystemic appeals invoke principles of justice embodied in the legal system and public morality.364 Appeals of this kind compel the prosecutorial duty to bargain justly.365
Conversely, they bar “prosecutorial reliance on tactical and resource
considerations”366 in the exercise of ethical discretion. Informing both
rehabilitative and punitive discretionary judgments, the appeals strive
to achieve a retributive equity of blame and responsibility, hence to
strike a balance of equitable attribution and blameworthiness,367 in
spite of the ambiguity of criminal rehabilitation and punishment.368
only supplies representation.” Id. The act of representation itself, he insists, “should not be
taken to signal support for the client’s past actions—only support for the due process right to a
fair hearing.” Id.
362. See PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 75 (1998). Haskell puts
forward a “justice theory of representation” that explains the lawyer’s role in terms of
“achiev[ing] for the client only what the facts allow him under the law.” Id. On this explanation, the lawyer turns from a “zealous advocate” to “an instrument of justice.” Id. Haskell is
quick to point out that this role transformation in no way “suggest[s] that the adversarial
method be abandoned, but rather that it be limited to honest differences concerning facts and
law.” Id.
363. Cf. Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The O.J. Simpson Trial—Triumph of Justice or Debacle?,
41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 9, 18 (1996) (commenting that where the defense counsel’s search for the
truth “is lost or distorted, the adversarial system becomes useless as a means for determining
guilt or innocence”) (footnote omitted).
364. See ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 178 n.70,
179 (1998) (explaining that “nullification serves as an intrasystemic corrective device” based on
an appeal to conscience that extends beyond the principles of justice as these principles are
embodied in the legal system).
365. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 356, at 1161-63 (considering the role of equitable
arguments in a prosecutor’s decision to plea bargain).
366. Id. at 1180. Zacharias argues that “[t]he sole issues for the prosecutor should be what
the defendant has done and what the defendant’s situation is.” Id.
367. See Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 597 (1997) (examining victim blameworthiness in attributions of accident fault and
civil damage awards).
368. See Charles H. Logan & Gerald G. Gaes, Meta-Analysis and the Rehabilitation of
Punishment, in OFFENDER REHABILITATION: EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION 38
(Francis T. Cullen & Brandon K. Applegate eds., 1997) (“Meta-analysis of research on rehabilitation has not yet established that any particular method of treatment is significantly and
reliably effective.”).
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By comparison, extrasystemic appeals trigger principles of justice
implanted in social and cultural community. Appeals of this sort animate victim-based theories of justice.369 Consider the victims’ rights
movement and the growing prosecutorial use of victim impact statements.370 In this way, extrasystemic appeals provide a prosecutorial
form and forum for victim and community participation.371 Surprisingly,
the employment of victim impact statements as a means of curing
prosecutorial and community inaction372 may invite defendant-directed
public mercy.373 The fostering of victim and community participation by
defendant-specific appeals to mercy is relevant to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The best example of such relevance may be
found in capital punishment proceedings.374 Other instances of equitable mercy may be seen in criminal sentencing,375 though for some juridical agents justice and mercy may lie distinct.376
369. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 177-206 (1995). Fletcher asserts that “it would be valuable in many criminal cases” to
include a “procedure of a preliminary verdict that the act was a criminal violation of the victim’s rights.” Id. at 183.
370. See Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 233, 235-48 (1991) (providing an overview of victim participation statutes); see
also Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 105-13 (1997) (arguing that the
admission of victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings improperly influences
prosecutorial and jury decisions).
371. See Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 143-49, 163-78 (1984) (discussing the
potential conflicts between the interests of the state and the interests of victims in criminal
cases, and advocating that victims be allowed an expanded role throughout criminal proceedings); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS.
L.J. 515, 547-58 (1982) (condemning prosecutorial prohibition on victim participation as historically unjustified and advocating that victims be considered parties with interests in both
procedural and substantive case development).
372. See Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 489-93 (1988) (proposing statutory authority for
individuals to challenge prosecutorial inaction as a “direct, effective, and systematic means” of
balancing prosecutorial discretion and victims’ interests).
373. For a discussion of mercy and criminal justice, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 165-83 (1988).
374. See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1009-33 (1996) (discussing the role of mercy in the penalty phase
of capital sentencing); Malla Pollack, The Under Funded Death Penalty: Mercy as Discrimination in a Rights-Based System of Justice, 66 UMKC L. REV. 513, 550 (1998) (assailing the notion of “arbitrary mercy” in capital cases as violative of the “equal protection principle of distributive justice” and therefore incompatible with a rights-based justice system); Paul W. Cobb,
Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 393-408
(1989) (discussing the institutional status of and need for mercy in capital proceedings).
375. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
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B. Post-Liberal Models of Racialized Discretion: Critical Race
Theory
The alternative model of race-conscious, community-oriented
prosecutorial discretion sets aside the colorblind conventions of advocacy and adjudication well known in the civil and criminal justice systems. Instead, this model seeks to employ critical race theory in developing race-consciousness. Before implementation, however, this model
must first survive the threshold controversy over the meaning of raceconsciousness.377
Race-based classification schemes present categorical dilemmas
concerning the construction of racial identity and narrative. The dilemmas implicate Christopher Ford’s notion of “administering identity.”378 Ford reveals the strained coherence of racial differentiation in
regulating race-administration systems.379 Like any assembly combining
advocacy and adjudication, these systems labor under the added strain
of race-layered interactions of power. In this respect, john powell argues that the very “process of racial categorizing is a power struggle
implicating structural, cultural, economic, and identity politics.”380 A
product of this struggle, the prosecutorial role under the proposed
model of race-conscious discretion expands to recast the performative
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 366-72 (1996) (applying the tradition of mercy to the conviction
and sentencing process); Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 288, 330-43 (1993) (exploring the role and moral virtue of mercy in criminal sentencing).
376. See SCHOPP, supra note 364, at 180-83. Schopp observes that justice and mercy comprise “two distinct virtues” by ordinary understanding. Id. at 180. Virtuous persons, he explains,
“might determine that they ought to temper justice with mercy or that they ought to exercise
mercy rather than justice in some circumstances . . . .” Id. For Schopp, dilemmas of this kind
point out the deep-seated conflict between justice and mercy. See id.
377. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 passim (arguing that raceconsciousness helps to define modes of thinking about civil rights).
378. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in RaceConscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1231-40 (1994). Ford argues that today’s “laws and governmental regulations establish an enormously elaborate system of race-conscious policy.” Id.
at 1231-32.
379. See id. at 1240-62.
380. john a. powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered,
31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 803 (1997). Denominating race as a social construction, powell contends
that “white and black has [sic] to be understood in relationship to each other.” Id. So too, he
adds, relationships of social and political power, together with their implications, “must be
identified.” Id. To powell, there can be “no black without white” and “no white without black.”
Id. Powell maintains that “[i]n this sense we are all multiracial.” Id. At the same time, he concludes: “We are also fractured racially not because of blood, but because we are mutually and
continuously defining and constituting our race by what we include and exclude of the racial
other.” Id.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1216

10/14/99 9:35 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1157

function of racial identity in role-specific moral decisionmaking. David
Wilkins discerns this performative function in the role-specific behavior of the black bar during the civil rights movement.381 Within such sociolegal movements, Wilkins contends, “race based ties have moral as
well as social significance.”382 For Wilkins, race consciousness of the self
and of the other influences moral decisionmaking.383 That influence
prompts several objections.
An opening objection concerns the integration of role, identity,
and narrative. Challenging the presumption of epistemic access, the
objection refers to the twin difficulty of accurately discerning and describing identity and narrative. Even when these epistemic obstacles
may be surmounted (for instance by provisional forms of classification)
the difficulty of designing prescriptive policies and practices that will
advance “some conception of the good” may bar progress.384 While
lauded in the abstract, contingent classifications produce ad hoc remedial policies and practices. Moreover, reliance on contingency in the
categorical ordering of identity and narrative suggests that lawyers control the sociolegal epistemology of advocacy and adjudication and,
therefore, must prevail on the claim of “truth-as-warrantedassertability”385 in the context of the adversary system.
A satisfactory answer to this epistemic access objection demands
more than passing reference to the axioms of client consent and direction, at least as contemplated under the parameters of Model Rule 1.2,
which governs the scope of representation.386 Careful answer recom-

381. See David B. Wilkins, Social Engineers or Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education
and the Conscience of the Black Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW & CULTURE 137 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1997); see also David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education
in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1985-2013 (1993)
(positing black corporate lawyers’ obligation to combat oppression).
382. David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1041 (1995). Wilkins asserts that
“blacks are inextricably linked to each other in a manner that makes it predictable that the actions of individual blacks will affect the fate of the black community as a whole, and that ties
the opportunities available to any individual black to the progress of the group.” Id.
383. See id.
384. Colin M. Macleod, Liberal Neutrality or Liberal Tolerance?, 16 LAW & PHIL. 529, 54546 (1997) (discussing applications of the epistemic access argument to policy); cf. JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 173-211 (1993) (connecting justice to the notions of right and good).
385. David Luban, Lawyers Rule: A Comment on Patterson’s Theories of Truth, 50 SMU L.
REV. 1613, 1626-27 (1997). To Luban, law “is a specialized medium for distributing the burdens
of obligation; ultimately, law is concerned with mobilizing, demobilizing, or threatening to mobilize or demobilize the instruments of state violence.” Id. at 1625.
386. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(a) (1999). The Rule re-
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mends introduction of the idea of interpretive consensus. This formative notion of consensus provides a kind of founding consent to be used
both as an interpretive guide and as a means of ratification of an interpretive outcome.387
Ensnarled in the process of race- and group-based identity construction,388 even interpretive consensus may prove unable to solve the
enigma of individual and group identity.389 Perplexed by this interpretive endeavor, Lisa Ikemoto offers to treat identity “in a way that reclaims essentialism as socially useful information.”390 This reclaiming
requires the act of privileging identity. Extending the work of Jacques
Derrida, Madeleine Plasencia unburies the notion of privileging to locate an act of preference.391 Plasencia explains that the act of “preferring certain concepts over others in order to ground one’s theory
privileges or elevates subject (self) over object, one concept over another.”392 Expressing ideological preference through prosecutorial acts
of subject/object racial privileging implies the basic insecurity of identity. Common illustration of this unsteady quality may be seen in the
confusion surrounding the admissibility of character evidence in civil
and criminal trials due to the instability of personality.393
Further evidence of instability may be deciphered elsewhere in
identity constructions. For example, consider the uneasy meaning of
gender identity and role in the case of mothering. The same shifting
quires a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation,”
and moreover, to “consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” Id.
387. See Crosby, supra note 244, at 867 (rejecting the constitutional notion that “founding
consent” can guide interpretive outcomes because it is “inconsistent with Gadamerian legal
hermeneutics”).
388. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1757-77 (1993).
Harris contends that “law’s approach to group identity reproduces subordination, in the past
through ‘race-ing’ a group—that is, by assigning a racial identity that equated with inferior
status, and in the present by erasing racial group identity.” Id. at 1761.
389. See JON MICHAEL SPENCER, THE NEW COLORED PEOPLE: THE MIXED-RACE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 131-64 (1997) (noting the intermixing of ethnicity, culture, and class
in racial identity); Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups
and the Anglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381, 406-08 (1991) (relating the judicial struggle to define membership in racial groups).
390. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Racialization of Genomic Knowledge, 27 SETON HALL L. REV.
937, 948 (1997).
391. See Madeleine Plasencia, Who’s Afraid of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 219-27 (1997).
392. Id. at 223.
393. See Miguel A. Méndez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality,
45 EMORY L.J. 221, 226 (1996) (“In the absence of a stable personality, character evidence is
devoid of a valid predictive base and cannot be probative of an individual’s conduct across diverse situations.”).
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quality afflicts the duality of the “good” and “bad” mother,394 and the
identity-giving judgment delegated to prosecutorial discretion.395 A
similar inconstancy affects the dynamics of ethnic,396 sexual,397 cultural,398 and even religious identity.399 For each category of identity, cultural and political contests entangle legal actors in a process of social
construction.
The prevalence of identity-based prosecutions and defenses attracts a growing literature on the interrelationship of personal identity
and law.400 Consider the social construction of race in criminal cases.401
In the criminal justice setting, identity constructions contribute to the
intuitive and the analytic construction of racial reality, not simply to

394. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 692-723, 741-61 (1998);
see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101-42 (1995) (discussing deviant motherhood); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 945-54
(1997) (discussing the legal devaluation of and bias against black mothers).
395. See Murphy, supra note 394, at 719 (pointing out that prosecutors exercise decisionmaking discretion “against a backdrop of stereotypical good and bad mothers”).
396. See generally Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and
White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1995) (exploring the determination
and treatment of ethnicity/ethnic groups under the Constitution).
397. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of
Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995) (assailing judicial use of sexual
identifications as myths).
398. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 361-77 (1986) (discussing the history and philosophy of cultural
identity in America); see also Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of Alaska Natives and
the Criminal Justice System in Rural Alaska, 77 OR. L. REV. 1, 5-20 (1998) (discussing the clash
between the cultural mores of Native Alaskan communities and the institutional expectations
of the adversarial system of criminal justice).
399. See Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence
of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 124-40 (1997) (discussing the similarities between racial
and religious affiliation and identification). Yang asserts that race and religion rise to societal
importance “not because of their underpinnings in biology or pure belief, but because of their
cultural significance and social implications to the individual.” Id. at 123. For Yang, both “are
of similar importance because they play equivalent roles in the formation of an individual’s
conception of the self, sense of belonging, and value framework.” Id. Therefore, he concludes,
“they should be treated alike as a constitutional matter.” Id.
400. See Wade L. Robinson, Privacy and Personal Identity, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 195, 204-05
(1997) (connecting personal identity with norms of dignity, autonomy, and moral agency).
401. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
138-46 (1996) (discussing unconscious racism in the criminal justice system); Paula C. Johnson,
The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verité and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 355-59 (1996) (distinguishing biologically determined and
socially constructed differences in racial classification).

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

10/14/99 9:35 AM

PROSECUTING RACE

1219

the reification of an idea of color.402 Concretely, this contribution affects the assessment of racial credibility.403 Doubtless, credibility presents a crucial evidentiary judgment in criminal prosecution. Sheri Lynn
Johnson points out, for example, that prosecutors may very well
“screen the credibility of witnesses in a racially biased way.”404
In the same way, prosecutors may grade the credibility of victims
and defendants in a racially slanted way, particularly when the defense
implicitly or explicitly avers racial provocation. Surveying the law of
provocation, Victoria Nourse describes the evolving “personification”
of the defense.405 This “inward move,” Nourse explains, shifts normative inquiry “inside the emotional life of one person.”406 Interior shifting of this kind “takes normative questions (which passions the law
should protect) and puts them, in answer form, into the minds of the
defendants.”407 Hence, Nourse adds, “the standard questions asked in
provocation cases all focus on the emotional life of reasonable persons.”408 The job of overcoming a racial provocation defense pushes
prosecutors to invade that emotional life, making judgments about the
identity of the defendant and the victim, and then circulating those
judgments in juridical narratives at trial.
Racialized identity judgments and narratives occur against the historical background of race-based disdain and exclusion by the legal
profession.409 That history includes identity judgments that cross the
lines of race, gender, and sexuality in denigrating lawyers, clients, victims, and communities.410 Clients stand at great risk from racialized

402. For an intriguing critique of the concept of reification dominant in the literature of
Critical Legal Studies, see Anthony J. Fejfar, An Analysis of the Term “Reification” as Used in
Peter Gabel’s Reification in Legal Reasoning, 25 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 579, 596-610 (1996).
403. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 passim (1996) (describing the relationship between race and credibility).
404. Id. at 319 (mentioning the probable unreviewability of racially biased prosecutorial
decisions).
405. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1385 (1997).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Disdain of Alien Lawyers: History of Exclusion, 7 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 103, 120-32 (1996) (detailing legislative and judicial exclusion of aliens from
state bar associations).
410. See J. Clay Smith, Jr., Black Women Lawyers: 125 Years at the Bar; 100 Years in the
Legal Academy, 40 HOWARD L.J. 365, 372-79 (1997) (tracing the historical intersection of racial and gender hierarchies in the law); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Introduction: Law Is No Mystery to
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judgments. Clark Cunningham observes that such identity judgments
may inflict damage to client self-respect.411 The experience of selfrespect inhabits both private and public spheres. The private sphere of
self-respect grows out of self-perception. By contrast, the public sphere
of self-respect arises out of “the historical and sociopolitical situatedness of individuals.”412 Interpreting self-respect as a sociopolitical construction, Robin Dillon argues that “it develops and plays out against
the backdrop of social and political contexts,” and moreover, “that it
is constituted by and reflects prevailing forms of social and political
life.”413 According to Dillon, the constitution and expression of selfrespect “both at the level of individual experience and at the level of
concept, is a function of social relationships and the structure and
functioning of the social institutions among which we live.”414
Evaluating the damage to client, victim, or community selfrespect inflicted by lawyer identity judgments may be undertaken
through narrative. Indeed, the form and content of narrative may
furnish a rough measure of the damage to identity exacted from sociopolitical devaluation and subordination. Narrative acquires sociolegal power in the courtroom and in society despite its stylistic
ambiguity.415 The variable, heavily contingent quality of narrative does
not diminish it as a resource for lawyers, clients, victims, and their
communities. Admittedly, practitioners of the narrative form give
strong reasons for skepticism.416 Even the sympathetic puzzle over the

Black Women, in REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 1, 6 (J.
Clay Smith, Jr., ed., 1998) (mentioning that “the voices and the ideals of black women lawyers
have evolved in spite of the jagged edges of social and legal culture that have attempted to assign her to historical oblivion by simply excluding her from the matrix of legal thought”).
411. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1325-28 (1992); see also Robin
S. Dillon, Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, and Political, 107 ETHICS 226 (1997).
412. Dillon, supra note 411, at 243.
413. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
414. Id.
415. See Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Immigration Law and the Promise of Critical Race Theory:
Opening the Academy to the Voices of Aliens and Immigrants, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 121219 (1997) (defending narrative as the best means of presenting unrepresented views of subordinated groups).
416. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 800-10
(1998). Raising issues of concrete narrative application in criticism and public policy, Hyman
asks: “[C]an one tell truth from fabrication? Are the unrepresentative stories ignored, and the
representative ones embraced? How, if at all, is the frequency of an event factored into the
equation? What is the baseline from which the stories are assessed?” Id. at 799 (footnote omitted).
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accuracy, truthfulness, and representativeness of narrative.417 Here, for
example, the context of racial immigration and anti-immigrant bias
shows the mystifying iterability of narrative in law, culture, and society.
Whatever the ambit of narrative in cultural and social texts, the
forceful play of narrative imagery stands undeniable.418 The criminal
justice context provides a forum for the intersection of narrative image
and text. That forum offers a fertile site for manufacturing stereotypes
rooted in race, gender, and sexuality. Noting the narrative intersectionality of this sociolegal site may guide prosecutors in fashioning a raceconscious model of community-oriented discretion. But without more
evidence of race-conscious community practices reliant on identity
judgments and narrative performances, that guidance will go unchanneled. As a result, Carter and other prosecutors may adopt strategies
that garner tactical appeal419 but fail to dismantle or actively bolster entrenched structural hierarchies of race, gender, and economic subordination.420 To carve a path for such experimental discretion, prosecutors
should assess several existing race-conscious practices, some flourishing, others faltering.

417. See id. at 809. Again, Hyman inquires:
Is the “flash of recognition” enough to ensure only “good anecdotes” become the basis for laws, or are additional safeguards necessary? Should we ignore narrative unless it is accompanied by an affidavit? Is a single affidavit sufficient, or should we require cross-examination and confirming witnesses? Is a statistical analysis which
proves typicality and frequency necessary?
Id.
418. On the subjective love for the “living image,” or social representation of the law, see
Peter Goodrich, “The Unconscious Is a Jurist”: Psychoanalysis and Law in the Work of Pierre
Legendre, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 195, 201 (1996). Goodrich observes that the law—“the images,
symbols and rites around which law is identified and reproduced”—constitute “domains of attachment or subjects of love.” Id. at 228. The function of the image, according to Goodrich, “is
to incite attachment and to focus desire or love upon circumscribed social objects of affection
or legitimate political sites.” Id. On this analysis, the very “structure of social love is one of the
great enigmas of political power and one of the most opaque of the features of the history of
law.” Id.
419. For an example of such strategies, see Kenneth Winchester Gaines, Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Toward Proper Use in the Criminal Trial Context, 20 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 227, 23032 (1996-97).
420. See Regina Austin, Nest Eggs and Stormy Weather: Law, Culture, and Black Women’s
Lack of Wealth, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 767, 769-77 (1997) (noting institutional impediments
blocking poor black women’s ability to accumulate wealth, and advocating government macroeconomic policy initiatives favoring such accumulation); Patricia Hill Collins, AfricanAmerican Women and Economic Justice: A Preliminary Analysis of Wealth, Family, and African-American Social Class, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 825, 829-51 (1997) (citing class reproduction of a
racialized system of inherited privilege and disadvantage in explicating economic inequality of
African-American women).
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A glancing analysis of the fields of civil and criminal law uncovers a wide variety of race-conscious practices ranging from affirmative action programs to political referenda.421 Similar analysis reveals
an equally broad spectrum of gender- and sex-oriented practices.422
For the limited purpose of this comparative inquiry, consider two diverse sets of fields where race-conscious practices seem to sustain expansion (e.g., environmental justice and transracial adoption) and to
suffer contraction (e.g., employment discrimination and jury selection).423 Although in no sense exhaustive, the instant canvassing effectively demonstrates the far-reaching diffusion and the divergent tendencies of race-conscious practices in law and society.
Race-conscious practices emanate from the field of environmental protection through the development of the environmental justice movement.424 Evolving out of a multipronged critique of environmental protection, poverty,425 and race,426 the movement connects
communities of color to the environment427 under an ideology of “re421. See Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California
Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1145-49 (1996) (examining the colorblind content of California’s Proposition 209); L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California Style—Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding a Fatal Constitutional Attraction
Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 281, 290-311 (1997) (examining the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 209).
422. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1205-29 (1998) (tracing the developing jurisprudence of sexual harassment); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2456-73 (1997)
(applying his earlier-developed jurisprudence of “coming out” to a variety of constitutional
cases).
423. This truncated grouping omits a substantial number of criminal justice system practices, including pretextual stops and arrests, germane to future investigation. See Sean Hecker,
Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 554-71 (1997).
424. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3 passim (Robert D. Bullard ed.,
1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION] (tracing the evolution and politics of the environmental justice movement); Deeohn Ferris, A Call for Justice and Equal Environmental Protection, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra, at 298 passim (recommending federal environmental
protection initiatives advancing the environmental justice movement).
425. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641-54 (1992) (finding that mainstream
environmental groups have failed to represent the poor with respect to environmental dangers).
426. See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 424, at 53, 53 (examining the “reasons why communities of color bear
a disparate burden of pollution”).
427. See Dorceta Taylor, Can the Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Sup-
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source egalitarianism.”428 Based on local traditions of community action and organization,429 people of color participating in the movement search for a more inclusive environmental coalition430 in a kind
of democratization effort. In doing so, they “increase the movement’s
size and power,” and “alter the environmental organizations themselves,”431 consequently influencing environmental prosecutions432 and
criminal trials.433
The swift expansion of race-conscious practices in organizing
communities of color around public and private legal initiatives in
order to combat environmental crime and pollution-site discrimination contrasts with the harmful, more covert enlargement of raceconscious practices in the realm of the family. For illustration, consider the phenomena of transracial adoption434 and racial preference435
port of Minorities?, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 28, 41-42
(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (noting the grassroots movement’s appeal to minorities in poor communities).
428. The theory of “resource egalitarianism” is based on the concepts of distributive justice
for environmental resources. See Will Kymlicka, Concepts of Community and Social Justice, in
EARTHLY GOODS: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 30, 32-33 n.10 (Fen Osler
Hampson & Judith Reppy eds., 1996).
429. For an example of community action and resistance in white and black communities,
see PHIL BROWN & EDWIN J. MIKKELSEN, NO SAFE PLACE: TOXIC WASTE, LEUKEMIA, AND
COMMUNITY ACTION 43-74 (1990) (discussing community organization in response to a childhood leukemia cluster in Woburn, Massachusetts).
430. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 110-17 (1990) (advocating a policy of inclusion and diversification in the environmental movement).
431. Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 987 (1998).
Carlson adds that an environmental movement more inclusive in scope “could even alter the
nature of the issues on which environmental groups focus.” Id. This alteration, she reasons,
“could help environmental groups to rethink what environmentalism actually means and thus
might help them see and embrace emerging environmental issues such as environmental justice
or new methods of environmental problem solving that attempt to balance competing needs.”
Id.
432. See Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecutorial Decision Making and the Environmental Prosecutor: Reaching a Crossroads for Public Protection, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND
CRIMINALITY 77, 78-96 (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds., 1996) (probing factors influencing prosecutorial decisionmaking in cases of environmental crime).
433. See id. at 90. Commenting on environmental crime trials, Rebovich states:
[I]t is the intimacy that local prosecutors have with the local court politics, the immediate community affected by the offenses, and the local public’s comfort that the
community has with its district attorney that is underscored as an invaluable determinant in gaining satisfying dispositions for the state. Local prosecutors argue that it
is their identification with the local community—its customs, hopes, and anxieties—
that make local prosecutors ideal for accurately gauging judge/juror levels of understanding of toxic dangers and fears associated with pollution.
Id.
434.

See Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race,
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in adoption. Race-inferred variance in caregiving across cultural
communities and subcultures436 quietly extends and reinstantiates the
hierarchy of racial status subordinating black437 and ethnic438 identity
in adoption determinations. Racialized status inferiority also materializes unmarked and unimpeded in the application of the relevant
standards of adjudication in child welfare cases,439 as well as in racialmatching440 and placement441 decisions.
Next, consider fields designated by narrowing race-conscious
practices: employment discrimination and jury selection. Since the
slow unraveling of the school desegregation decrees of the post442
Brown era, no area of publicly administered racial classification
and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 108-21 (1998) (identifying possible
reasons for race-based hostility to transracial adoptions).
435. See Davidson M. Pattiz, Note, Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571, 2600-05 (1994) (discussing the need for transracial adoption
given the high percentage of black children in foster care).
436. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent
Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 358-60 (1996) (discussing the effect of acculturation on children’s reactions to everyday separations).
437. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of
Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, 945 (1994) (refuting “the argument that
same-race placement is necessary” to “foster a positive racial identity in Black children”).
438. See Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification
of the Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21 (1997) (considering legislation
giving tribal courts jurisdiction over the adoption placement of Native American children in the
hope of better serving the children’s best interests).
439. See Gayle Pollack, The Role of Race in Child Custody Decisions Between Natural Parents over Biracial Children, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603 (1997) (urging modification of the “best interests of the child” test to consider parental ability to foster positive racial
identity). Pollack asserts that “[a] biracial child’s ability to form a cohesive racial identity is important to her emotional development.” Id. at 626. She cautions, however, that “even statutes
which comprehensively enumerate factors to consider in determining the best interests of the
child do not tell judges to consider parental ability to help a child form a positive racial identity.” Id. Such an instruction, she emphasizes, “is important to a court’s ability to determine the
best placement for a biracial child.” Id.
440. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1183-1245 (1991) (examining current racialmatching policies and their impact on minority children).
441. See Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 57-83 (1990-91) (examining the relationship between race and the
“best interests of the child” test, and criticizing the test for permitting judges such broad discretion that issues of race may supersede other concerns such as a child’s psychological wellbeing); Myriam Zreczny, Note, Race-Conscious Child Placement: Deviating from a Policy
Against Racial Classifications, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1994) (observing that racial
classification systems survive strict scrutiny in child placement cases).
442. See April Chou, Racial Classifications, in RACE VERSUS CLASS 45, 65-66 (Carol M.
Swain ed., 1996) (arguing that government-sponsored racial and ethnic classification systems
for data collection and public policy administration fail to represent the nation’s diversity).
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generates more rancor than the field of private and public employment. Yet, despite ongoing controversy, colorblind principles still
enjoy muted legitimacy.443 Rooted in notions of “universalism and abstract individualism,”444 those principles survived the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent development of disparate-treatment theory. Over time, these changes modified the standard for weighing proof of discrimination and measuring the present
effects of past discrimination in employment as well as in housing.445
Furthermore, they altered the concept of preferential treatment later
elaborated in the policy of affirmative action.446 None of these developments, however confining, check the colorblind “aspiration” 447 of
liberal theory. Even within the closing ambit of race-conscious practices, none halt the essentialist construction of individual and group
racial identity in employment discrimination cases. Bound up in the
implied statutory precondition of racial immutability, 448 essentialist
identity construction suffuses disparate treatment cases.449 Moreover,
the cases seem struck by court insistence of fixed neutrality in both
rule and racial category.450 Citing this requirement, e. christi cunningham asserts that the category of race discrimination requires “the invention of a quality called ‘race’ and the collective treatment of peo-

443. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 34 (1996) (explaining that the “color-blind model was
seen as legitimate and in the interests of blacks because [in the 1960s] it was unreflectively attached to a causal principle: it was believed to result in black equality, understood in terms of
near equal participation in society”).
444. Id.
445. For a review of similar effects in the field of residential segregation, see Cindy Kam,
Residential Segregation, Racial Discrimination, and the Road to Reform, in RACE VERSUS
CLASS, supra note 442, at 207.
446. See Carol M. Swain, Affirmative Action Revisited, in RACE VERSUS CLASS, supra note
442, at 1, 3-13 (tracking the paradigm shift from equal opportunity to preferential treatment).
447. See PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA, 1933-1972, at 7 (1997) (noting congressional
embrace of colorblind principles in civil rights legislation); see also ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 7-21 (1992).
448. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 328-32 (1997) (finding that
courts’ assertion of immutability places limits on Title VII’s protection).
449. See e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected
Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 496-500 (1998) (arguing
that construing an individual’s identity based on race or gender limits that person’s opportunity
for self-definition).
450. See Engle, supra note 448, at 353-57.
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ple according to that invention.”451 The danger of race-cabined invention, cunningham explains, arises when “individuals, after years of
shackling, out of habit, or out of political necessity, begin to identify
themselves according to the ties that have bound their creativity
rather than their own invention.”452
Race-conscious jury selection practices also fit within a larger literature documenting the intersection of race, criminal law, and procedure.453 This intersection locates race-conscious practices in the
courtroom, especially visible in the summoning and selection of jurors.454 Procedures governing jury selection, particularly concerning
the regulation of peremptory strikes during voir dire, deserve special
attention given the historical exploitation of the selection process to
disadvantage people of color. Sheri Lynn Johnson comments, for example, that “the data on race and guilt attribution, coupled with an
understanding of unconscious racism, compels the conclusion that
what black defendants need is not purification of voir dire procedures, but black jurors.”455 But the risk of juror bias in high profile
cases where the potential jury pool may be exposed to prejudicial
pretrial publicity456 rests unchanged by the improvement in black juror representation. Short of “affirmative selection” jury selection
procedures,457 the task of accurately discerning and eradicating juror

451. cunningham, supra note 449, at 496-97 (footnote omitted).
452. Id. at 497.
453. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1016 passim (1988) (mapping presence of unconscious racism in the reasoning of race
and criminal procedure decisions).
454. See HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 5 (1993). The authors argue that notwithstanding changes, “a
system still exists in which the legal and judicial structures continuously reproduce, maintain,
and perpetuate the subordination of racial and ethnic minorities.” Id. at 34. Moreover, they add
that “[h]istorically, these minorities have been discouraged, if not prevented, from full participation in political structures, courts, and the judicial decision-making process.” Id. On this assessment, it is labor-market and other socioeconomic inequalities that “serve to reinforce the
poor representation of minority jurors.” Id.
455. Johnson, supra note 453, at 1024 (footnote omitted).
456. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 943, 974 (1997) (noting that “media saturation coverage” of high-profile trials
places the burden of ensuring fairness on the effective use of the traditional tools of “voir dire
questioning of jurors, challenges for cause, change of venue, and sequestration”).
457. José Felipé Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the
Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 392-99 (1998) (proposing a system of jury selection that would permit a defendant to trade peremptory challenges for affirmative selections of jurors).
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bias may be, as Christopher Slobogin suggests, a “futile endeavor.”458
Permitting the defendant to trade peremptory challenges in order to
seat qualified jurors believed to be favorable to his cause459 may easily
turn pernicious, notwithstanding the admission of race-conscious motive. Ironically, given the narrowing of discretionary opportunities for
lawyer facilitation of racial discrimination in jury selection, Christopher Smith and John Burrow mention that the Supreme Court’s ratification of pretextual, race-based peremptory challenges “enables attorneys to use their discretion in excluding jurors by race—so long as
they do not admit their true motives.”460
The unsteady evolution of race-conscious practices under liberal
models of ethical discretion comes to awkward fruition within postliberal models of racialized discretion deduced from critical race theory. Together the models highlight the importance and uncertainty of
racial identity and narrative to such normative determinations. In the
Louima case, both racial identity and narrative seem to inform Carter’s decision to pursue a superseding federal prosecution and to refer the case to the Justice Department for a department-wide investigation of police brutality. The conduct involved in the Louima assault
and its accompanying rhetoric seem plainly to evoke race and the
continuity of state-sponsored sexualized racial violence in American
history. Confronting this history, Carter made the following statement: “People of ordinary common sense, and people with a sense of
history of the perceived and real police misuse of force in this country
will understand the skepticism that many in minority communities
have that police misuse-of-force allegations will be taken seriously.”461
Furthermore, he offered: “You have to ask yourself this question: In
the absence of a videotape, what was the likelihood of there having
been a prosecution in the Rodney King case? This is part of our history.”462 Historical resistance by communities of color to racial violence inflicted by private and state actors, taken together with stilldeveloping race-conscious practices in varied civil and criminal law
fields, allow for the discussion of race-conscious, community-based
prosecutorial discretion.

458. Slobogin, supra note 301, at 749.
459. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
460. Christopher E. Smith & John Burrow, Race-ing into the Twenty-First Century: The Supreme Court and the (E)Quality of Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 279, 289 (1997).
461. Firestone, supra note 17, at B2.
462. Id.
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V. PROSECUTORIAL RACE- AND COMMUNITY-BASED DUTIES
This Part considers whether federal prosecutors ought to bear
race-conscious and community-oriented duties to investigate and to
prosecute cases of racially motivated violence. It endeavors to show
that the foundation for such duties may arise from a battery of norms
moored in constitutional precepts, citizenship ideals, professionalism
values, racial traditions, and moral customs. Consideration of special,
race-based prosecutorial duties warrants revisiting the general purpose
of prosecution. Typically construed, the purpose of prosecution translates in terms of positive law sanction, moral retribution, and instrumental deterrence. Yet an alternative purpose of prosecution exists in
the form of the heroic moral witness. On this construction, the prosecutor rises up as a historic witness to confront injustice. The idea of
bearing witness in legal advocacy animates other areas of the profession, notably the conduct of death penalty defense practice.463 Applied
to the facts of the Louima case, the idea urges a more expansive view
of Carter as a heroic witness in the historical struggle for American racial dignity and equality.464
The “heroic witness” tradition militates against the denunciation
of the prosecutorial function as a blunt instrument of white dominance.465 Casting that function in the starkness of racial hierarchy sends
prosecutorial discretion veering far from the abolition or punishment
of racism toward the manufacture and reproduction of sociolegal
privilege. In cases of racially motivated violence, the re-entrenchment
of dominance occurs in the state representation of the black body. For
463. See Michael Mello, A Letter on a Lawyer’s Life of Death, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 121, 168
(1997) (“We litigate for the historians, the sociologists, and the anthropologists, in addition to
litigating for the courts.”); Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 365 (1996) (“In their address to the present audience, death
penalty lawyers serve as witnesses to injustice; in their address to the future, they serve as historians memorializing the injustices they witness.”).
464. For a comparable discussion of the tendency to look for heroism in the historical development of racial equality, see Ronald K. Noble, Between Complicity and Contempt: Racial
Presumptions of the American Legal Process, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 664, 681-83 (1997) (reviewing
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996)) (citing Judge Higginbotham’s recognition of “heroes”).
465. White dominance operates in a variety of juridical, cultural, and social dimensions
through an identity-making process designating racial and ethnic difference. See generally
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of “White Ethnics” in the United
States, in TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND
WORKING CLASS HISTORY 181 (1994) (noting difficulty in applying standards of “whiteness”
without contrast to “non-white” and “ethnic” groups).
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the prosecutor, representation traditionally entails the defense of the
victim’s body, rather than the person or community of the victim. The
notion of “representing the body”466 suggests an alienation or estrangement from not only the person, but also the community of the
victim in criminal and civil rights prosecution.
The practice of victim- and community-estrangement is deeply
embedded in the tradition of criminal prosecution. In the Louima case,
this practice finds challenge from calls for federal prosecutorial intervention. These calls articulate an inchoate politics of prosecutorinstigated community organization and mobilization around claims of
criminal and civil rights injustice. Such mobilization offers the promise
of wider forms of community organization about issues relevant not
only to crime and criminal justice, but also to education, equality, and
economic development.
The creation of race-based victim- and community-affirming
prosecutorial duties requires a move beyond “body-centered” advocacy to higher traditions of representation animated by the values of
citizenship, professionalism, race, morality, and the Constitution. That
move involves a jurisgenerative process of normative reconstruction in
law and lawyering.467 Producing an account of special responsibilities in
the prosecutorial setting of racial violence demands both normative
and pragmatic review. On normative grounds, Samuel Scheffler argues
that “special responsibilities need to be set within the context of our
overall moral outlook and constrained in suitable ways by other pertinent values.”468 Under a positive law regime, the values may be acquired by voluntary act, by office, or by rule. The offices, rules, and acts
of prosecutors shape conceptions of racial fairness, social good, and
community.

466. This phrase belongs to Lash LaRue. See Interview with Professor Lewis Henry LaRue,
Washington and Lee University School of Law, in Lexington, Va. (Nov. 2, 1998).
467. See, e.g., Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 710-42 (1997) (conceptualizing mediation as
a multivariant process of social norm formulation and implementation).
468. Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 189, 207
(1997). Scheffler argues that these responsibilities may be constrained in three different ways:
Some [constraints] may affect the content of special responsibilities, by setting limits
to the circumstances in which, and the extent to which, people are required to give
priority to the interests of those to whom they have such responsibilities. Other constraints may affect the strength of special responsibilities, by supplying countervailing
considerations that are capable of outweighing or overriding those responsibilities in
various contexts. Still other constraints may affect people’s reasons for valuing their
relationships.
Id.
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On pragmatic grounds, Brian Leiter urges that “theorizing should
make a difference to practice (or experience).”469 Put differently, the
task in founding a race-conscious prosecutorial politics of community
outreach is to theorize about norms pragmatically. “Fruitful, pragmatic
theory-construction,”470 according to Leiter, follows from the “recognition that the only possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic
norms—norms about what to believe—are pragmatic.”471 For Leiter,
the burden of undertaking pragmatic normative theorizing lies in the
acceptance of “the epistemic norms that work for us—that help us predict sensory experience, that allow us to manipulate and control the
environment successfully, that enable us to ‘cope.’”472 Enlarging prosecutorial duties adds the further onus of pragmatic cross-racial collaboration in both integrated and segregated communities. Close study of
the context of a local community persuade Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabel that “workable, long-term collaboration can issue from, and aid
the construction of, the institution of problem-solving deliberation itself.”473
A. Constitutional Norms
Constitutional norms may provide the foundation for prosecutorial race-conscious duties of community outreach in cases of racially
motivated violence. That formulation stems from the federal prosecutor’s role as a constitutional officer. By constitutional grant under Article II, the President enjoys the power to appoint, subject to Senate confirmation, the Attorney General and the inferior posts of U.S.
Attorney for each of the twelve judicial districts.474 Codified in subsequent congressional enabling legislation, the President thus appoints
both the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney for each of the re-

469. Leiter, supra note 246, at 304. Leiter defines pragmatism in terms of “a double commitment, pertaining, on the one hand, to the enterprise of theorizing itself, and on the other, to
epistemology.” Id.
470. Id. at 304 n.161.
471. Id. at 307.
472. Id. To Leiter, pragmatic criteria present “the only possible criteria for the acceptance
of epistemic norms precisely because we can’t defend our choice of any particular epistemic
norm on epistemic grounds ad infinitum.” Id. Although undetermined, at a future point of
analysis he insists, “we must reach an epistemic norm for which the best we can say is, ‘it
works.’” Id.
473. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 322 (1998).
474. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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spective judicial districts.475 To this extent, Carter inhabits a constitutionally sanctioned position ratified by both the executive and the legislative branches of the federal government.476 This endorsement gives
Carter constitutional and statutory sources of authority beyond the endowment of general oversight function over the federal criminal justice
system within the Eastern District of New York. Along with the charge
of district-wide administration of justice477 comes the duty to implement
a general policy of nondiscrimination.
The principle of nondiscrimination mandates the equal treatment
of all defendants, victims, and communities. The prosecutorial mandate
of equal treatment extends to core, defendant-specific decisions to investigate, to charge, to go to trial, and to recommend sentence by plea
or alternative means.478 But that mandate may collide at times with a
revised set of obligations to secure victim and community justice.
Moreover, because case-by-case conceptions of victim and community
justice may compete and even conflict, the collision may rupture
evolving commitments and outreach efforts to the victim, his family,
and his community. The inherent vagueness of the notion of community intensifies that rupture.
The collision may also strain, in one of two ways, the obligation of
prosecutors to obey the law. The first kind of strain arises from competing obligation either internal to the definition of the law or external
to the law in culture and society. The second kind goes to the ability to
comply with the proscriptions of statutory or common law. Both elements may be particularly acute at the investigative and pretrial stages
of a case where overreaching seems most likely to occur. The Justice
Department probe into prosecutorial misconduct in the Louima case
illustrates the motives, incentives, and attendant risks of prosecutorial
overreaching with respect to witness coercion and contemplated immunity deals. Similar risks attend the pretrial stage where exculpatory
materials may be withheld, and the trial stage where inflammatory
475. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 541(a) (1994).
476. Davis points to the position of federal prosecutors within the executive branch as an
illustration of their “unique position” to exercise discretion “to eliminate many of the racial
disparities in the criminal justice system.” Davis, supra note 263, at 50.
477. Commenting on the prosecutorial administrative oversight function, Davis highlights
the interrelated duties of insuring systemic fairness and efficiency by “recognizing injustice in
the system and initiating corrective measures.” Id. at 51.
478. See ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
AND PROBATION 1-4 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the historical and contemporary unequal treatment of minorities by prosecutors and judges with regard to both plea bargaining and sentencing).
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statements may be pronounced in closing arguments. Even sentencing
may be influenced, for example, when prosecutors improperly resist alternative forms of disposition or downward departure recommendations.
As in the Louima case, suspected prosecutorial infidelity to the
law may feed criticism by defense counsel on the grounds of misconduct or partisanship and, more seriously, engender a public perception
of illegitimacy. The turmoil of illegitimacy may be aggravated by the
additional claim of unjust law enforcement. Defense counsel in the
Louima case, for example, claim that Carter abused civil rights law in
order to punish police misconduct. Proponents of this claim argue that
the deployment of civil rights statutes to punish offending officers unfairly racializes otherwise neutral state conduct. They implicitly argue
that such deployment undercuts positive law civil/criminal distinctions
and violates the separation of law and morality in civil society. Nevertheless, by reinforcing the chief distinctions of positive law regimes in
the defense of institutionally tolerated racial violence, proponents of
the above claim threaten to stumble into the accommodationist posture
of the antebellum period.479 Although a limited positivistic explanation
may inadequately comprehend the full text of antebellum lawyer and
judicial conduct, the neglect of extralegal considerations provided at
least part of the animating force behind that conduct. Debate over the
appropriate place and weight to be accorded extralegal considerations
in the calculus of positive law and its enforcement continues unabated
in American jurisprudence.480 The resurgence of interest in Holmes, for
example, signals an enduring dissonance spurred by that debate and
the controverted separation of law and morality.481
B. Citizenship Norms
Citizenship norms likewise may advance the development of
prosecutorial race-conscious duties of community outreach in cases of
racially motivated violence. Early American history supplies a citizen479. Consider in this light the racial accommodation by the French legal community in Vichy
France. See Philip Shuchman, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
607, 629-41 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN
FRANCE (1996)).
480. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS 77-108 (1998) (framing the lawyer’s duty to obey the law in terms of the jurisprudential
tension between legal and nonlegal norms).
481. See Symposium, The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 HARV. L. REV.
989 (1997); Symposium, The Path of the Law Today, 78 B.U. L. REV. 691 (1998).
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ship-inspired vision of a lawyer’s role and duty.482 Bruce Frohnen points
out that the early American lawyer’s responsibilities transcended narrow, professional interests to encompass a sense of public good and
community integration.483 Indeed, Frohnen notes, the lawyer’s sense of
calling derived in part from the duties expected “of a citizen, a member
of a church, a member of a family, and a pious man.”484
The cultivation of prosecutorial race-conscious duties of community outreach gleans from this vision to create a “shared citizenship” of
liberal constituents engaged in “self-restrained, moderate, and reasonable” conduct.485 Derivation of the notion of self-government from a
private/public sense of civic virtue evokes Michael Sandel’s work on
liberalism and self-governance.486 Sandel remarks that “proliferating
sites of civic activity and political power can serve self-government by
cultivating virtue, equipping citizens for self-rule, and generating loyalties to larger political wholes.”487 Local, decentralized proliferation
of this sort conforms to the scheme of political pluralism, often defined in terms of group competition, relative truth, and limited state
mediation. Yet pluralism may promote group isolation and disaggregation, and furthermore, encourage a false sense of civic consensus. To
that extent, the pluralist paradigm may very well undermine citizenship
norms, especially when that paradigm is suffused with an unyielding
structure of racial hierarchy characterized by white dominance and
black subordination.
In similar fashion, republican norms pose an obstacle to citizenship norms. The republican vision presents a weak and deformed conception of the racial other. In terms of citizenship, the other belongs to
the minority group in politics and society. Denoted as inferior, the racial other is consigned to the margins of public participation in civic
discourse and deliberative decisionmaking. Phyliss Craig-Taylor explains that the citizenship ideal falls partial and impoverished with re-

482. See Russel G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250-58 (1992) (tracking early historical development of the republican vision of the lawyer’s role).
483. See Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and Community in Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 933 (1995).
484. Id.
485. Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56, 59 (1998).
486. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
487. Id. at 348.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1234

10/14/99 9:35 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1157

spect to race.488 Searching out the normative content of citizenship,
Craig-Taylor finds the devastation of servitude489 and the ideology of
inferiority.490
To cure this poverty of exclusion, consider the alternative normative content available in the communitarian491 values of cooperation,
remorse, and moral accountability.492 Surely race-sensitive cooperation
and remorse over race-motivated competition render a firm normative
basis for citizenship. Accountability for the sins of racial self-interest
and rivalry strengthens that basis. But these values also generate epistemological doubts and gamble risks of manipulation.493 Further, they
do nothing to diminish the hazard of discriminatory impact.494 Even in
translating the idea of racial representation, the communitarian difficulty seems pronounced, for example, in the class action setting. Beset
by unresolved intraclass conflicts over representation495 and undispelled
doubts about procedural fairness,496 the communitarian alternative may
fail as a viable framework for remedial prescriptions of citizenship.
For remedial purposes, consider citizenship tied to the notion of
respect.497 This notion serves as the premise for the standard of the re488. See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 45 (1998).
489. See id. at 55-56 (contending that “having begun life in America as property for other
Americans, the citizenship status of ‘free’ African Americans was continuously problematic”)
(footnote omitted).
490. See id. at 56 (arguing that “in the wake of post-emancipation anxiety, intellectual and
theological theories and social practice soon established the ‘inherent inferiority’ of African
Americans in law and culture”).
491. See Kraig James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism, Federalism,
and American Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 71-80 (1996).
492. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”:
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1510-23 (1997).
493. See id. at 1554-56.
494. See id. at 1548-53.
495. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (probing client-organization and client-counsel conflicts in class action litigation over school desegregation).
496. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN L. REV. 1183, 122162 (1982) (evaluating procedural mechanisms for coping with interest and value conflicts in institutional-reform class actions); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623,
1644-80 (1997) (mapping individualist, democratic, expertise, and integrated models of procedural and ethical rules to promote democratic means of client goal setting and expertise-driven
norms of attorney decisionmaking in group litigation).
497. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
445, 482-506 (1997) (discussing the possibility of “respect as a legal standard for sexual harass-
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spectful person.498 The source of this standard lies in ethical personal
relationships. Its content draws from the obligations found in the
evolving doctrine of sexual harassment law. The respectful person, according to Anita Bernstein, “is a standard that measures action rather
than reaction.”499 Under its terms, “the actor is charged with a duty to
refrain from offending others by keeping his behavior within the
boundaries of respect.”500
Bernstein’s conception relies on both common sense and respect.501 Indeed, she propounds respect as a “commonsensical norm.”502
Implied here is the principle of equal respect familiar from political
liberalism.503 That principle spawns problems of compliance and enforcement. To rectify these familiar problems, Bernstein departs from
the standard of respectful conduct “encouraged by conventional reasonable person rules” to an elevated standard of respect under which a
racially biased citizen “knows it is he, rather than his accuser, who will
be held directly to the standard.”504 In the Louima case, both the arresting and the conspiring officers comprise a racially biased citizen
group. Their prosecution and investigation reaffirms the principle of
equal respect and shared citizenship applied to communities of color in
criminal justice enforcement.
C. Professionalism Norms
Professionalism norms similarly may aid the formulation of prosecutorial race-conscious duties of community outreach in cases of racially motivated violence. Long mired in partisanship and moral nonaccountability traditions,505 professionalism norms often give rise to
amoral and immoral acts typified in the exploitative conduct of the
ment cases”).
498. See id. at 507.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. See id. at 521-24.
502. Id. at 521.
503. See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV.
385, 413 (1996) (“[F]or the government to treat its citizens with equal respect requires that it
treat each citizen’s interest in autonomy as equal, and that it respect and enhance the capacity
of each citizen to choose her own ends and not have them determined or unduly influenced by
others.”).
504. Bernstein, supra note 497, at 507.
505. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393-403 (1988)
(binding the standard conception of the lawyer’s role to the principles of partisanship and
moral nonaccountability).
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Holmesian-inclined advocate.506 To break from these traditions, consider the prosecutorial function as an expression of moral action. That
expression flows not merely as an extension of legislative will or juridical power, but as an independent exercise of professional morality. The
federal criminal justice system is replete with examples of prosecutorexerted ethical discretion. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for instance, furnish a substantial discretionary opportunity in plea negotiation.507 This discretionary opportunity stretches to leniency as well.508
But that expanded reach also opens the opportunity for the imposition
of disparate treatment.509
Avoiding discriminatory treatment and harnessing the opportunity
to deploy professional norms as a means of deterring crimes of racialized violence510 requires a model of ethical decisionmaking. For guidance, consider the work of Robert Cover on the process of judging,511
particularly his notion of a “dialectical environment.”512 In his pathbreaking study of antislavery judges and the adjudication of fugitive
slave cases, Cover explains that the antislavery judge “acted amidst a
dialectical process.”513 The process took two forms. One captured “the
adversary proceeding before him.”514 Another enveloped “the sense of
506. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-60
(1897) (introducing a moral conception of the extralegal actor as a “bad man”); see also David
J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. REV. 515, 552-57 (1997) (discussing various contemporary
reactions to Holmes’s “bad man” standard). Robert Gordon assails Holmes for too often urging legal actors and decisionmakers “to defer to power even more than their role requires, to
be passive instruments of society’s or clients’ ends rather than active forces to help refigure and
transform those ends.” Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1018 (1997). Gordon also condemns Holmes for discarding “the traditional roles for lawyers as
seekers of justice, social mediators, and curators of the legal framework” whether performed in
isolation or in collaboration with larger reform movements. Id.
507. See James B. Burns et. al, We Make the Better Target (But the Guidelines Shifted Power
from the Judiciary to Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1317, 1326-35 (1997).
508. See David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for RealOffense Sentencing, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1434, 1438-39 (1997).
509. See Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 577-80, 582-83, 608-10, 621-23, 630 (1998) (describing prosecutorial discretion and resulting sentencing disparities).
510. See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2488 (1997) (arguing that “social influence can generate affirmative
deterrence strategies that are both politically acceptable and morally appealing”).
511. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975).
512. Id. at 211-16.
513. Id. at 211.
514. Id.
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the larger struggle of ideological movements to which the proceeding
often seemed related.”515
Cover enumerates three primary factors of influence comprising
this juridical dialectical environment.516 At the outset, he points to “the
ideological basis of advocacy.”517 Unearthing this basis, he finds a shift
to extralegal argument and militant advocacy. The Louima case displays the same “heightened moral intensity of advocacy.”518 This intensity seems to shun settlement and to discount pecuniary gain in favor of
moral struggle, whether against state-sponsored slavery or police brutality. In fact, Cover notes that “both ideological poles had a distaste
for settling the fugitive case, preferring to see it as symbolic of the
struggle between inconsistent moral demands rather than as a simple
matter of pecuniary interest.”519
At the same time, Cover cites “the presence of, or potential for,
extralegal action (civil disobedience or resistance)”520 in the composition of a dialectical environment. To Cover, the growing “presence or
threat of resistance and disobedience” acted to intensify the dialectical
environment in several ways.521 He mentions, for example, that “it operated to bar a formal resolution as ultimately determinative.”522 Additionally, it raised the level of local political intensity, escalating both
repression and antislavery propaganda.523 Acts of resistance further in-

515. Id.
516. See id.
517. Id. Cover observes:
To a large extent, the judge could control what was said in his courtroom. But, he
could not control the public meetings, the demonstrations, and the ideological press.
Nor could he easily ignore them when they were the principal news of the day. The
fugitive slave cases of the 1840’s and 1850’s led to organized, militant representation,
which in the West included direct appeal to the judge as responsible to a morality
above the law.
Id. at 211-12.
518. Id. at 212.
519. Id. at 214.
520. Id. at 211.
521. Id. at 214.
522. Id. Cover adds:
The refusal to abide the results of the formal apparatus was a threat to the viability
of that structure and a direct assertion that the moral values of antislavery were of
higher priority than those underlying fidelity to legal process. On a more personal
level, the readiness of others to go beyond the formal set of obligations was an invitation to the judge to consider his own priorities. The judge, in confronting the resister,
had to be prepared not only to enunciate the law, but also to justify it. In the process
of so doing, he confronted his own doubts and hesitations.
Id.
523.

Cover mentions that strong instances of resistance “may lead to escalation in suppres-
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tensified the reigning moral environment, according to Cover, “by generating a literature exploring the bases for obligation to law.”524 This
literature, he comments, “directly engaged and challenged the protective ‘professional role’ justification for complicity in slavery.”525
Cover also refers to “the sympathetic qualities of the potential victims of injustice.”526 For Cover, the juridical act of envisioning the victim of the Fugitive Slave Acts enabled the judge “to understand,
though not justify, the act of resistance.”527 Without gainsaying judicial
victim-specific empathy toward slave and fugitive, Cover concedes that
“almost every slave” counted as “a sympathetic victim to a man morally opposed to the institution.”528 Nonetheless, he underscores that intuitive sympathy and empathy added to “the general and pervasive
elements of conflict.”529
The dialectical environment of the antebellum period gave rise to
the proposition, heralded by resisters, that “if the moral ends of antislavery were to be served, they would have to be served at the expense
of, or in preference to, the formal obligations of law.”530 Out of this
proposition emerges ideological practices of race-conscious advocacy
and adjudication. Professionalism norms cast grave suspicion on such
practices, especially when discovered in a prosecutorial setting. When
located in that and related legal settings, Cover observes, “the avenues
for traditional representational forms and the prerequisites for traditional respect for the institutional structures” of the law and the state
collapse.531
At first blush, Cover’s historical notion of race-conscious advocacy
and adjudication seems incompatible with the role of the prosecutor in
the federal criminal justice process. Whatever attraction the role and
sion and a further round of asking whether the formal system is indeed worth the cost.” Id. at
214-15.
524. Id. at 215.
525. Id. (footnote omitted). Cover comments: “By taking seriously the explicit judicial excuse of role fidelity, the Garrisonians came up with a widespread demand for resignation.” Id.
In this way, Cover concludes, “they pushed the judge beyond the stage of reiteration of role
definition.” Id.
526. Id. at 211.
527. Id. at 216.
528. Id. Cover explains: “Playing upon the potential for empathy, the abolitionists always
tried to personify the victims; to stress the personal, dire consequences of an impersonal rule; to
relate the victim’s life story; to introduce the familial and vocational context from which he was
torn.” Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 217.
531. Id. at 220.
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function of the antislavery judge might hold in retrospect,532 particularly
in seeking to avoid or to mitigate “harsh moral-formal conflicts,”533 the
contemporary federal prosecutor seems far removed from the imagined role of conciliator. Yet, racial reconciliation serves a crucial policy
function in the prosecutorial maintenance of the criminal justice system. For reconciliation to succeed, it must bring together the stalwart
defenders and active resisters of racist ideology. Like the antislavery
judge-as-regulator, the prosecutor must “depend on his ability to communicate with ideological resisters.”534 He also must address the appropriate audience535 among an array of adversaries, colleagues, courts,
victims, and communities. Performance of this reconceived prosecutorial role demands fidelity to a different set of professional norms. This
differential fidelity enables prosecutors vigorously to engage what
Cover calls the “moral-formal battle” over race.536
D. Racial Norms
Racial norms also may spur the development of prosecutorial
race-conscious duties of community outreach in cases of racially motivated violence. Several sites provide norms. Civil rights law offers a still
evolving antidiscrimination norm. More recently, critical race theory
advances an antisubordination norm. Historically, conservative black
nationalism posits a black fundamentalist norm.537
Consider first the antidiscrimination norm trumpeted in civil rights
law reform. At the core of the antidiscrimination principle lies the axiom of colorblindness. To many, that axiom encourages and tolerates
532. Cover asserts:
The judge confronted the ideological advocate or resister and was a potential
spokesman for the values underlying fidelity to law. He was also in a position to
change the law or, if the formal costs seemed too high, to alleviate its harsh application by manipulating procedural components; by encouraging consensual settlements
or washouts; by nondecision techniques to avoid further doctrinal divergence.
Id. at 223-24.
533. Id. at 224.
534. Id. Cover remarks that information plainly “is not only factual, but also rhetorical.” Id.
On rhetorical grounds, “the eloquence of the judge was a factor to be considered.” Id. Indeed,
the judge “had not only to state the values underlying the formal system that were threatened,
but he had to convince.” Id.
535. Cover notes that the antislavery judge served to advance his regulative function “so
long as he convinced enough people of the intolerable costs to formal values to isolate a relatively helpless, suppressible elite.” Id.
536. Id. at 225.
537. See Manning Marable, Black Fundamentalism: Farrakhan and Conservative Black Nationalism, 39 RACE & CLASS 1, 9-14 (1998).
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subordination, separation, and segregation.538 Indeed, for critics, colorblindness presents a cultural process of white hegemony. Accordingly,
the discursive and material enforcement of a colorblind precept in the
prosecution of race cases indicates a “nested and processual paradigm
of hegemony.”539
Since midcentury, the colorblind paradigm of race-neutral prosecutorial discretion has evolved to become part of the state’s “remedial
responsibility”540 to eradicate race discrimination. Angela Davis delineates a cluster of misleading race-neutral factors commonly deployed in
prosecutorial decisions concerning initial charging and plea bargaining.
Consider first the seriousness of the offense. Neutrality notwithstanding, the assessed gravity of an offense may hinge on the comparative
racial worth of the defendant and the victim.541 Similarly, the defendant’s prior criminal record, including arrests and convictions, may be
infected by discriminatory police policies and practices, such as race
profiles.542 Likewise, the victim’s punitive, deterrent, or retributive interest in prosecution, especially when bolstered by the supplemental
interests of the public, may prove race-susceptible, particularly to the
extent it relies on the evaluation of a defendant’s dangerousness.543 Furthermore, the strength of the evidence, coupled with the likelihood of
conviction, both may depend on the assessment of racial credibility and
preference.544 Finally, the availability of alternative dispositions at sentencing, such as rehabilitation, dictates an estimate of rehabilitative potential that is frequently race-pervaded.545 Even the alternative of resti-

538. See, e.g., David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 729, 748 (1996) (arguing that “color-blindness has become a code word not for inclusion
or integration—words and ideas not heard much lately—but for the separation and segregation
that increasingly characterize American society as we move toward what looks like a developing American apartheid”).
539. Larson, supra note 266, at 1001.
540. Angela Davis insists that prosecutors rightly bear the burden of “remedial responsibility to eliminate racism in the criminal process, even though inappropriate or illegal considerations of race may occur at the arrest stage, often before prosecutorial participation in the process.” Davis, supra note 263, at 31.
541. See id. at 34-35 (arguing that “otherwise legitimate, race-neutral factors” such as the
seriousness of the offense “may be permeated with unconscious racism”).
542. See id. at 37 (contending that the existence of an arrest record for “a black defendant
who lives in a designated ‘high crime’ area . . . . may not reflect relative criminality in black and
white defendants”).
543. Cf. id. at 36 (“[T]he prosecutor may legitimately dismiss the case based on the victim’s
feelings, especially if she believes that the defendant does not pose a danger to society . . . .”).
544. See id. at 34.
545. See id. at 37.
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tution, based on the ability to pay, demonstrates the intersection of
class and race in the criminal justice system. Together, these factors
muster only the pretense of race-neutral prosecutorial discretion.
In contrast, the antisubordination norm emanates from the recognition that people of color inhabit a position of inferiority that permeates the structures of not only politics and economics, but also culture
and society.546 Deeply entrenched, that position materializes in discourse, imagery, and public and private space.547 Discursively articulated in the overt slurs and covert disdain of race-talk, the language of
inferiority crops up in the cultural and social assignment of character
traits associated with natural or learned incompetence and infirmity.548
Semiotically expressed in the cultural artifacts of advertising, the media, and the visual and performing arts, the image of inferiority molds a
way of seeing people of color as morally and even genetically defective.549 Spatially exhibited in the boundaries of segregation, the walls of
prison, and the deprivations of poverty, the concrete fixtures of inferiority shape the dimensions of public and private space.550 Founded to
oppose the discourse, image, and spatial representation of inferiority,
the antisubordination norm may be applied both to expose and to
abolish the trope of inferiority. It also may be used to fashion an alternate vision of color that restores dignity and power to people and
communities of color. Counterposing antidiscrimination and antisubordination norms fails to resolve whether colorblind and colorconscious prosecutions may in fact open up the hegemonic process of
subordination to create transformative opportunities. 551 Often times

546.

See DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE
1880-1996 passim (1997).
547. See THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS passim (1996).
548. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 202-45 (1997) (tracing assignment of racialized cultural myths of
family irresponsibility, economic sloth, and state dependency in the American welfare system).
549. See MAROUF ARIF HASIAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
THOUGHT 51-71 (1996) (discussing the “genetic defectiveness” of people of color); EDWARD J.
LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 155-57 (1995) (describing
racism among southern eugenicists in the 1930s).
550. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994) (asserting that “the position and function of
jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries” promote inequality, specifically racial inequality).
551. See Larson, supra note 266, at 1001. Larson comments that once “hegemonic processes
are conceptually opened to the meaningful contribution of subalterns, it should not be surprising that in some cases subalterns articulate languages of hegemony that constrain the elite,
OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE,
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these opportunities are forged from historic experiences. For example,
as a student at Cornell University in 1969, Carter was an active participant in campus civil rights demonstrations and defended the legitimacy
of such political engagement.552
E. Moral Norms
Moral norms additionally may stoke the development of prosecutorial race-conscious duties of community outreach in cases of racially
motivated violence. The subject of moral norms brings attention to
keenly debated matters of extraprofessional regulation. It also prompts
revisiting the settled formalist separation of law and morality.553 Returning to that separation proffers a choice between intrinsic and extrinsic venues for moral sustenance. An intrinsic choice to embrace the
law itself for moral guidance in defiance of the law/morality separation
relies on the disclosure of moral character. Look, for example, to the
character standards for state bar admission,554 standards that are reiterated in the Model Rules555 and the Model Code.556 These standards prevail despite the often ad hoc and reprehensible application of character
tests.
To search out additional intrinsic sources of moral character, consider the substantive content of legal doctrine. Criminal law doctrine,
for example, reflects a strong substantive commitment to moral val-

rather than merely disputing, reworking, or transforming languages introduced by the politically dominant.” Id. Subalterns, Larson maintains, “may dominate the intellectual field of force
without a conscious struggle.” Id. Yet, though “providing for the contributions of non-elites to a
common cultural hegemony,” he notes that “the concept of struggle is especially problematic in
the field of popular culture.” Id. Indeed, according to Larson, people “do not necessarily see
the ways in which they transform ideas and practices as purposeful contests with a confining
force.” Id.
552. See Firestone, supra note 17, at B2.
553. For a discussion of the Anglo-American jurisprudential roots of the distinction between law and morality, see Morton J. Horwitz, ‘Why Is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?’ 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 581-83 (1997).
554. On moral character as a prerequisite to bar admission, see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral
Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 494-554 (1985); Richard R. Arnold,
Jr., Comment, Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful Conduct: The Danger of Unpredictable Character Standards for Bar Applicants, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 63, 64-68; Maureen M.
Carr, Note, The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to Practice Law: The Move
to More Flexible Admissions Standards, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367, 374-90 (1995).
555. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.1 (1999) (prohibiting attorneys from making false statements).
556. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 DR 1-101(B) (1980)
(citing character as a relevant attribute for qualified admission to the bar).
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ues.557 A like commitment, evidencing a moral or at least theological
disposition, reverberates in the prosecutorial use of religious appeals,
notwithstanding their purported prejudicial effect558 or their applied
ethical asymmetry.559 Because moral claims echo a premodernist
faith,560 they draw objection from separationist and neutrality561 principles. As demonstrated below, that objection shadows the attempt to
practice racial morality and, accordingly, to abide by the antidiscrimination principle in government prosecutorial activity.562
The confrontation of faith, race, and neutrality hinders the search
for an objective moral standpoint in prosecutorial decisionmaking.
Contemplating objectivity in both its weak and strong senses mitigates
the force of this confrontation and may evade the furor over moral
objectivity. Although this distinction may ease the tension between
morality and neutrality, the absence of transcendent possibility and the
prevalence of moral uncertainty hamper any effort to reconfigure the
meaning of objectivity. For R. George Wright, objectivity in a “weak
sense” demands “only something like transcending some particular
specified bias, authoritativeness, a standard external to the decisionmaker whether that standard is authoritative or not, or a matter of
judgment disciplined and constrained by some standard-setting com-

557. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96
MICH. L. REV. 127, 137-44 (1997) (attaching legal moralism to the position that “[m]ost individuals know how to live law-abiding lives without ever consulting their community’s criminal
code . . . . because they assume that the criminal law tracks certain basic moral norms”).
558. See Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se ReversibleError Rule for Prosecutors’ Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital
Cases, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1356-59 (1997) (maintaining that the power of religious arguments is likely to bias a jury against a defendant).
559. See id. at 1379-82 (arguing that prosecutors, but not defense attorneys, should be
barred from making religious arguments).
560. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The
Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1394-1417 (1997) (contending that eighteenthand nineteenth-century legal science presupposed the existence of an objective moral order).
Feldman finds premodernism to be defined by “an abiding faith in nature or God as a stable
and foundational source of meaning and value.” Id. at 1389. Consistent with this faith, Feldman
explains, both discrete individuals and societal groups “seemed to belong to, rather than exist
separately from, nature and God.” Id. Within this “metaphysical unity,” Feldman continues,
“human access to meaning and value always remained immanent in ourselves and in the
world.” Id. Based on this metaphysical logic, “humans seemed capable of directly accessing and
knowing eternal and universal principles that arose from or within nature or God.” Id. at 138990.
561. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY
L.J. 43, 73 (1997) (arguing that “[s]eparation is consistent with substantive neutrality”).
562. See supra notes 301-37 and accompanying text.
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munity rules.”563 In contrast, objectivity in a “strong sense” entails “the
fuller transcending of bias or of mere group conventional norms, or the
transcending and correction of what might be called appearances.”564
To fill the breach in a unified sense of moral objectivity, Alasdair
MacIntyre offers the notion of norm-embedded practice traditions.565
For MacIntyre, practice traditions express normative standards
through narratives.566 Yet neither professional norms nor rules may accommodate personal moral values.567 In fact, the bureaucratic organizational settings and hierarchical work relations predominant in prosecutorial offices render “expectations of moral assertiveness”
unreasonable.568 Nonetheless, significant historical precedent for moral
invocation exists. Segregationists, for example, “engaged in highly discursive strategies of resistance that facilitated continued discrimination
by recreating the way in which the law defined African-Americans.” 569
These strategies recirculate in the modern rhetorical tactic of “substituting abstract classifications of morality for race.”570 In the same way,
the segregationist discursive tendency of “substituting the quality of
blackness for the characteristic of immorality”571 equally “transformed
blacks from the victims of wrong, to the agents of it.”572 The false depiction of Louima as a promiscuous homosexual, with a preference for

563. R. George Wright, Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?,
4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 463, 481 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
564. Id.
565. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187-225 (2d ed. 1984).
566. See id. at 187. MacIntyre remarks:
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends
and goods involved, are systematically extended.
Id.
567. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 20-21 (1997) (exploring tensions between professional norms and
personal moral values in lawyer decisionmaking).
568. Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86
CAL. L. REV. 939, 1012 (1998).
569. Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 405
(1997).
570. Id.
571. Id. at 423.
572. Id.
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rough-and-tumble nightclub sex, rather than as a victim of perverse
police brutality, nicely illustrates this point.
Invoking the ideal of the heroic prosecutor under morality- or
virtue-based norms573 may work simply to refashion race-neutral discourse in order “to disguise racial discrimination as moral reform.”574
The alternative resort to personal moral and religious norms offers
no panacea. Bruce Green points out that personal moral values and
religious beliefs present a double-edged sword—“they have the potential either to ameliorate or to exacerbate the deficiencies of the
professional norms.”575 In an effort to modulate this tension, Green
sketches a middle course remedy—the exercise of moral judgment on
an “ad hoc basis.”576 This course of action, however, fails to guide discretion in the encounter with a legal system rendered unjust by racial
animus or by the pursuit of immoral objectives. Channeling prosecutorial discretion in these circumstances based on ethical duties fashioned from norms rooted in constitutional, citizenship, professionalism, racial, and moral landscapes confronts a battery of objections to
a race-conscious, community-based ethic of prosecutorial discretion.
VI. OBJECTIONS
This Part enumerates four main objections to the proposed raceconscious, community-based ethic of prosecutorial discretion. The
first protests the constitutional incompatibility of race-conscious
standards of prosecutorial discretion under equal protection principles. The second assails the same standards as unworkable, pointing
to the mutability of racial identity and the incoherence of racialized
narratives. The third cites to the expressive or representational harm
inflicted on white-majority communities when governmental prosecutorial action favors minority interests. And the fourth complains of
the injury to voluntary, cross-racial community when prosecutorial

573. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework,
15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 215-54 (1988) (arguing that, beyond acting as a mere adversary, a
prosecutor should perform a “quasi-judicial” function of impartially seeking the truth).
574. Walker, supra note 569, at 423.
575. Green, supra note 567, at 57.
576. Id. at 59. Green adds: “Much as conflicts between professional norms and common
morality might occasion lawyers to reevaluate the professional norms, conflicts between professional norms and personal values might occasion lawyers additionally to reevaluate the relevant personal beliefs; to determine whether their beliefs are clear, fundamental, and deeply
held . . . .” Id. at 59-60 (footnote omitted). For Green, such reevaluation might eventually prod
lawyers “to make a judgment whether to follow conscience or professional norms.” Id.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1246

10/14/99 9:35 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1157

intervention intended to remedy the effects of interracial violence
displaces community-based, citizen-led modes of racial reconciliation.
A. Constitutional Incompatibility
Like state-enacted race-conscious procedures and remedies,
prosecutor-espoused race-conscious standards of discretion strain
against the axioms of liberal jurisprudence and the constitutional tradition of colorblind adjudication. And yet, because of the difficulty in
contemplating “the idea that the legacy of racial injustice can be rectified by ‘color blind’ political policies,”577 color-conscious approaches
to racial inequality persistently resurface in statutory regulation, administrative rule, and judicial decree. Nevertheless, the direction of
contemporary constitutional doctrine in the field of equal protection
runs counter to such approaches. Equal protection principles increasingly condemn race-conscious procedures in the criminal law
area of peremptory challenges while tolerating the invidious posture
of color-coded strikes.578 The same principles rebuke race-conscious
remedies in the arena of capital punishment.579
Applied to the criminal justice system, constitutional objections
to race-conscious procedures and remedies may produce nothing
more than a kind of “procedural republic.”580 But it is unclear
whether this form of government, a byproduct of liberal republican
constitutional theory, would secure what James Fleming and Linda
McClain describe as the basic liberties undergirding the conditions
for self-government: deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.581 For Fleming and McClain, deliberative democracy involves
citizens in the exercise of the capacity to picture “a conception of justice” while “deliberating about the justice of basic institutions and so-

577. Lyons, supra note 187, at 49.
578. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam) (tolerating prosecutorial
use of peremptory challenges to strike two black men appearing in long hair, mustaches, and
beards); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion) (permitting prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to disqualify Spanish-speaking Latinos).
579. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting petitioner’s statistical claim of
racially discriminatory sentencing).
580. James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1997) (reviewing SANDEL, supra note 486, and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)).
581. See id. at 511-12.
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cial policies.”582 Deliberative autonomy, on the other hand, entails
exerting the capacity to imagine “a conception of the good” while
“deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives.”583
To the extent that race-conscious, community-oriented prosecutorial discretion opens up previously segregated public and private
space, it enhances the collective sphere of deliberative democracy
and the individual sphere of deliberative autonomy. Insofar as newfound openness in the political space available for democratic exchange induces race-related forms of speech regulation abutting pretrial and trial narratives, however, spatial desegregation may
encroach on the constitutional freedom of speech. Moreover, while
expanding the boundaries of egalitarian space, such desegregation
may trample constitutionally protected property rights and traditions.584
Out of obedience to a race-conscious mandate, prosecutors may
adopt formal rules or informal habits of self-restriction in charging
decisions, pretrial statements, trial tactics, and sentencing recommendations. Consider, for instance, prosecutorial self-restrictions on
the form and content of trial narratives in race cases or, conversely,
adversarial restrictions on criminal defense narratives in the same set
of cases. Restrictions of either variety likely will spur complaints of
unconstitutional incursions on First Amendment freedoms. Ongoing
legislative and administrative efforts to promulgate such restrictions
in the regulation of hate crimes and hate speech585 encounter precisely
this complaint from those who argue that curbing individual freedom
of expression will thereby inhibit autonomy-based freedoms of selfdetermination and self-realization.586 Common to protests against
anti–hate speech theories founded on critical race theory and feminist antipornography theory,587 this accusation universally assails hate

582. Id. at 511.
583. Id. at 512.
584. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 318-25 (1998)
(evaluating impact of egalitarian republicanism on traditional property rights and allocation).
585. See Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, in 1 HATE
SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HATE SPEECH DEBATE FROM
GROUP LIBEL TO CAMPUS SPEECH CODES at ix, ix-xci (1996).
586. See Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645, 671 (1997) (“The relationship of autonomy to the free speech guarantee is apparent, at least to the degree that autonomy contemplates freedom of inquiry, and the
freedom of self-expression through communication.”).
587. See Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic
Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1508-16 (1996).
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speech and hate crime regulation, even with regard to sentencing enhancement. Constitutional defenders of the First Amendment charge
that “expression that cannot constitutionally be made criminal when
standing alone should not be made the cause of additional punishment simply because of its manifestation during the commission of a
separate crime.”588 That charge introduces the asserted distinction between criminal intent and hateful motive,589 and, by extension, the
democratic dilemma of the well-intentioned speaker whose speech is
harmful.590 For race-conscious prosecutors, the “tragic dilemma” of
protecting freedom of speech “only by sacrificing other important
values” requires moral commitment.591 Honoring even constitutionally based political obligation in the face of “outrageous, deeply entrenched, systematic injustice” bound up in racialized narrative signifies a form of “culpable indifference” and, thus, an expression of
moral failing.592 To dislodge the ingrained presumption of colorblind
obligation impeding prosecutorial moral reasoning demands the formulation of generally applicable standards of racial identity, narrative, and speech restriction.593
B. Unmanageable Standards
The second objection to race-conscious prosecutorial discretion
attacks color-conscious standards of discretion as unworkable,

588. Robert S. Peck, Deciding When Speech Isn’t Speech, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 667, 673 (1993-94) (reviewing FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)). Peck warns that “[t]he First Amendment’s protection of ideas,
speech, and associations—including those that society deems morally contemptible—should
not be limited to preventing these thoughts and utterances from being the basis of a crime; it
should also prevent them from being the basis of additional punishment.” Id.
589. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 333, 363-68 (1991) (discussing the legal distinction between “intent” and “motive”).
590. See Adler, supra note 587, at 1563-65 (critiquing the attempts of scholars Mari Matsuda and Catharine MacKinnon to reconcile the speaker’s intent and the harm to the victim in
examining hate speech and pornography).
591. Heyman, supra note 585, at xv.
592. Lyons, supra note 187, at 48. Lyons draws this conclusion based on the proposition that
“political obligation cannot coexist with significant, systematic injustice that is deeply entrenched.” Id. at 35-36.
593. See id. at 49. Lyons uproots the presumption of political obligation under the leverage
of racial insensitivity. He reasons: “The judgment of those of us who took political obligation
for granted—despite the obvious existence of intolerable, deeply entrenched, systematic injustice against clearly identified groups within our society—was distorted by inadequate sensitivity
to the palpable impact of the oppression, especially on those of color.” Id. at 48.
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pointing to the mutability of racial identity and the incoherence of
racialized narratives. The Louima case shows racial identity shifting
into the mutable categories of color, race, ethnicity, nationality, and
sexuality. It also demonstrates the inconsistency of racialized narrative enunciated by prosecutors, defense attorneys, defendants, victims, and judges. In addition to categorical inconstancy, racial identity and narrative suffer from the redundant inscription of a
white/black dichotomy that is ill-suited to mixed-race classification
and racial gradation across divergent groups and subgroups.594 That
central dichotomy arises in both high- and low-profile trials, though it
seems most pronounced in “criminal trials that have generated intensive and prolonged local media attention.”595
The prosecutorial management of racial identity and narrative
notorious for their protean quality and group divergence596 seems especially onerous in a criminal justice system already burdened by excessive caseloads.597 The further onus of regulatory monitoring and
enforcement shared among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges is doubly vexing, notwithstanding the duty—shared jointly by
attorneys and judges—to report misconduct.598 In fact, reporting generates additional problems of nonuniformity in a decentralized federal and state system of ad hoc disciplinary sanctions. The perception
of bias stemming from evidence of nonuniformity599 should anticipate
no rescue from black judges.600 Nothing in the black judicial role en594. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights
Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 887, 895, 903-06 (1996).
595. Peter L. Arenella, Televising High Profile Trials: Are We Better Off Pulling the Plug?,
37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 879, 882 (1997); see also William L. Howard, Televised Trials: Can
the Government Market Electronic Access?, 49 S.C. L. REV. 55, 56 (1997) (“Not surprisingly,
the expanded television coverage of trials has increased debate over the appropriateness of
procedural safeguards implemented to protect a defendant’s due process right of a fair trial because these same safeguards potentially restrict media access to the court proceeding in violation of First Amendment protection.”) (footnote omitted).
596. See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 2, 127-49 (1995) (describing
judicial difficulties in trying to define membership in, among other things, ethnic or racial
groups).
597. See Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 763-66 (1996).
598. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other
Judges and Lawyers and Its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 755-78,
763-66 (1997).
599. See id. at 782.
600. See THOMAS M. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 63-76 (1979). Uhlman argues that “[b]lack
and white judges differ little in determining both guilt and the punishment a defendant ‘deserves’ for committing a crime . . . .” Id. at 71.
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sures racial justice601 given the paucity of empirical evidence of “systematic behavioral differences between the black and white judicial
elite.”602
The erection of an identity- or narrative-based system of federal
and state sanctions might benefit federalism interests in fostering the
equal protection of people of diverse races.603 To the extent that such
sanctions include victim-compensation schemes, prosecutorial discretion may also advance restitution goals in cases of racial violence.
Here too, however, judicial supervision comes into play.604 Although
not unmanageable, judicial supervision over compensatory sanctions
once more implicates courts in the definition of the political community of race.605 Because identity and narrative derive from and create
racial community, determining the breadth of individual and group
authorship and the protection to be afforded such discursive standing
remains unclear.606
On the basis of the unfinished record in the Louima case, to infer
that sanctionable prosecutorial misconduct in the form of witness coercion or evidence tampering necessarily accompanies a race601. See id. at 63. Uhlman points to the black judicial role as “frequently more than symbolic.” Id. at 63. Discerning “a sensitivity to a variety of inequities observed within their courtrooms,” he observes that “black judges see themselves as educators, reformers, and advocates
for social change.” Id.
602. Id. at 72. Uhlman also states that in “[c]haracterizing the trial bench of a major urban
court, only minor variations distinguish the behavior of black and white judges at the critical
points where guilt is determined and punishment meted out.” Id.
603. For a discussion of the historical interplay of race and federalism, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015 (1997) (exploring race-informed
theories of constitutional federalism).
604. See Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment
Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163, 200 (1998). Commenting on the efficacy of judicial supervision,
Barton observes:
Even where problematic aspects can be parsed out, the law generally fails to deliver
a solution that does anything more than compensate one party for the breach or dissolution of the relationship. The law cannot make children love or respect their parents, inspire a group member to greater institutional commitment, or do much to
prompt more authentic communication between employer and employee. But even
on a behavioral level, effective legal solutions in these contexts would imply a level
of supervision over the relationship which seems impractical or undesirable.
Id.
605. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 534-35 (1997) (discussing the judicial difficulties of defining the legislatively declared borders of political community).
606. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1 (1997) (applying philosophical and legal pragmatism to investigate the moral rights
of authorship and copyright).
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conscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion
proves too much. But coercion, when spurred by community outrage
and racial passion, may prove to be a byproduct of such a decisionmaking model. Long viewed as an “entirely discretionary” matter of
decisionmaking,607 the prosecutorial charging decision, and its undergirding investigation, acquires added weight in the prosecution of interracial crime, whether black-on-white or, as here, white-on-black.
This is not to say that intraracial forms of crime hold no consequence.
In fact, Michael Tonry laments that “a failure by the state to take
crimes by blacks seriously depreciates the importance of victimization of blacks.”608 Here, the charging decision gains even greater importance because it comes at the expense of federal-state jurisdictional redundancy, traditionally favored when the incident invites
both criminal and civil rights prosecutions. The logic of this redundancy, expressed in the availability of successive state criminal and
federal civil rights proceedings, flows from the efficacy and, at times,
necessity of overlapping state-federal prosecutions.609 Although federal prosecution may harbor distinct advantages over parallel state
prosecution in evidentiary and remedial matters, it seems unclear
whether race cases may easily succumb to common federal “managerial strategies of rationalization”610 and, moreover, whether such cases
may effectively accommodate the constraints on federal courts in the
management of caseloads, procedures, and institutional resources.
C. Expressive and Representational Harm
The third objection to race-conscious prosecutorial discretion refers to the expressive or representational harm inflicted on whitemajority communities when governmental prosecutorial action favors

607. Angela Davis explains that prosecutorial discretion survives independently of the doctrinal predicate of probable cause. Even with evidence of probable cause, Davis remarks, “the
prosecutor may decide to dismiss the case and release the suspect.” Davis, supra note 263, at
21. Alternatively, Davis adds, the prosecutor may “file a charge that is either more or less serious than that recommended by the police officer, as long as there is probable cause to believe
the suspect committed the crime.” Id. at 21-22.
608. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 50 (1995).
609. Similar claims of efficacy and necessity advance the argument for redundant prosecution in the federal system. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution
Phenomenon in the Federal System, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 628-40 (1995) (discussing sources of repeat prosecution in the federal system).
610. WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 123 (1990).
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minority interests, as sometimes found in racial gerrymandering. The
theory of expressive or representational harm applies equally to
white-majority and black-minority communities, though the focal
point here leans toward the meaning or expectation of harm experienced by the dominant racial group. Race-conscious prosecutorial action that favors minority interests invites objection not simply because of the threatened risk of community stigma harm,611 and the
correlative danger of the internalization of and conformity to that
concept of harm,612 but also because of the threatened loss of public
faith in government.613
Extracted from Christine Desan’s study of the early American
republic, the notion of public faith is crucial to the testing of a raceconscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion.
Desan’s study reveals that public faith in the early republic emerged
from “the need to maintain a viable political community—a matter
effectuated by politics in its narrow sense, but gauged as well by public actors’ ability to ensure the public credit and to maintain, at least
minimally, the broader public’s recognition and its continued participation in the life of the colony.”614 In the Louima case, the instant
objection speaks to the issue of public faith and the consequences of
its perceived loss. On this criticism, loss of public faith follows from
611. By community stigma harm, I mean the cultural marking of “outsiders.” The demarcation of a group or a community as an unwanted other denies a sense of belonging. See RUTH
FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
WHITENESS 191-235 (1993); cf. Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear Itself: A Social-Psychological
Model of Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REV. 452, 475-82 (1997) (discussing stigma in the context of environmental contamination of property). With respect to the
effects of stigma, Geisinger notes:
[A]lthough it is possible that a contamination event may endure much longer at a
community level than at a state or national level, it is also very likely that the stigma
associated with any event may be temporary, and proof of this may itself be the most
difficult obstacle to prevailing on a stigma damage claim.
Id. at 494. For a further discussion of stigma harm, see Eric S. Schlichter, Comment, Stigma
Damages in Environmental Contamination Cases: A Possible Windfall for Plaintiffs?, 34
HOUSTON L. REV. 1125 (1997) (challenging damage claims that allege stigma by proximity to
contaminated property).
612. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2457-61
(1997).
613. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in
the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390, 1481-94 (1998). Desan adds that
historically relevant “terminology evoked the idea of trusteeship that Americans had used to
define the legislative role.” Id. at 1482. To Desan, this “image sanctified the responsibility that
representatives owed to their constituents: they had to enforce, indeed exemplify, norms of
right and justice.” Id.
614. Id. at 1483.
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Carter’s asserted failure to fulfill the obligations of colorblind government. Cast here as a kind of prosecutorial representative of national government, Carter’s highest obligation purportedly runs to
the preservation of a viable political community. Viability, on this
reasoning, depends on white-majority participation in the life of that
community.
Like the harm attributed to excess state speech regulation,615 the
injury of expressive and representational harm may escape individual
display. Instead, generalized to community, it may better resemble a
process injury resulting from unwieldy state intervention. In this
sense, the public and private distinction often separating individual
and common realms of interest bears less relevance here.616 More
compelling in this case is the implicit claim of contractual breach in
the government covenant of equal citizenship. By contractualizing
“human moral and political relationships”617 and staking its legitimacy
on popular consent and sovereignty, liberal theory produces the
“perverse effect” of inflicting expressive and representational harm
upon white-majority communities unfavored by prosecutorial discretion, while stoking “the fires of racism with resentment and hostility
toward the ‘favored,’” and, thus, reinforcing “racist stereotypes.”618
D. Voluntary, Cross-Racial Community
The fourth and last objection to race-conscious, communityoriented prosecutorial discretion complains of the injury to voluntary, cross-racial community when prosecutorial intervention intended to remedy the effects of interracial violence is favored over
alternative community-based, citizen-led modes of racial reconciliation. Wedded to the normative value of individual and collective action, this objection enlarges the concept of autonomy beyond claims
of legal right619 and political deliberation620 to embrace the mission of

615. Richard Abel contends that state speech regulation fails to silence harmful speech and
instead perversely “encourages, valorizes, and publicizes it, transforming offender into victim
and offense into romantic defiance or fundamental right.” RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING
RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 244 (1998).
616. See Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 47, 59 (1997) (discussing the “schism between a public realm of equality, inclusivity, and
common interest, and a private realm of difference, exclusivity, and individual will”).
617. Stephen Mulhall, Promising, Consent, and Citizenship: Rawls and Cavell on Morality
and Politics, 25 POL. THEORY 171, 192 (1997).
618. THOMAS POWELL, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA 302 (1992).
619. See John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Can the Right to Autonomy Be Resusci-
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collective diversity.621 Espousing that mission, the objection offers a
narrative of community and national unity.622 Like the meaning of
citizenship,623 the meaning of community “membership” is frequently
contested.624 Central to this contest are the issues of inclusion and exclusion. Describing the “distinctively American struggle for equal
membership in the political community,”625 Keith Bybee refuses to
reduce the struggle over community membership to “fixed categories
of inclusion and exclusion.”626 To Bybee, “the politics of representation is constitutive in nature, drawing on competing notions of whom
‘the people’ are and turning on questions of how self-government
ought to be achieved.”627
Explicating community membership and self-government under
pluralist628 and deliberative629 conceptions of democracy reveals seritated After Glucksberg?, 69 COLO. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) (cataloguing scholarly “attempt[s]
to justify the autonomy of the individual to engage in certain acts free from state strictures”).
620. See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1,
6-56 (1995).
621. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 765 (1997) (arguing that diversity “has no inherent meaning and cannot be
a compelling interest unless we ask the prior question: diversity to what purpose?”).
622. See HENRY A. GIROUX, FUGITIVE CULTURES: RACE, VIOLENCE, AND YOUTH (1996).
Commenting on narratives of national identity, Giroux writes:
[N]ational identity is structured through a notion of citizenship and patriotism that
subordinates ethnic, racial, and cultural differences to the assimilating logic of a
common culture, or, more brutally, the “melting pot.” Behind the social imaginary
that informs this idea of national identity is a narrowly defined conception of history
that provides a defense of the narratives of imperial power and dominant culture and
legitimates an intensely narrow and bigoted image of what it means to be an American.
Id. at 190.
623. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 3-23
(1995).
624. See Keith J. Bybee, Essentially Contested Membership: Racial Minorities and the Politics of Inclusion, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 469, 471 (1997) (“Too often the struggle for inclusion in
the community of citizens is recounted without devoting much attention to what counts as inclusion in the first place.”).
625. Id.
626. Id. at 472.
627. Id. (“To understand the development of American citizenship it is not enough simply
to keep track of insiders and outsiders, for it is within representational politics that the conundrums of membership are posed and resolved.”).
628. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
83 (1985) (explaining that “the notion of a distinctive common good becomes tyrannical or
mystical” under the pluralist understanding of politics and governance); see also Richard A.
Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for
Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1433-45 (1997). Primus explains that “an interestbased conception of democracy views institutions of government as forums in which attorneylike representatives try to advance the interests of the particular constituencies they represent.”
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ous and enduring barriers to cross-racial communication and consensus.630 Communication through the traditional forum of public debate
may in fact either distort racial identity and narrative or reinforce racially deformed conceptions of identity and narrative.631 Moreover,
consensus itself may prove impossible without a sense of cross-racial
citizenship. In cases of racially motivated violence, that sense of citizenship very well may serve as a basic “precondition of criminal liability.”632
The proliferation of sects, subgroups, and subcommunities,633
documented in a growing constitutional literature,634 poses the addiPrimus, supra, at 1433. This conception of interest-based democracy, he notes, “tends to view
human nature as atomistic.” Id. The conception “says little about how preferences are formed,”
and moreover, “is skeptical about whether there can exist a public interest distinct from the
aggregated interests of individuals.” Id.
629. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A
NEW AGE 150-55 (1984); Primus, supra note 628, at 1445. Primus indicates that deliberative
conceptions of democracy urge “a more dynamic view of decisionmaking.” Primus, supra note
628, at 1445. This view “imagines people coming to their opinions through a process of discussion with others,” rather than through a decisionmaking process arrived at “by aggregations of
individuals whose interests and preferences are formed and fixed in advance.” Id.
630. Sunstein notes that “social, political, and economic inequalities will have significant
consequences for the potential of rational deliberation.” Sunstein, supra note 628, at 84. Indeed, for Sunstein, “a deliberative politics is an imperfect guarantee of public-regarding outcomes.” Id.
631. See R. Richard Banks, The Political Economy of Racial Discourse, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 217, 237-38 (1997) (reviewing HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING:
CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES (1995)). Banks argues that public
dialogue about racial issues, however celebrated, “may neither further participation in democratic self-government nor promote the discovery of truth to the extent that many would like to
believe.” Id. at 244 (footnote omitted). Such racial dialogue, according to Banks, “may promote the illusion that public debate is free from racial bias and equally open to members of all
groups.” Id. In reality, because “prevailing attitudes about black Americans may serve to limit
speech that questions racial assumptions,” public and private dialogue “may not lead to truth.”
Id. Unfortunately, “conversation may indirectly reinforce underlying assumptions about race
and racial differences.” Id. As a consequence, critical “[i]deas that contradict the widely held
assumptions that frame public debate may never be heard.” Id.
632. R. A. Duff, Law, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal Liability,
18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 202 (1998). Duff also adds:
[O]ne account of the moral conditions of the obligation to obey the law, and of being
answerable through the courts, is expressed in terms of community. The defendant is
obligated to obey the law in virtue of his membership of a community whose law it is;
and he is answerable through the courts to his fellow members of the community for
his alleged breaches of that law. . . . [This account raises] questions about the conditions for the existence, and for membership, of a community of the appropriate kind.
Id. at 197.
633. See Jonathan Boyarin, Note, Circumscribing Constitutional Identities in Kiryas Joel,
106 YALE L.J. 1537, 1554-59 (1997).
634. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 8-16, 57-82 (1996) (discussing how the U.S. Constitution enhances the rights of sub-
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tional barrier of tolerance toward diversity and plurality.635 Here, calls
for tolerance extend to community self-governance and selfactualization.636 Yet, however isolated the community, selfgovernance inevitably must impinge on state demands of normative
integration. Because integration involves coercion,637 the liberal ideal
of state neutrality comes under strain.638 More than the differential
application of state power to voluntary as compared to fortuitous associations, the key to the objection at hand concerns statecommanded group or community coercion.
Gerald Frug recommends curing coercion through the nurturing
process of “community building.”639 In cases of racially motivated
violence, as here, community-building also requires a politics of identification. Formulated originally in the work of Regina Austin,640 the
politics of identification guides the transformative reconstitution of
communities of color under a framework of common experience and

communities in the context of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet); Martha Minow, The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 8-17
(1995) (same).
635. See Veit Bader, The Cultural Conditions of Transnational Citizenship: On the Interpretation of Political and Ethnic Cultures, 25 POL. THEORY 771, 774 (1997) (arguing that neither republican nor pluralist models of civil society require “ethnic-cultural assimilation as a
precondition for integration into the political community”).
636. See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1141
(1998) (arguing that “political perfectionists should be allowed the opportunity to govern themselves in some sub-federal sovereigns so they can self-actualize in accordance with their views
of what self-actualization requires”).
637. Jonathan Boyarin points out that “[t]he term ‘sect,’ even where it is not pejorative,
focuses on the feature of individual belief and occludes the genealogical dynamic, while ‘subgroup’ and ‘subcommunity’ imply ‘outsider’ status.” Boyarin, supra note 633, at 1559. As such,
Boyarin suggests, “these categories draw subtly coercive circles.” Id.
638. See Colin M. Macleod, Liberal Neutrality or Liberal Tolerance?, 16 LAW & PHIL. 529,
530 (1997) (asserting that “[e]mbracing neutrality has . . . generated significant tensions within
liberal theory”).
639. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 36 (1998). Frug denies that his
use of the term “community” intends “to invoke the romantic sense of togetherness often generated by the image of cities as voluntary associations.” Id. By his usage, the term instead refers
“to the experience, characteristic of fortuitous associations, of being part of a group composed
of people different from oneself.” Id. Frug postulates that the goal of community building is “to
increase the capacity of all metropolitan residents—African American as well as white, gay as
well as fundamentalist, rich as well as poor—to live in a world filled with those they find unfamiliar, strange, even offensive.” Id.
640. See Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1799-1817 (1992) (describing ways in which members of the
black community engage in informal and occasionally illegal economic activity as a form of
community development).
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struggle.641 The goal of that struggle is community empowerment in
law, politics, and economic development. Expanding this framework,
Lisa Crooms maintains that the politics of identification demands
that the black community “reconstitute itself according to community-developed criteria” that may fall outside mainstream norms and
conventions.642
Part of this reconstitution may obtain from voluntary, local, citizen-led modes of racial reconciliation. Like community forms of
charity, alternative modes of racial reconciliation may belong more
properly to individuals and groups than to state entities and enterprises.643 The chances of reconciliation hinge on racial empathy and
forgiveness. Stephen Morse points out that the “capacity for empathy
is not the sort of characteristic one can easily ‘work on’ and alter.”644
But forgiveness, having earned a place in criminal justice sentencing
systems,645 affords more hope. Indeed, the criminal justice system
concedes the prosecutorial role in dispensing “institutional or official
forgiveness.”646
Talk of voluntary, cross-racial community and reconciliation
may amount to nothing more than folly given private market forces647
and American populist histories.648 Although specific to the context of
late–nineteenth century political culture, the racial tensions and po-

641. See Lisa A. Crooms, Stepping into the Projects: Lawmaking, Storytelling, and Practicing the Politics of Identification, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (1996) (remarking that “marginalization provides a common experience that binds virtually all Black people across lines of class,
sex, ethnicity and sexual orientation”).
642. Id. at 9.
643. See Jennifer Roback Morse, The Modern State as an Occasion of Sin: A Public Choice
Analysis of the Welfare State, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 531, 541-48 (1997)
(analyzing the moral relationship between donors and donees in a welfare state).
644. Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,
61 (1997).
645. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Role of Forgiveness in Criminal Sentencing, 27
SETON HALL L. REV. 980, 1019-20 (1997) (arguing that the “criminal justice delivery system
should set an example for society, assist to condition citizens to desire progress, guide them to
seek positive healing results, and not remain mired in hatred or their dark desire for revenge”).
646. Id. at 1020.
647. The history of segregation in interstate commerce and transportation suggests that private-market entities may revert to bias without outside state intervention. See Joseph R. Palmore, Note, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim Crow: Race, Transportation, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878-1946, 83 VA. L. REV. 1773, 1815-16 (1997).
648. Both nineteenth- and twentieth-century populist movements adhered to the doctrine
of white supremacy. See MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 14-15, 23-24, 40-41, 227-42 (1995).
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litical limits of that era649 endure, giving shape to the unruly conceptions of community-based, popular justice current today.650 This decayed conception, together with the objections of constitutional incompatibility,
practical
unmanageability,
expressive
and
representational harm, and compromised voluntary, cross-racial
community dim the prospects of promoting a race-conscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion.
CONCLUSION
The daunting prospects confronting the instant race-conscious
model of prosecutorial discretion under the above objections in no way
halts the advance of the larger project underway here. My hope in undertaking this series of case studies is to convince the bar and bench to
reconsider the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors in racially and politically charged cases like the assault of Abner Louima, and moreover,
to persuade interdisciplinary scholars of American law and society to
comprehend the importance of integrating theory and practice in their
analysis of both high- and low-profile race cases. In these interlocking
ways, the Article may contribute to a greater understanding of the
place of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and ethics.
To facilitate this contribution, consider an outline of strategic maneuvers potentially capable of overtaking some of the objections enumerated here. Outside of the magical “creation of metaphysical entities
that make certain worldly events come out the way one desires,”651 the
reigning metaphysics of colorblind, race-neutral prosecutorial discretion seems certain never to deliver racial harmony to American law
and society. The deliverance of harmony requires something more than
an aspirational metaphysics to succeed. To the extent that law repre-

649. See PETER H. ARGERSINGER, THE LIMITS OF AGRARIAN RADICALISM: WESTERN
POPULISM AND AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (1995) (asserting that “[p]opulist decisions and actions,
if not completely determined, were definitely limited” by the cultural and structural components of political context).
650. See Timothy Lenz, Popular Law and Justice, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 387, 387 (1996) (explicating the contemporary populist challenge to the autonomy of courts and the separation of
law from politics).
651. Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427,
437 (1997) (reasoning that to “engage in magical thinking, one simply posits a thought that will
make things come out the way one desires and one then affirms that the thought is or refers to
something that is ontologically real and ontologically effective”).
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sents “a concrete social form embedded in institutional practices,”652
the practical reform of racialized law and sociolegal practices warrants
a project more boldly prescriptive than the cryptonormative653 style
routinely assailed by postmodernist scholarship.654
The project of fashioning a race-conscious, community-oriented
model of prosecutorial discretion requires integrating the considerations of racial identity, racialized narrative, and interracial community into the function of federal and state prosecution. That function
applies to the prosecutorial decisionmaking process as a whole. At
the outset of each case, from the charging decision on, prosecutors
must look to evidence of racial identity and racialized narrative, and
moreover to the potential for community protection and mobilization. The Louima case embroils racial identity both as to color and
alienage. It also involves racialized narrative in the use of racial slurs.
Additionally, it implicates community, both black and immigrant.
Applied to the Louima case, the function of federal and state prosecution properly expands to protect communities of color against police brutality and to mobilize those communities around the norms of
racial dignity, equality, and justice.
But more than the charging decision is at stake. Once the decision to charge arises, prosecutors next must look at the reallocation
of investigative and trial resources. From charging and institutional
resources, prosecutors also must turn to the nature of pretrial publicity and the related discursive issues concerning narrative tactics in
trial strategy. These issues encompass narrative content in opening
statements, direct- and cross-examination, objections, expert testimony, and closing argument. They extend as well to sentencing recommendations.
The inquiry does not end there. Reconfiguring the charging decision, reallocating institutional resources, and reconceiving the narrative purpose of the criminal trial and the sentencing process are not

652. Id. at 440.
653. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 215, 263 (1997) (reviewing DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA
(John D. Caputa ed., 1997)).
654. Postmodern scholars denounce traditional legal scholarship for its prescriptive style, a
style that is manifested in both overtly normative and covertly cryptonormative forms. See
Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43
STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 801 (1991).
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enough. The prevention of identity-based violence dictates police
training and community outreach. The goal of outreach should be to
establish monitoring, compliance, and enforcement structures within
communities of color. Community work, undertaken in collaboration
with local churches, community centers, and schools, offers a starting
point for this prosecutorial project.
To be sure, the very act of imagining such a project implies that
the law and legal agents are susceptible to racial reason and to normative persuasion. The goodness of well-placed normative intention,
however, fails to answer how the application of racial reason and normative persuasion will resolve the enigmatic qualities of racial identity
and narrative, even without the added complexity of criminal and civil
adversarial proceedings. It also leaves uncertain the practical utility of
critical race theory, intimating that the development of an alternative
race-conscious community approach to the prosecution of cases incited
by racially motivated violence may fall outside of a single theoretical
school. Nonetheless, any approach will pose the stubborn challenge of
theoretical integration and practical application. Hard fought and perpetually resisted, integration of this sort involves the painstaking work
of continuing the critical race theory–led effort to formulate an analysis
of the role of the modern state in constituting the subordinate public
and private status of people of color.
Extending that analysis in the instant context of the criminal justice system dictates the ongoing investigation of the relationship between the state prosecutorial function, racial ideology, and the sociolegal order. As the Louima case illustrates, the state prosecutorial
function contains both entrenched and transformative ideologies.
Channeling that function to articulate or rearticulate transformative
racial ideology linked to the “creation of new identities, new racial
meanings, and a new collective subjectivity” entails a political project
advanced in conjunction with an oppositional movement.655 In this regard, Michael Omi and Howard Winant explain that the attempted

655. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 90
(2d ed. 1994). Omi and Winant add that “disorganization of the dominant racial ideology, the
construction of a new set of racial meanings and identities, the transition from political project
to oppositional movement, is a complex, uneven process, marked by considerable instability
and tension.” Id. at 90-91. Although change may be demanded, they argue that “any change in
the system of racial meanings will affect all groups, all identities.” Id. at 91. They stress that
rising up to challenge “the dominant racial ideology inherently involves not only reconceptualizing one’s own racial identity, but a reformulation of the meaning of race in general. To challenge the position of blacks in society is to challenge the position of whites.” Id.

ALFIERI TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

10/14/99 9:35 AM

PROSECUTING RACE

1261

“rearticulation of pre-existing racial ideology is a dual process of disorganization of the dominant ideology and of construction of an alternative, oppositional framework.”656
Conceiving the prosecutorial function as a political project dedicated both to dismantling hierarchical structures of racial identity and
narrative, and to building oppositional forms of advocacy that liberate
subordinate images and discourses, pushes prosecutors into a model of
community participation. Here the community at stake travels far outside local boundaries to countenance a historical community connected
by common issues of racially subordinated identity and narrative.
Relevant models of community participation may be found in prior instances of identity-based criminal violence, even when confounded by
the crosscutting categories of race, ethnicity, and gender that reflect the
individual and group diversity of color.657 The failure to recognize the
historical intersection of gender, ethnicity, and class658 in race cases
permits the continued manipulation of stereotypical images “in the
service of political or economic expediencies.”659
Ending the state manipulation of stereotypical imagery demands a
study of race as a political and cultural project. In the Louima case, this
overlapping project involves a process of sociolegal reimagination specific to the black male body. For Michael Uebel, undertaking a recasting of the signifying male body introduces “a political enterprise, aimed
at producing new solidarities and exposing the bounds of the dominant
and ‘normal’ as fragile and subject to revision.”660 Recasting directs the
mapping of identities in terms antagonistic to “colonial fantasy and the
iconography of racial masculine bodies.”661 From this mapping, theoretical models may emerge “that are aimed at supplanting reductive

656. Id. at 89.
657. See Jenny Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies: Models for Community Participation, 50 ME. L. REV. 283, 294 (1998) (asserting that “Latinas recognize that in order to actualize participatory representation of women and the Latino community generally, Latinas must
develop community-based organizations and entities that allow for intragroup discourse by different Latina subgroups”).
658. See Hope Lewis, Global Intersections: Critical Race Feminist Human Rights and Inter/national Black Women, 50 ME. L. REV. 309, 319 (1998) (pointing to legal literature that
“overlooks the roles that race, ethnicity, class, and gender play in the experiences of Black female immigrants”).
659. Id.
660. Uebel, supra note 220, at 7.
661. Id.
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accounts of identity formation at the intersection of race and masculinity.”662
The Louima case illustrates the performative intersection of race
and masculinity. In demonstrating that the identity categories of race,
sexuality, and nationality may be readily “defined less as fixed identities rooted in bodies, normative sexuality, nature, or geography, and
more as dynamic and dramatic modes, the sum of one’s cultural practices,”663 the Louima assault shows that the cultural politics of race and
masculinity play out in the sociolegal context of the criminal and civil
justice systems. The play of racial masculinities in the Louima case
highlights the “dynamic modes of cultural practice” in legal advocacy
and adjudication.664 Evidence of this dynamic, divulged in “shifting, repeating sets of performances” with no “fixed or essential subject category,”665 compels the investigation of white/black masculinity “as a revisionary process, a constitutive performance”666 that inscribes race and
masculinities within the cultural politics of performativity.667 The juridical inscription of racial and masculine subjectivities in the Louima case
through the contextualized performance of criminal and civil advocacy
constitutes a “politics of representation” that manufactures its own social and political existence.668
Confronting the harsh reality of that racially oppressive and segregated existence, and its animating politics of legal representation,
commences a gradual process of ethical positioning for prosecutors,
victims, and communities of color.669 This process involves the move
toward the prosecutorial exercise of race-conscious, communityoriented ethical judgment accompanied by joint victim/community acts
of moral solidarity. In these ethical moments,670 prosecutor, victim, and

662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. See id.
668. Id.
669. See id. at 11. Uebel explains that racial masculine identities “describe a process of positioning: they name the ways raced men position themselves in relation to the past that has
shaped them and to the future they will shape.” Id. For Uebel, such identities “possess a history, but also the power to perform, or transform, that history.” Id. Transforming that history,
he adds, indeed the very “power of transformation, the ways in which power is exercised or undermined, and the choices power necessitates and depends upon, all require a postulation of
what ought to be, a recognition of the obligation the future places on the individual subject.” Id.
670. See id. Uebel asserts:
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community collectively acknowledge that the discursive and symbolic
systems of meaning that configure race, sex, class, and nation may be
constructed and deconstructed by the force of human agency.671 Here,
deconstruction refers to the contest over the performative space in law
and legal advocacy where identity categories become constituted.672
Unsurprisingly, the construction and negotiation of identity brokered
in this space occurs “against a complex historical matrix of alterities,
against a web of differences” signified by race, class, gender, and sexual
orientation.673
Admittedly, the notion of state-sponsored prosecution may fit uneasily with egalitarian forms of interracial community-building. But the
political project at issue here depends on the reconfiguration of state
prosecutorial power applied throughout widely divergent communities
of color.674 Properly channeled to shape racial consciousness in a way
that eradicates hierarchical images of racial identity and narrative,675
prosecutorial initiatives at both federal and state levels may forge
bonds between victims of racial violence and their communities. The
strength of those bonds rests on the inclusive breadth of community676
and the ability to instill a common sense of mutual victim/community
obligation.677
Certainly the activist presence of the state in the company of the
other—victim or community—may cause ambivalence and even fear.678
If the categories race and masculinity crucially depend upon the dialectics of what is
(bodies, the other, the past) and what will be or what is in process (desire, performance, the future), then we cannot, and ought not, disengage our readings of racial
masculinities from an attention to the responsibilities and commitments demanded in
the ethical moment.
Id.
671. See id.
672. See id.
673. Id. at 12.
674. See Joseph Erasto Jaramillo, Comment, The Community-Building Project: Racial Justice Through Class Solidarity Within Communities of Color, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 195, 233-42 (1997)
(discussing the challenge of linking the disparate interests of various communities of color).
675. See id. at 239. Jaramillo remarks that “[t]o summon and forge obligations that bind
people within a larger community of color across class lines, local communities of color,
whether they be neighborhoods, professional organizations, community-based organizations,
churches, or youth organizations, need to ‘identify’ with each other in a meaningful way.” Id.
676. See id. at 240 (advocating efforts to create a “larger community of color” that is more
inclusive and more sensitive to the interests of the most disadvantaged).
677. See id. (urging “‘community-building’ in a way that forges stronger bonds and feelings
of mutual obligation among people of color across socioeconomic divisions”).
678. Uebel remarks: “In the presence of the other, the subject is intensely ambivalent, poised
between desire and fear, incitement and interdiction, mastery and anxiety.” Uebel, supra note
220, at 5-6.
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Still, state-sanctioned community-building no longer appears utopian,
even in marginalized collectivities, such as gay and lesbian communities679 or communities of color.680 To be sure, some political philosophers, like David Lyons, seem unpersuaded that such collectivities can
muster an effective challenge to institutionalized forms of injustice. Indeed, Lyons questions the societal potential for the development of
collective action “calculated to overcome the significant, deeply entrenched, systematic injustice that remains.”681 The vivid “memories of
oppression”682 evoked by reflection on the historical struggle over the
wielding of prosecutorial power against people of color and native
peoples683 merely reinforces this sense of despair. For communities of
color, prosecutorial forms of insurgence may prove too romantic a vision of state violence.

679. See COMSTOCK, supra note 293, at 10-14, 25-30 (describing forms of political organizing in gay and lesbian communities).
680. See Amy Waldman, Diallo Case Tests Bronx Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at
B1 (noting that the Bronx district attorney Robert T. Johnson tries to maintain “a strong bond
with his constitutents” and “attends countless community events”).
681. Lyons, supra note 187, at 49.
682. JOSEPH TILDEN RHEA, RACE PRIDE AND THE AMERICAN IDENTITY 126 (1997). Because of “memories of past oppression,” Rhea asserts that “many may feel marginal even
among populations which respect and value their heritage.” Id. He acknowledges the open
question as to “whether minority groups can simultaneously assert their memories of oppression and also feel at home with the majority.” Id. at 126-27. Accordingly, he concludes, “[i]f
minority identities are to be other than oppositional, minorities themselves will have to grapple
with the anxieties and fears that their past oppression can easily inspire.” Id. at 127.
683. See JOHN WILLIAM SAYER, GHOST DANCING THE LAW: THE WOUNDED KNEE
TRIALS 217-32 (1997) (viewing conviction of Native American activists for their actions during
the 1973 Wounded Knee uprising as a “retelling” of the history of whites and Native Americans).

